<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topicality</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congo Affirmative & Negative

| Coaching Guide | 20 |
| Index | 21 |
| Evidence | 22 |

Democracy Promotion DA & Answers

| Coaching Guide | 66 |
| Index | 67 |
| Evidence | 68 |

Spending DA & Answers

| Coaching Guide | 98 |
| Index | 99 |
| Evidence | 100 |

NATO Counter Plan & Answers

| Coaching Guide | 124 |
| Index | 126 |
| Evidence | 127 |

Borders K & Answers

| Coaching Guide | 172 |
| Index | 173 |
| Evidence | 174 |
TOPICALITY
INDEX

1NC Shells
Establish = To Make Firm  4
Establish = To Create  5
Foreign Policy  6
Substantially  7
Increasing  8
Support of  9
Peace Keeping Operations  10

Extension Definitions
Establish  11
Foreign Policy  13
Substantially  14
Increasing  15
Support  16
Peacekeeping  17
INC Shell: Establish means to make firm

A. NEGATIVE INTERPRETATION: Establish means to sure up and make firm.
   Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
   3 a : to make firm or stable

B. VIOLATION: The Affirmative creates a foreign policy substantially increasing support for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

C. STANDARDS:

1. Fair Ground: The negative interpretation provides the affirmative plenty of ground by allowing cases that make firm a foreign policy that increases support of UN peacekeeping operations, grounded in the literature. This best protects negative ground because it prevents the affirmative from creating new peacekeeping missions in new countries or in new capacities which would explode the topic.

2. Predictability: Creating a new foreign policy is unpredictable because it allows the affirmative to think up new missions for peacekeepers.

3. Bright line: The negative interpretation creates a clear distinction between affirmative and negative ground. The affirmative can only make firm foreign policy increasing support of UN peacekeeping operations.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of education and competitive equity.
INC Shell: Establish means to create

A. NEGATIVE INTERPRATATION: Establish means to create:
   Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003  
   4 a : to bring into existence: FOUND

B. VIOLATION: The affirmative does not create a new foreign policy increasing support of UN peacekeeping operations.

C. STANDARDS:
   1 FAIR GROUND: The negative interpretation preserves DA uniqueness and counter plan ground by forcing the affirmative to do something new. Otherwise, the affirmative will just add a few troops or dollars to current missions and say our DA’s are non unique.

   2 BRIGHTLINE: The negative interpretation provides a clear bright line between what is affirmative and negative ground. Only new foreign policies increasing support of UN peacekeeping operations are topical. The policies that already exist are negative ground.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of education and competitive equity.
INC Shell: Foreign Policy

A. Negative Interpretation: Foreign Policy is not domestic policy.
   Retrieved from Dictionary.com
   http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=foreign%20policy
   WordNet ® 1.6, © 1997 Princeton University
   foreign policy
   n : a policy governing international relations

B. Violation: The Affirmative establishes a domestic law and does not establish a foreign policy.

C. Standards:

1. Fair Ground: The Affirmative interpretation explodes the topic. Allowing any change in domestic law opens the floodgates to any US domestic law. Our interpretation allows for plenty of cases

2. Predictability: It’s impossible to predict what domestic law the Affirmative would change, making debate unfair because the Negative could never come to the debate prepared.

3. Bright line: The Negative Interpretation provides a clear bright line defining what is affirmative and negative ground.

4. They Justify Effects Topicality which is illegitimate: Any domestic law could eventually effect US foreign policy on UN peacekeeping operations. This makes the topic limitless and destroys competitive equity.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of education and competitive equity.
**INC Shell: Substantially means to a great extent**

A. Negative Interpretation: Substantially means to a great extent of degree.  
   Source: *WordNet® 1.6, © 1997 Princeton University*  
   **substantially**  
   adv 1: to a great extent or degree; "I'm afraid the film was well over budget"; "painting the room white made it seem considerably (or substantially) larger"; "the house has fallen considerably in value"; "the price went up substantially"  
   [syn: well, considerably] 2: in a strong substantial way; "the house was substantially built"

B. Violation: The affirmative plan is only a small increase in support of UN peacekeeping operations.

C. Standards:
   1. Fair Limits: Our interpretation allows for a fair number of affirmative cases while eliminating cases that only give a dollar, send a troop and/or declare support.
   2. Fair Ground: The negative interpretation preserves disadvantage and counter plan ground by forcing the affirmative to make more than a minor increase in support of UN peacekeeping operations.
   3. Each word is key: A true understanding of the resolution can only come from an examination of the words in the sentence. The affirmative moots out the word substantially.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of competitive equity and education.
1NC Shell: Increasing, to make greater

A. Negative Interpretation: Increase means to make greater
   Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
   http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=increasing
   Main Entry: increase
   Inflected Form(s): increased, increasing
   1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

B. Violation: The Affirmative does not establish a foreign policy increasing support of UN Peacekeeping operations. They either leave things the same, transfer support from area to another or decrease support.

C. Standards:
   1. Fair Limits: The negative interpretation fairly limits the topic by allowing cases that only make greater US support of UN peacekeeping operations while eliminating cases that merely transfer from one area to another or actually decrease US support for UN peacekeeping operations. Their interpretation risks a bi-directional topic which would make it impossible for the negative to compete.
   2. Fair Ground: Actual increases in support are key to the negative’s ability to link disadvantages, critiques and counter plans.
   3. Bright line: The negative interpretation provides a clear distinction between good affirmative and good negative ground.
   D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of competitive equity and education.
INC Shell: Support of

A. Negative Interpretation: Support means to bear the cost of and keep in existence.
   Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
   http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=support
   (3) : to bid in bridge so as to show support for c : to provide with substantiation : CORROBORATE <support an alibi> 3
   a : to pay the costs of : MAINTAIN b : to provide a basis for the existence or subsistence of <the island could probably
   support three -- A. B. C. Whipple>

B. Violation: The affirmative plan merely provides planning, training and/or moral support of UN peacekeeping operations.

C. Standards:

1. Fair Limits: The negative interpretation provides a fair and functional limit on the topic by forcing the affirmative to make
   expenditures of troops and/or money, eliminating cases that only provide training, planning and moral support. The
   affirmative interpretation allows them to explode the topic by allowing cases that only train on small, minute issues, or
   plan missions or provide moral support without doing anything.

2. Fair Ground: Forcing the affirmative to take a tangible action is critical to linking disadvantages such as politics and
   spending to the affirmative plan. Absent true increases of support of UN peacekeeping operations, the negative could not
   win a debate.

3. Bright Line: The negative interpretation provides a clear distinction between what good affirmative and negative ground
   is.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of competitive equity and education.
1NC Shell: Peacekeeping Operations vs. Peacebuilding Operations

A. Negative Interpretation: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding are two distinct functions.

Defining Peace Operations (from the Brahimi Report) United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding. Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether. Peacemaking addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently. Peacekeeping is a 50-year plus enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars to one that incorporates a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

B. Violation: The affirmative establishes a foreign policy increasing support of UN peacebuilding, not peacekeeping.

C. Standards:
   1. Fair Limits: The negative interpretation allows for a fair number of affirmative cases such as those that increase political and financial support for UN peacekeeping operations but effectively limits the topic by preventing Peacebuilding cases such as those that reintegrate soldiers into society, human rights monitoring, education, war crimes investigations, elections and conflict resolution.

   2. Education: Focusing solely on peacekeeping operations allows a more complete education on the topic. Expanding the breadth of the phrase will only serve to dilute the educational value of the resolution.

   3. Fair Ground: Peacebuilding and conflict resolution measures are key to negative counter plan ground. Allowing the affirmative to take these areas away eliminates the negative’s ability to test the veracity of the resolution to the fullest extent.

   4. Contextual Definition: The negative definition is the most qualified because it comes from the Brahimi Report which is the most recent survey of UN peace operations. This makes it a highly predictable interpretation.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of competitive equity and education.
ESTABLISH DEFINITIONS

1. PERMANENTLY ENACT.
Merriam Webster OnLine Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
estab·lish 1 : to institute (as a law) permanently by enactment or agreement

2. ESTABLISH MEANS TO PERMANENT ACCEPTANCE.
Establish /'establ/ verb 1 set up. 2 settle. 3 (esp. as established adjective) achieve permanent acceptance for. 4 place beyond dispute.

3. ESTABLISH MEANS TO ACCEPT.
establish (ACCEPT) verb [T] to cause to be accepted in or familiar with a place, position, etc: His reputation for carelessness was established long before the latest problems arose. He's established himself as a dependable source of information. After three months we were well established in/at our new house/new jobs.

4. ESTABLISH MEANS TO DISCOVER.
establish (DISCOVER) verb [T] FORMAL to discover or get proof of something: Before we take any action we must establish the facts/truth. [+ question word] Can you establish what time she left home/whether she has left home.[+ (that)] We have established (that) she was born in 1900.

5. ESTABLISH MEANS TO FOUND.
Word Smyth Dictionary OnLine,
http://www.wordsmyth.net/live/home.php?script=search&matchent=establish&matchtype=exact
Definition 1. to found or bring into being on a firm or stable basis.

6. ESTABLISH MEANS TO PROVE TRUE.
Word Smyth Dictionary OnLine,
http://www.wordsmyth.net/live/home.php?script=search&matchent=establish&matchtype=exact
Definition 2. to determine or prove to the satisfaction of others; show to be true or valid.

7. ESTABLISH MEANS TO PUT FIRMLY IN PLACE.
Word Smyth Dictionary OnLine,
http://www.wordsmyth.net/live/home.php?script=search&matchent=establish&matchtype=exact
Definition to put firmly into a situation or position, as into a job.

8. ESTABLISH MEANS TO SET UP.
TRANSITIVE VERB Inflected forms: es·tab·lish·ed, es·tab·lish·ing, es·tab·lish·es 1a. To set up; found. See synonyms at found 1. b. To bring about; generate: establish goodwill in the neighborhood. 2a. To place or settle in a secure position or condition; install: They established me in my own business. b. To make firm or secure. 3. To cause to be recognized and accepted: a discovery that established his reputation. 4. To introduce and put (a law, for example) into force. 5. To prove the validity or truth of: The defense attorneys established the innocence of the accused. 6. To make a state institution of (a church).
ESTABLISH DEFINITIONS

9. ESTABLISH IS SYNONOMOUS WITH FOUND.


estab·lish To set up; found. See Synonyms at found. To bring about; generate: establish goodwill in the neighborhood. To place or settle in a secure position or condition; install: They established me in my own business. To make firm or secure. To cause to be recognized and accepted: a discovery that established his reputation. To introduce and put (a law, for example) into force. To prove the validity or truth of: The defense attorneys established the innocence of the accused. To make a state institution of (a church).
FOREIGN POLICY DEFINITIONS

Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=foreign+policy

Main Entry: foreign policy
Function: noun
Date: 1859
: the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states

http://www.bartleby.com/61/22/F0252200.html
foreign policy
NOUN: The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other nations.
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFINITIONS

1. SUBSTANTIAL MEANS REAL, NOT ILLUSORY
   Merriam Webster OnLine Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
   sub·stan·tial Pronunciation: s&b-’stan(t)-sh&l Function: adjective Date: 14th century 1 a : consisting of or relating to substance b : not imaginary or illusory : REAL, TRUE c : IMPORTANT, ESSENTIAL 2 : ample to satisfy and nourish : FULL <a substantial meal> 3 a : possessed of means : WELL-TO-DO b : considerable in quantity : significantly great <earned a substantial wage> 4 : firmly constructed : STURDY 5 : being largely but not wholly that which is specified <a substantial lie>

2. OF THE SAME GENERAL COMPOSITION.
   substantial (GENERAL) adjective [before noun] FORMAL relating to the main or most important things being considered: The committee were in substantial agreement (= agreed about most of the things discussed). substantially adverb generally: This model has a few extra fittings, but the two cars are substantially the same.

3. SUBSTANTIAL MEANS REAL.
   sub·stan·tial Of, relating to, or having substance; material. True or real; not imaginary. Solidly built; strong. Ample; sustaining: a substantial breakfast. Considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent: won by a substantial margin. Possessing wealth or property; well-to-do.

4. SUBSTANTIALLY MEANS ESSENTIALLY.
   Definitions from The Online Plain Text English Dictionary:
   Substantially (adv.) In a substantial manner; in substance; essentially.
INCREASING DEFINITIONS

1. INCREASE MEANS TO MAKE GREATER PROGRESSIVELY
   Merriam Webster OnLine Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
   1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

2. INCREASE MEANS TO AUGMENT
   Merriam Webster OnLine Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
   1: to make greater: AUGMENT

3. GROWTH IN SIZE, AMOUNT OR INTENSITY.
   Merriam Webster OnLine Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
   synonyms INCREASE, ENLARGE, AUGMENT, MULTIPLY mean to make or become greater. INCREASE used
   Intransitively implies progressive growth in size, amount, or intensity <his waistline increased with age>;

4. LARGER IN SIZE OR AMOUNT.
   increase verb [I][T]
   to (make something) become larger in amount or size: Incidents of armed robbery have increased over the last few years.
   The cost of the project has increased dramatically/significantly since it began. Gradually increase the temperature to
   boiling point. Increased/Increasing efforts are being made to end the dispute.

5. MAKE GREATER OR LARGER
   increase v. increased, increasing, increases v. intr. To become greater or larger. To multiply; reproduce.
   v. tr. To make greater or larger.
SUPPORT (OF) DEFINITIONS

Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=support

4 a: to hold up or serve as a foundation or prop for b: to maintain (a price) at a desired level by purchases or loans; also: to maintain the price of by purchases or loans

Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=support

6: to keep (something) going

Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=support

Main Entry: 1support
Function: transitive verb
1: to endure bravely or quietly: BEAR

Merriam Webster Dictionary On Line, Copyright 2003
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=support

2 a (1): to promote the interests or cause of (2): to uphold or defend as valid or right: ADVOCATE (3): to argue or vote for b (1): ASSIST, HELP (2): to act with (a star actor)

Encarta World English Dictionary

support
transitive verb  (past supported, past participle supported, present participle supporting, 3rd person present singular supports)

1. keep from falling: to keep something or somebody upright or in place, or prevent something or somebody from falling
   • Those pillars support the roof.
2. bear certain weight: to be strong enough to hold a particular object or weight in place without breaking or giving way
   • Are you sure the ice is thick enough to support the weight?
3. sustain financially: to provide somebody with money and the other necessities of life over a period of time
   • She succeeds in supporting her family on what she earns in a part-time job.
4. give active help and encouragement: to give active help, encouragement, or money to somebody or something
   • We support the charity through voluntary work.
5. be in favor of something: to be in favor of something such as a cause, policy, or organization, and wish to see it succeed
6. be present and give encouragement: to give encouragement to somebody or something by being present at an event
7. give assistance or comfort: to give assistance or comfort to somebody in difficulty or distress
   • He supported me throughout my crisis.
8. provide technical support: to provide technical support for a computing system or package
9. corroborate: to give something greater credibility by being consistent with it or providing further evidence for it
   • There is further evidence that supports the defendant’s claim.
PEACEKEEPING DEFINITIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS INVOLVE A HOST OF THINGS.

Peacekeeping is a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace. UN peacekeepers—soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries—monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. The Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. For this reason, the international community usually looks to the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping operations. Most of these operations are established and implemented by the United Nations itself with troops serving under UN operational command. In other cases, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate or feasible, the Council authorizes regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Economic Community of West African States or coalitions of willing countries to implement certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions.

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING NO LONGER EXISTS. THE MANDATE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAS GROWN.

From traditional peacekeeping..... United Nations peacekeeping initially developed during the Cold War era as a means to resolve conflicts between States by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, between the armed forces of the former warring parties. Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and international peace and security, including a number of so-called “proxy wars” waged by client States of the superpowers. Peacekeepers were not expected to fight fire with fire. As a general rule, they were deployed when the ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. UN troops observed from the ground and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict. ..... to multidimensional peacekeeping The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in UN and multilateral peacekeeping. In a new spirit of cooperation, the Security Council established larger and more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-State conflicts. Furthermore, peacekeeping came to involve more and more non-military elements to ensure sustainability. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping.
CONGO AFFIRMATIVE CASE AND NEGATIVE
CONGO COACHING GUIDE

Introduction

Considered one of the bloodiest civil wars in Africa’s history, the civil war in Congo is a very complex situation. Not only are there warring factions within the country but other countries such as Rwanda and Uganda have occupied parts of the country. The UN already has a peacekeeping force stationed in the Congo called MONUC.

While the size of the UN force has gradually increased and multiple ceasefires have been signed, the fighting continues.

Additionally, the Congo (formerly Zaire) is considered to be one of Africa’s resource richest countries. This complicates any ceasefire between rebel groups and the government because the groups are supported by neighboring countries soldiers and money.

Plan Options

There is already a peacekeeping operation in the Congo. This means that the Affirmative can send US troops and/or money to support the current operation. Additionally, the Affirmative can increase support of a specific mission in Congo example, gender mainstreaming and/or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

Advantages

The advantages that an Affirmative can claim are fairly straight-forward. Civil War, Genocide, War Crimes (both regular and Gendered), and Regional Stability.

The trick to this Affirmative will be winning that the United States is key to stability in the region or winning that US approval is critical to the UN’s success and credibility in Congo.

Debate Ivory Coast On the Negative

The most pertinent question for any country specific Affirmative, including the Congo, is why does the United States have to increase it’s support of UN peacekeeping operations. Can another country do the same thing or should the US go it alone?

The Case/Advantage

Most country specific Affirmatives will claim advantages that are specific to the country in question. For example, they won’t claim a generic civil, they will argue a civil war in the Congo. Most likely, the impact will be spillover into the region and escalation but the starting point will be the country in question. They could also claim genocide.

A good strategy for debating the Congo and any country specific case for that matter would be to find some cards (of which there are quite a few) that say peace is lasting in the Congo and that the current UN mission is enough. This should decrease the weight of their specific advantage.

Additionally, if you cannot find specific “US/Peacekeeping in the Congo is bad,” arguments, make sure you have your generic peacekeeping bad arguments ready to go. Arguments such as peace will collapse once peacekeepers leave and peacekeeping increases conflict should get some pretty good mileage.

Disadvantage Links

Any generic increase in peacekeeping arguments should link. Here are they ways that the stories can be told:

Spending: Pretty simple story: plan spends money. Supporting peacekeeping missions with troops or money or logistical and technical support all cost money you could either run a Budget Deficits Disadvantage or Foreign Aid Trade off. You can also
argue that the impact turns the case because a collapse in the global economy will likely increase ethnic tensions throughout the world.

Politics: It is possible to spin a political capital story a few different ways. First, it takes political capital to get new spending through congress. Second, congress doesn’t like the UN so there will be a fight. Third, congress doesn’t like to put troops in harms way. Congressional representatives find it hard to justify to their constituencies American soldiers dying in foreign lands.

Elections: Bush Bad: There is a pretty sweet story to be told that the plan makes President Bush look like a compassionate conservative and the that helps him get reelected. Additionally, multilateral actions and the UN in general have a tendency to popular with the public. Together, these arguments make for a very strong link story.

Elections Bush Good: This is a more difficult story to spin. The one that comes to mind is based on deficit spending. If the plan is passed, his opposition will be able to sell it as fiscal irresponsibility causing the GOP base not to vote. This strategy is probably very susceptible to link turns, which are the link stories for Elections: Bush Bad.

Hegemony Bad: Plan makes the United States look good in the eyes of the rest of the world by making the US seem like its more compassionate and willing to cooperate with international institutions.

Military Overstretch: Committing US troops and resources to new missions would cripple our already overstretched forces.

Counter Plans

There are two strategies that will most likely be very common against teams that specify the Congo as a country in the plan (or any country specific Affirmative for that matter.) Teams will most likely International Agent Counter Plan or they will have the US do the action of the plan unilaterally.

There are many more net benefits for an International Counter Plan. Any US specific disadvantage for effectively function as a net benefit because other countries would not affect US policy. Hegemony Bad, Politics, Elections, Military Overstretch, and Spending are all good examples.

Additionally, running an International Counter Plan would allow the Negative to access specific net benefits to that country acting. For example, if you the Japan Counter Plan, the Negative run Japanese Soft Power as a net benefit, even if the plan doesn’t link because only the Counter Plan could solve.

Options are a more limited with a US Unilateral Action. Probably the strongest net benefits would US Hegemony Good (Hard Power) and UN action bad. There is definitely literature supporting the US avoiding interactions with the UN.

Further, if Politics is a must, the story would probably be a Bush Bad position. The Negative would want to read link cards that talk about how Congress absolutely hates the UN military, i.e. peacekeeping operations that involve putting US troops under UN command.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inherency</td>
<td>22-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Continues</td>
<td>32-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC Fails</td>
<td>34-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: French Forces</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Peace Deal Fails</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Enough Peacekeepers</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR Fails Now</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Policy</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harms Millions Dead</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
<td>43-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Mindset Shift</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Peace Solves Rape</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>46-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kivus Region</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger Mandate</td>
<td>49-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Can’t Stop Rwanda</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Harms Answers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace in Congo</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC Solves</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Strong</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcements Coming</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga Violence</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Answers</td>
<td>57-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR Answers</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Congo</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvency General</td>
<td>61-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure CP</td>
<td>63-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONGO IAC

CONTENTION I: THE US DOES NOT SUPPORT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO.

WHILE THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF TROOPS IN THE CONGO, THE UN LACKS THE ABILITY TO STABILIZE THE COUNTRY.

Bruce Zagaris, Staff Writer, International Enforcement Law Reporter, April 2004 Vol. 20, No. 4, Pg. L/N

Although the UN has thousands of troops in Congo as part of a peacekeeping mission, it is having difficulty in stabilizing the east of Congo where ethnic tensions are high and competition for resources ignites fighting among rivals.

THIS IS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE US IS NOT INTERESTED IN HELPING THE CONGO.

Thalif Deen, UN Waits for Help As Congo Faces Genocide, May 28, 2003, Global Information Network

UNITED NATIONS, May 27 (IPS/GIN) -- The United Nations remains in limbo waiting for member states to answer its call to assist one of the largest countries in Africa, the strife-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which continues to be threatened by a genocidal war. Clashes between Lendu and Hema tribal factions in the embattled DRC are threatening to escalate what began years ago as a regional struggle for gold, diamonds, timber and other resources into a major civil war of genocidal proportions. "The international community just doesn't care," says Bill Fletcher of Washington-based TransAfrica Forum. "Over two million people dead. So what?" Africa is of secondary or tertiary importance to the Bush administration, Fletcher added in an interview with IPS. "The U.S. interest in Africa is in direct relationship to oil in the ground. Angola, yes. Equatorial Guinea, yes. But DRC, no."

MONUC, THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE CONGO IS HORRIBLY UNDERFUNDED.


A Human Rights Officer told RI, “We don’t have a budget—not even our cell phones. No budget is forthcoming. The mission is DDRRR-focused. All the money is going there. There is one car for 4 people. We have to pay for official phone calls out of pocket. We can’t be compared to other missions because we have no budget. That’s MONUC-wide. We have no tables, no logistics. We report to Kinshasa. We need dollars and access.” “Our mandate is more observation than monitoring,” said a MONUC Human Rights Officer in eastern DRC. “We’re severely understaffed. Given the size of the Congo, we need more people.”

HENCE THE PLAN:

THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENACT A FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASING SUPPORT OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY INCREASING FINANCIAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT OF MONUC IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AS PER OUR AUTHORS. FUNDING AND ENFORCEMENT GUARANTEED. AFFIRMATIVE SPEECHES WILL CLARIFY INTENT.
ADVANTAGE I: CIVIL WAR IN THE CONGO

THE PEACE IN CONGO IS ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSING. REBELS AND THE GOVERNMENT ARE CLASHING.
THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON) JUNE 1, 2004, PAGE 25

RENADE REBELS marched towards the eastern Congolese city of Bukavu yesterday, plunging the region into a fresh round of chaos and threatening the Democratic Republic of Congo's fragile peace process. About 1,000 soldiers loyal to Brigadier General Laurent Nkunda had established positions on a lakeside road about 18 miles north of the city, said Sebastien Lapierre, a United Nations spokesman in Bukavu.

MONUC HAS FAILED. BOTH RWANDA AND UGANDA HAVE RETURNED FORCES TO THE CONGO AND BLOODSHED IS INCREASING.
Arnaud De Borchgrave, United Press International, March 12, 2004, Pg.L/N

Rwandan and Ugandan forces have reinfilted the Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC, formerly Zaire, is the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Some 11,000 ineffectual U.N. peacekeeping troops are lost in the vastness of Africa's answer to "Darkness at Noon" that is costing the world body $90,000 per blue helmet per year. It is the United Nations' most expensive operation.

THE NEWS ONLY GETS WORSE ON A DAILY BASIS. THE VIOLENCE IS ETHNICALLY BASED AND GRUESOME.

News from the Ituri region of the misnamed Democratic Republic of Congo in recent weeks has been so grim as to make one want to turn the page or flip the TV channel in despair: tens of thousands of refugees in flight, ethnically based mass murder, killers jubilantly draping themselves in the entrails of their victims, animals eating dead bodies in the streets, 10- and 11-year-old child soldiers bearing AK-47s and hand grenades. Such horrors are but the latest in a civil war whose death toll, in less than five years, is estimated by the International Rescue Committee to be at least 3.3 million. This is the greatest such bloodshed anywhere on earth since the end of World War II. There is no end in sight.

MILLIONS HAVE DIED AND ARE STILL DYING IN THE CONGO.
Thalif Deen, UN Waits for Help As Congo Faces Genocide, May 28, 2003, Global Information Network

"Thousands of civilians have already died in this conflict," said Kenneth Roth, HRW's executive director. "Only rapid U.N. action can head off continued killings." According to HRW, at least 5,000 people have died from direct violence in the town of Ituri between July 2002 and March 2003. These are in addition to the 50,000 civilians who have died there since 1999, according to U.N. estimates. An estimated 2.5 million to 4.7 million civilians have died in the DRC since the civil war began in 1998, triggered by a mad scramble among neighboring countries for rich mineral resources.

VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO HAS TURNED INTO GENOCIDE.

How bad does it have to get this time? How many Africans must die before the world is moved to action? Once again, there is bloodletting in Africa, this time in a place called Ituri, in the dense equatorial forests in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Machetes and Kalashnikovs are the preferred weapons. Ethnic rivals are the preferred victims, especially in batches and whole families. At the United Nations this spring, whispered fears of "genocide" were in the air again. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who has been down this road before, warned that the pattern of killing in Ituri could presage a far more disastrous conflict. He called for a more robust U.N. peacekeeping force than the 8,700-strong contingent already in Congo, and France is now leading a supplemental emergency force of 1,400 to try to quell the Ituri violence.
THE VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO WILL BRING A NEW APOCOLYPSE.
Francois Grignon There Will Be No Excuses For Not Knowing Observer May 25, 2003

The eastern Congolese province of Ituri has already been consumed by violence. 50,000 deaths have occurred there since 1999. Three million are dead as a result of the war across all of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is hard to imagine the situation can get any worse - but it is doing so. As global attention turns to the need to intervene, time to prevent an apocalyptic genocide is fast running out. Despite the presence of a UN monitoring mission and a national peace plan, Ituri has already suffered from repeated acts of genocide. Machete murders, horrific mutilation, rape, and terrified people fleeing their homes - these are again happening for the sake of absolute power in central Africa. And despite the lessons of Rwanda, indifference and bad management remain the hallmarks of international intervention in the region. If swift and decisive action is not taken in Ituri, the world may soon come to know the names of Hema and Lendu as we now know Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda - because we stood by, failing to act until it was too late. Unlike in Rwanda, no State machinery will plan the extermination of the Hema minority in Ituri. The State has long collapsed, but precisely because of the vacuum left by three decades of Mobutuism and the conflict, greedy local warlords, Hema and Lendu, have turned against one another committing acts of genocide which now threatens to escalate into a new apocalypse.

THE UN’s FAILURE TO BRING STABILITY IN CONGO RISKS ENGULFLING THE WHOLE CONTINENT. A STABLE CONGO CAN BE A BEACON TO THE REST OF AFRICA AND HELP PROVIDE VALUABLE RESOURCES.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Central Africa, stretching from the Atlantic coast to the highlands of the Great Lakes, with more than 50 million inhabitants and nearly a million square miles of territory. It has some of Africa’s most valuable deposits of gold, oil, copper, cobalt, uranium, diamonds, and coltan, which, when refined, yields a basic element necessary for the manufacture of many electronic devices. Central Africa’s mightiest river system flows through the DRC and has the potential to supply hydropower to the entire continent. Because of its size, resources and strategic location, a stable DRC is essential to a stable Central Africa. But a DRC in decay, vulnerable to plunder and engulfed by war — as it has been for nearly a decade — is a threat to the entire continent. For decades, in order to promote Cold War “stability” in Central Africa, the United States accommodated the misrule of the DRC by Mobutu Sese Seko, one of Africa’s most corrupt dictators. Mobutu’s regime stole the country’s resources and diverted its foreign loans and grants to private coffers. Compounding the problem of internal decay, the DRC shares borders with nine other states, seven of which (Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo) have suffered civil wars in the last decade, the effects of which spilled into the DRC. Such external factors, together with DRC’s internal political weakness and substantial resource wealth, explain in large measure the internationalized conflicts that have devastated the country in the last seven years.
THE INTENTIONAL GROUP ACT OF GENOCIDE OUTWEIGHS EVEN THE RISK OF OMNICIDE.
LANG, PROF. OF PHILOSOPHY & HUMANISTIC STUDIES, 1984/85.

“A number of further questions arise in connection with the act of genocide, in particular with the status of its agents. That genocide entails the intended destruction of a group does not by itself imply that the destruction must itself be the act of a group; but the extent of actions required by any design for genocide is so broad as virtually to insure that the purpose will involve corporate decisions and effort. Admittedly, the same technological advances that (in communications, for example) that make genocide as a collective action increasingly possible also increase the likelihood that an individual acting alone could initiate such actions. (When the push of a single button can produce unmeasurable catastrophic effects, we discover the possibility of an order of destruction beyond genocide as well: “omnicide.”) But it is also clear that the opprobrium attending the term “genocide” comes in part from its connotation of a corporate action – as if the same act or set of acts would be a lesser fault, easier to understand or even excuses, if a single person rather than a group were responsible, with the connection of the latter (we suppose) to a public moral code and to decisions that would have had to be made or supported collectively. The fact of corporate responsibility sometimes diminish the enormity of an action, as when the difficulty of assigning specific responsibility gives to the action a vagueness of reference similar to that of a natural or otherwise impersonal force. But the almost necessarily corporate origins of genocide seem rather to accentuate its moral enormity, multiplying the individual acts of consciousness that would have been required to produce the larger corporate act.”

GENOCIDE RENDERS THE OBSERVER COMPLICIT WITH THE ACT. ONLY BY TAKING ACTION IS THERE A HOPE FOR THE VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE.
VETLESEN, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY @ U OF OSLO, 2000 [ARNE JOHAN, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, VOL 37, NO 4]

“Most often, In cases of genocide, for every person directly victimized and killed there will be hundreds, thousands, perhaps even millions, who are neither directly targeted as victims nor directly participating as perpetrators. The moral issue raised by genocide taken as the illegal act par excellence, are not confined to the nexus of agent and victim. The majority to the event will be formed by the contemporary bystanders. Such bystanders are individuals; in their private and professional lives, they will belong to a vast score of groups and collectives, some informal and closely knit, others formal and detached as far as personal and emotional involvement are concerned. In the loose sense intended here every contemporary citizen—cognizant—of a specific ongoing instance of genocide, regardless of where in the world, counts as a bystander.”

VETLESEN CONTINUES...
“But is not halting genocide first and foremost a task, indeed a duty for the victims themselves? The answer is simple: the sheer fact that genocide is happening shows that the targeted group has not proved itself able to prevent it. This being so, responsibility for halting what is now unfolding cannot rest with the victims alone, it must also be seen to rest with the party not itself affected but which is knowledgeable about—which is more or less literally witnessing—the genocide that is taking place. So whereas for the agent, bystanders represent the potential of resistance for the victims they may represent the only source of hope left.”
VETLESEN CONCLUDES…

“The vital insight articulated, albeit not developed, in the passages quoted is that not acting is still acting. Brought to bear on the case of genocide as a reported, ongoing affair, the inaction making a difference is the action of the bystander to unfolding genocide, the failure to act when confronted with such action, as involved in accomplishing genocide, is a failure which carries a message to both the agent and the sufferer the action may proceed. Knowing yet still not acting means granting acceptance to the action. Such inaction entails letting things be done by someone else, clearly in the case of acknowledged genocide, to the point of criminality to invoke one of the quotes from Ricoeur, In short, inaction means complicity.”

ADVANTAGE II: RACISM

US FOREIGN POLICY IS GUIDED BY SO CALLED STRATEGIC INTERESTS, PROMPTING IT IGNORE AFRICA.

Salih Booker, Interviewed in the Washington Post, July 9, 2003, Pg. L/N

Salih Booker: Africa is a continent, four times the size of the continental USA. It has 54 countries and over 800 million people. We are addressing Africa as a continent in this discussion when focussing on common themes that affect many or most nations (like AIDS, poverty, US trade policies), and addressing specific nations when such questions are raised. American foreign policy needs to be able to do the same. But the US has historically ignored most of the continent and focussed on those countries where washington believes it has something to gain (e.g. oil, or political loyalty in the cold war or the war on terrorism, etc.).

TIME AND TIME AGAIN, VIOLENCE IN AFRICA HAS FAILED TO PROMPT THE US TO TAKE ACTION. THIS US ALLERGY TO INTERVENTION IN AFRICA IS BASED ON RACISM AND THE NOTION THAT AFRICANS ARE LESSER INDIVIDUALS.


President Bush will travel to the continent next month. Among his stops will be Uganda, across the border from Ituri, where Ugandan troops once patrolled and supplied arms to combatants. Bush's trip will look nice. Last Thursday, in a speech to the Corporate Council on Africa, Bush outlined a broad-brush agenda on Africa, including an end to Congo's war. "To encourage progress across all of Africa, we must build peace at the heart of Africa," he said. But don't count on the White House to support a beefing up of the U.N.'s role in Congo. And don't expect Washington to do anything aggressive to stop the killing. That is not Washington's way -- at least when it comes to Africa. This has happened many times before. It happened under President Clinton, when the world failed to deter genocide in Rwanda. With indignation and rhetorical flourishes, the Bush administration recently cited that episode as a cautionary tale to shame members of the U.N. Security Council reluctant to throw in their support for the war against Iraq. "From a moral point of view, as the world witnessed in Rwanda . . . , the United Nations Security Council will have failed to act once again," said White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. But with violence once again threatening Africa's Great Lakes region, the United States is doing just what it did in 1994 -- sitting on the sidelines. So I wonder: Just how many dead Africans would it take for the United States to intervene? The answer may come soon if Ituri and other ethnically riven Congolese regions continue to smolder. But historically, Washington's and the rest of the world's tolerance for mass African death has been quite high. The United States obviously cannot police the entire world. It cannot be expected or obligated to jump in and save the day in each and every conflict. Liberia, for example, also cries out for help. But it's the way Washington decides where to intervene, and for whom, that stirs indignation.
CONGO 1AC

DUKE CONTINUES . . .

It has become a chronic feature of U.S. policy -- dating back to the 1993 debacle that left 18 U.S. Rangers dead in Somalia -- to send no troops into harm's way in Africa. Over and over, U.S. diplomats will say that Africa, unlike the Balkans or Iraq, is not of strategic interest to the United States. But the U.S. aversion to intervention in Africa is deeper than that; Washington has prevented other nations' troops from intervening, as well. Rwanda, where 800,000 people died, is one case. Ituri, where the peacekeeping mandate comes up for Security Council reconsideration in the coming month, could become another. It is not a matter of asking why can't the Africans solve their own problems. It is, instead, a matter of asking: If the United States can help Kosovo Albanians, Iraqis, Bosnians, Israelis and Palestinians trying to settle their conflicts, why can't it help Africans? Many may be forgiven for believing it is about race and the lesser value that the United States places on African lives. Even by the standards of Africa's many catastrophes, the five-year-old Congo conflict rates high in terms of the sheer numbers of casualties. The conflict -- of which Ituri is one theater of battle -- is part of a domino effect caused by Rwanda's genocide. This war started in 1998, when a rebel faction supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops mounted a failed military push on the Congolese capital, Kinshasa. Since then, the Congolese war has claimed more than 3 million lives, not just in battle, but also as a consequence of the sustained degradation in the region's quality of life. People are dying from malnutrition and from disease. In Ituri, aid groups estimate the death toll to be 50,000. The Western powers, we must surmise, find these deaths tolerable, for they have evoked no more than the usual tut-tutting and shaking of heads that accompany bad news about Africa.

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA IS RIDDLE WITH RACISM. NOT ONLY HAS IT HELPED PROP UP RUTHLESS DICTATORS BUT IT HAS FUNDED CIVIL WARS WHILE MISLEADING THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE HOPELESSNESS OF AFRICA. THESE ACTIONS CONDONE SLAVERY AND DEHUMANIZE AFRICANS.

Tom Obaleh Kargbo, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle August 15, 2003

Many Africans remember that the U.S. State Department under then-Secretary Kissinger treated Africa as a continent of no consequence. Now by advocating American non-intervention in Liberia, Dr. Kissinger and his ilk are indirectly supporting destabilization, chaos and civil strife, which could be a precursor to the development of terrorism. However, equally disappointing are those who advocate American intervention, but only on a short-term basis and only to protect American lives, as if other lives are not worth saving. Remember Rwanda and Sierra Leone? The West came in only after appeal after appeal and the loss of millions of lives. Any talk of protecting national security and advancing the cause of freedom should not begin and end in the United States. Some in the Bush administration recognize this, or else what is America doing in Afghanistan. However, to the United States and its Western allies, Africa is peripheral, a continent infested with dictators, corruption and civil wars. Need we remind the West about the evils and plunder of slavery and colonialism? The West exploits Africa and then asks why it is poor and crying. Western societies that have always professed to be just and fair have never apologized for the crimes committed against our forefathers, not to mention the shameful ways they have continued to dehumanize Africans. To imply in any way that Africans are less than human is to condone slavery and current discriminatory practices. So much is said about corruption in Africa that we need to remind the West that Enron and the junk bond scandals did not take place in Africa. Need we also remind the West of its machinations to prop up dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo, Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia or Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia; its financing of civil wars in Africa; and its inhuman and shameful support of apartheid in South Africa? America should not forget that black troops fought in their civil and last two world wars against people they never had a quarrel with. Is America's reluctance to come to Liberia's aid a consequence of distance? I hardly believe that. Take Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Vietnam and the Philippines. Are these more distant than Africa from the United States? Was and is America still not involved in Bosnia and Kosovo? Most Americans are good people who continue to be misinformed and misguided by unscrupulous commentators and policymakers who have painted such a hopeless picture of Africa that black people the world over hesitate to associate themselves with their ancestral home. African Americans should not sit by and ignore the destruction of their ancestral home. American foreign policy has leaks, is discriminatory and difficult to defend in the part of the world where suffering goes unnoticed by the only superpower and so-called leader of the Free World. To protect its national security and advance the cause of freedom, America needs to look beyond its shores and seek to listen, understand and not dictate to or distance itself from the rest of the world.
EVERY INSTANCE OF RACISM MUST BE REJECTED. THE WALL THAT IS RACISM MUST BE DISMANTLED BRICK BY BRICK.
Joseph Barndt, Co-director of Crossroads, a ministry to dismantle racism, DISMANTLING RACISM 1991, p. 155-6

The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, an cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing even more near. The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggression, or over consumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return. A small and predominately white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

ADVANTAGE III: RAPE

RAPE HAS BECOME THE DEFINING CHARACTER OF THE WAR IN THE CONGO.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Rape has become a defining characteristic of the five-year war in the DRC, says Anneke Van Woudenberg, the Congo specialist for Human Rights Watch. So, too, has mutilation of the victims. "Last year, I was stunned when a 30-year-old woman in North Kivu had her lips and ears cut off and eyes gouged out after she was raped, so she couldn't identify or testify against her attackers. Now, we are seeing more and more such cases," she says. As the rebels constantly seek new ways to terrorize, their barbarity becomes more frenzied. I, too, was sickened by what I saw and heard. In three decades of covering war, I had never before come across the cases described to me by Congolese doctors, such as gang-rape victims having their labia pierced and then padlocked. "They usually die of massive infection," I was told. Based on personal testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch, it is estimated that as many as 30 percent of rape victims are sexually tortured and mutilated during the assaults, usually with spears, machetes, sticks or gun barrels thrust into their vaginas. Increasingly, the trigger is being pulled. About 40 percent of rape victims, usually the younger ones, aged 8 to 19, are abducted and forced to become sex slaves. "The country is in an utter state of lawlessness; it's complete anarchy," says Woudenberg. "In this culture of impunity, people know they can get away with anything. Every armed group is equally culpable."

FURTHERMORE, KNOWLEDGE OF THESE RAPES IS WIDESPREAD YET PEACEKEEPERS DO NOTHING TO PREVENT THEM AND WON'T HELP AFTER THEY'VE HAPPENED.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Patrols of MONUC, the UN's peacekeeping force in the DRC, have refused to pick up wounded rape victims and escort them to medical care when they were afraid they would be outnumbered by nearby rebels. "People denounce the rapes but do nothing to bring the rebels to justice," says Woudenberg. "There isn't the political will, domestically or internationally, to make it happen. I've never seen anything like this, when war has become this horrible, and human life so undervalued."
RAPE IN THE CONGO IS USED AS A WEAPON OF WAR. THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS AND OTHER DISEASES MAKE IT AN AUTOMATIC DEATH SENTENCE FOR THE VICTIMS.

Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

In the Congo, rape is a cheaper weapon of war than bullets. Experts estimate that some 60 percent of all combatants in the DRC are infected with HIV/AIDS. As women rarely have access to expensive antiretroviral drugs, sexual assaults all too often become automatic death sentences. Medecins Sans Frontieres operates five health clinics offering antiretrovirals in the conflict zone of northeastern DRC, but many women don't know about the drugs and cannot travel safely to the centers. Moreover, according to Helen O'Neill, a nurse who set up MSF’s sexual-violence treatment program, such drugs must be taken within forty-eight to seventy-two hours of the rape to prevent infection. If a woman has been exposed to the virus, the treatment is 80 percent effective. But in the Congo, rape victims who are not captive sex slaves must walk for days or weeks, often with massive injuries, and risk new capture by roving rebel bands, before reaching assistance. "So far, 30 percent of rape victims being treated at our hospital are infected with HIV/AIDS," says Dr. Denis Mukwege, the French-trained medical director of the Panzi Hospital in Bukavu. "And nearly 50 percent are infected with venereal diseases like syphilis that greatly increase their chances of contracting HIV."

CONTENTION II: SOLVENCY

EXPANDING THE PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO AT LEAST 10,000 COULD HALT THE BLOODSHED.


The current expansion of the minuscule and hamstrung United Nations peacekeeping force now in the country is a step in the right direction, although tragically belated and inadequate. There is an opportunity here for the UN to at last prove that it can be a power for peace in Africa, after shamefully caving in under US and British pressure-and allowing the Rwanda genocide to happen. Enough troops to provide security for all of Congo, which is as big as the United States east of the Mississippi but has no working road or rail network, is too much to hope for. But a UN force at least several times the size of the 10,800-soldier contingent that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed could begin to halt the terrible bloodshed in the northeastern corner of the country, where the most carnage has taken place. Its length of service should be seen as a matter of years, and its mission should be drastically toughened to include, for instance, disarming the rival militias-which there is no mandate now.

FURTHERMORE, A STRONGER UN CONTINGENT CAN HELP REMOVE THE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ARE INVOLVED AND SPURRING CONFLICT IN THE CONGO.


The UN is justifiably wary of getting sucked into the Congolese maelstrom, but its inaction has unacceptable human costs. Recent history shows that the governments with troops in Congo can be swayed through diplomacy. Rwanda and Uganda, for example, both depend on foreign aid: this should be cut if they go back to war. Rag-tag bandits, however, can be kept from running amok only by the threat of force. In Cote d'Ivoire, a few French soldiers with orders to shoot to kill have curbed mayhem in the half of the country they protect. A larger and more serious UN force in Congo could force the militiamen to turn their machetes back into farming tools.
THE DRC IS A CRITICAL TEST FOR THE UN THAT IT IS FAILING MISERABLY.
MONUC IS UNABLE TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN THE CONGO.
Thalif Deen, UN Waits for Help As Congo Faces Genocide, May 28, 2003, Global Information Network

"But given the vastness of the territory, the volatility of the situation and the wide range of critical tasks before the mission, MONUC needed to be provided with adequate resources to facilitate timely contingent troop deployments, and to ensure full and successful implementation of its mandate," he said. The proposed budget for MONUC in 2003/2004 is about $582 million, down from $608 million in 2002/2003. The U.N.'s total spending on 14 peacekeeping missions last year was about $2.6 billion. The total MONUC troop strength is about 4,684 compared with 14,715 personnel serving with UNAMSIL. Two major human rights organizations, Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), warned last week that the situation in DRC would be a "critical test" of the Security Council's commitment to prevent mass killings. But MONUC is unable to adequately protect civilians, they said in a letter to the Council.

THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE CAN BE STOPPED IN THE CONGO. IT ONLY TAKES A FIRM INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT.

That is what is fueling Ituri's violence. It is not some inevitable spasm of innate African violence, not some stereotype of darkest Africa as summoned up during Rwanda's nightmare. It is mere cause and effect, and thus highly predictable -- and preventable. Let hundreds of thousands of people die, and you can expect enmities to fester, leading to still more bouts of extreme violence. It is a cycle that can be slowed, even broken. The combatants in the broader Congolese war already have begun negotiating a transitional government, as called for in their peace accord. But that peace process could easily be sabotaged if the Ituri conflict goes unchecked. With a firm and consistent international commitment, plus a muscular military mandate and sufficient troop strengths, it can be done. It won't be easy, to be sure. Congo is a vast nation -- the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. It is a dysfunctional state, with little electrical infrastructure, a collapsed road system and a dearth of telephones in most places outside the capital. The country was picked clean under Mobutu, the infamously corrupt dictator of 32 years, and plunged into more confusion by his power-hungry successor, the late Laurent Desire Kabila. Spreading peacekeepers around such a large and problematic place would admittedly be a logistical nightmare. Yet it must be done, and more than the 8,700 troops in the international force are required. And they need more muscle; they need to be authorized to shoot to kill, as is the emergency French-led force in Ituri. If the goal is to stabilize Congo's embattled regions, save lives and stave off more of the kind of ethnic cleansing that already has taken place, the United States needs to be more aggressively and actively engaged.
CONGO IAC

THE UNITED STATES MUST ACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO BRING PEACE TO THE CONGO.


In the age of international terrorism, U.S. strategic interests in a stable DRC should be clear. The country’s dangerous combination of mineral riches and near-anarchy is tailor-made for terrorist exploitation. Smuggling, arms-trafficking and money laundering already thrive in the lawlessness of the region’s ongoing conflicts. Interconnected drug and terrorist networks also could develop in eastern Congo — which has a physical and political environment comparable to Colombia. For now, arms flow mostly to loosely-controlled militias that sustain the climate of anarchy that the smugglers need to survive. These militias commit grotesque atrocities in towns and villages that are out of the view of international media. To halt the present tragedy and avoid larger strategic consequences, the international community must help the DRC to become a functioning state governed by the rule of law that respects the basic human rights of its citizens. Only such a state will attract the trade and investment that the country needs to build an open, viable, legal market economy. There are no geostrategic arguments against increased U.S. engagement in the final resolution of this conflict. There are, however, compelling security reasons for the United States to want to shut down terrorist and criminal networks’ access to the DRC, as well as moral reasons for helping the Congolese people free themselves from the human rights and humanitarian catastrophe that plagues them. Only the U.S., working with the international community, can bring effective pressure to bear on the regional actors who have long undermined peace and security in the DRC and bear much of the responsibility for its continuing turmoil.

THE UNITED STATES MUST TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DRC. INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE UN FOR A FULL MISSION AND ADDING TROOPS CAN SOLVE THE CONFLICT.


But while peacekeeping is not the long-term answer for Congo, it is needed in the short term. One immediate issue, to be decided by the Security Council in the next few weeks, is what will replace the French-led contingent after September. A new version of the weak U.N. force that proved unable to protect Bunia before is not an acceptable answer. The next U.N. peacekeeping mission must have legal authority to use sufficient force to protect civilians. It must be strong enough to prevent anarchy from returning to Bunia. And it must be available to move around the country to enforce compromises negotiated between the rival Congolese factions. The U.N. should also consider sending peacekeepers to the Lake Kivu area near the Rwandan and Ugandan borders. That is where some of the ethnic conflicts that touched off the long Congo conflict still fester. Fears of cross-border raids by militias based in this area continue to drive Rwandan and Ugandan involvement. An effective U.N. force of 10,000 to 20,000 troops, used this way, could encourage an eventual political settlement and ease the plight of civilians. No American troops are expected to go to Congo, but Washington will pay more than a fourth of the U.N.’s costs. Through its veto power, America will shape the Security Council’s ultimate decision. The Bush administration should push for a peacekeeping mission that is militarily adequate and legally empowered to use appropriate force. Washington also needs to lean harder on its Ugandan and Rwandan allies to stop stoking the Congo conflict. No quick or easy solutions are available. The damage to Congo has simply been too extensive, the killing too vast, the many decades of past misgovernment too destructive. But the world must not abandon the Congolese people. Their agony challenges our humanity.
CONGO INHERENCY: FIGHTING CONTINUES

EVEN ROCK BANDS ARE AT RISK, FIGHTING HAS RESUMED IN THE CONGO.
James Sifiore, Special to the Star, The Toronto Star June 2, 2004; Pg. A03

Sum 41, the Ajax punk band that likes to toy with death imagery in its music and on its Web site, came a little too close to the real thing last week, lead singer Deryck Whibley says. Whibley, safely ensconced in a New York hotel and with his band mates back home in Toronto, described yesterday the ordeal they went through when a firefight broke out outside their hotel in war-torn Congo one week ago. The popular band was there with War Child Canada to shoot a documentary on the plight of children in war zones when violence escalated between rival factions of the Congolese army in the town of Bukavu, near the Rwandan border in the Democratic Republic of Congo. "There were a couple of moments when I thought, 'This is it, we're going to die,' so we (the band) reflected on everything we went through and talked about our lives back home," Whibley said in an interview.

THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELS ARE STILL FIGHTING IN THE CONGO.
The Washington Post June 2, 2004; Pg. A21

* BUKAVU, Congo -- Government soldiers attacked troops loyal to a renegade commander near the eastern town of Bukavu, breaking a shaky cease-fire and spurring U.N. peacekeepers to try to negotiate an end to the violence, Sebastien Lapierre, a U.N. spokesman, said. Lapierre said a U.N. camp near the airport was struck by stray gunfire, but no one was injured. He said U.N. troops were setting up checkpoints and conducting armored patrols in Bukavu to prevent fighting from breaking out in the city.

THE NEW OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO HAS CONFUSED THE UN AND RISKS THE NEW PEACE DEAL.
The Independent (London) June 1, 2004, Pg 25

Another U.N. official, speaking by telephone from the city, described the situation as "chaotic and confused", adding that "nobody is sure what's really happening". The violent outbreak is the latest blow to a peace deal supposed to end a six-year war that has caused more than 3.5 million deaths, mostly from disease and starvation.

KIVU AND KATANGA ARE ON THE BRINK OF RENEWED FIGHTING.
Africa News (South Scan) March 8, 2004, Pg. L/N

Cannibalism in Southern Kivu and Northern Katanga In Southern Kivu the situation remains very volatile. The 'Mwami' (king) of the small territory of Ngweshe, Pierre Ndatabaye, who also sits in the Congolese Senate, accused all the groups there of committing atrocities. Since 1998 there had been 2,500 reported attacks against villages and the official return of peace to the country had not produced an end to these attacks, he said. In a letter dated February 21 he said that men in military fatigues had abducted all the girls from the Musengezi Roman Catholic primary school and had taken them to the nearby forest of Nindja. "Several days ago three persons had their throats cut and were eaten after their kidnapping in Izege by armed men wearing military uniforms", he said. They had then entered into the village to exhibit the heads of their victims and left the message, "As long as we keep our weapons we shall not be lacking food". Those blamed for the outrages include the CRD, the Rwandan Hutu Interahamwe militias, the 'Forces d'Autodfense Populaires Mai-Mais', created by Laurent Kabila, the 'Mudundu 40' Mai-Mai militia, which fights on the side of the CRD, and "other bandits without scruples". The Mwami also attacked MONUC for failing to help the local people. There is no doubt that MONUC's prestige is at this lowest in this region. On March 1, a 'dead city' shutdown was organized by civil society groups to protest against the CRD, which still rules the city, and against MONUC because the UN did not support the pro-Kabila Gen. Nabyolwa in his battle with his deputy, the pro-CRD colonel Jules Mutebushi.
CONGO INHERENCY: FIGHTING CONTINUES

REBELS ARE TAKING OVER TOWNS AGAIN IN THE CONGO.
BBC News June 2, 2004

Dissident soldiers have taken control of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo town of Bukavu after a week of fighting with regular army troops. The BBC's Rob Walker in the town says the army had withdrawn from Bukavu, which is now calm except for looting. He says the 1,000 United Nations troops around Bukavu have not intervened to prevent the rebel advance. Under a 2003 peace deal, former rebels should be integrated into the army and the clashes threaten the peace process. UN sources say that a column of between 2,000 and 4,000 dissident fighters, led by Brig Gen Laurent Nkunda, has entered Bukavu.

MORE EVIDENCE.
BBC News June 2, 2004

Both Col Mutebusi and Gen Nkunda are former members of the largest rebel group during DR Congo's five-year civil war, RCD-Goma. A senior government delegation had been expected in Bukavu later on Wednesday, led by former RCD-Goma commander Vice-President Azarias Ruderwa. Under a peace deal agreed last year, all the Congolese warring factions were supposed to unite as a single army, but progress has been slow. The deal ended five years of war, which dragged in at least six other countries.

THE CONGO IS SLIPPING BACK INTO WAR.
Finbarr O'Reilly Aid Agencies Fear New Congo War, Humanitarian Crisis AlertNet May 20, 2004

The Democratic Republic of Congo is sliding dangerously back into war and aid agencies are preparing against an expected return to fighting in the volatile east, a senior U.N. official said on Thursday. The vast central African nation is struggling to emerge from a devastating five-year regional conflict that involved at least six countries and killed more than three million people, mostly civilians who died from hunger and disease. But deepening divisions within Kinshasa's transitional government, entrusted with steering the chaotic and divided state towards general elections next year, have threatened to derail a shaky peace process in the former Zaire. "We are extremely concerned because all the indicators have turned from green to red. Things have gone sour in eastern Congo," said Jahal de Meritens, head of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Congo (OCHA). OCHA oversees relief efforts by U.N aid agencies and groups such as World Vision, OXFAM and Caritas. "We have been working on contingency plans for the eastern provinces, but it's more a plan of action because we are now so close to being in a crisis. The situation is deteriorating very quickly," de Meritens told Reuters in the eastern Congolese town of Goma, bordering Rwanda.

THE CONGO IS ON THE BRINK OF WAR.
Finbarr O'Reilly Aid Agencies Fear New Congo War, Humanitarian Crisis AlertNet May 20, 2004

Clashes have erupted in recent weeks between the newly united but still disorganised Congolese army and Rwandan Hutu rebels who have been hiding in the Congolese bush for a decade since fleeing Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Many of the Rwandan rebels, also known as "Interahamwe", were involved in the 1994 slaughter of some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and their presence in eastern Congo helped fuel half a decade of conflict in the ex-Belgian colony. Their renewed activity has further divided Congo's already fractious transitional government, which includes ex-rebels sympathetic to Rwanda, and could again destabilise the region. Aside from localised fighting, some observers fear the deteriorating situation could spark a fresh Rwandan invasion. Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who withdrew his 23,000 troops from Congo under a 2002 peace deal, threatened this month to send his army back if the U.N. mission and Congo could not neutralise the threat from the Hutus rebels. Burundi, which shares borders with both Congo and Rwanda and is emerging from its own 10-year civil war, said this week it was stepping up frontier patrols to prevent Hutu rebels from using its territory to stage a possible attack on Rwanda. Rwanda says the Interahamwe attacked a village within its borders on April 8, but the U.N. and foreign diplomats have been unable to confirm a cross-border raid took place. The long-awaited appointment this week of governors to Congo's 11 provinces diffused some tensions of the past month, according to some aid workers and Goma residents, but de Meritens said he still wanted to be prepared for the worst. "Wars in Congo tend to target the civilian population and we have to be ready to deal with the massive displacement of people when it happens," he said.
CONGO: INHERENCY: MONUC FAILS


It is not unusual for differences of opinion to exist between a policy-oriented Headquarters that is driven by political realities, and the groundlevel military and civilian personnel a half a world away who believe they have been given an impossible mission constrain by a lack of money, people and political will. But as any military planner knows, it is the job of the headquarters to clearly define a mission and then to provide the resources necessary to accomplish that mission. The DPKO has failed on both accounts. Although leaders in New York understand that the mandate is a political product, and they understand the political “realities” that it represents, there is no such clarity in the DRC. There, MONUC personnel are frustrated by having a Chapter 7 component without the assets to implement it. And, if DPKO’s charge is correct – that the problem is not the mandate but rather the “risk averse” MONUC leadership – DPKO still bears responsibility for not acting to change the leadership or correct those risk-averse tendencies. It is clear, given the fact that a Chapter 7 protection mandate was approved by the P-5 and DPKO, that there was some international support for MONUC to provide protection to the civilian population. It is also clear that there is no support among UN member states to adopt a Chapter 7 mandate that would clearly and unambiguously allow MONUC forces to enforce peace and disarm combatants.

MONUC DRAGS ITS FEET WHEN HELPING DISTRIBUTING SUPPLIES.

A frequent complaint from NGOs is the difficulty in getting MONUC to assist in transporting humanitarian supplies to needy populations. An OCHA representative who visited the DRC in August 2002 noted, “It was surprising to see how MONUC viewed its relationship with the NGOs. They had a disrespectful attitude. There’s been some progress since then. MONUC plans to increase cargo for NGOs. But there’s still a lack of pro-activeness on the part of MONUC.”

MONUC LACKS A MANDATE FOR FIELD PROJECTS.

It’s not a one-sided issue. A MONUC Humanitarian Affairs Officer in eastern DRC explained, “We don’t have a mandate for field projects. We help a lot in transportation of goods. We assisted 9,000 non-MONUC passengers in the past year. It usually takes 3 days to get the paperwork for travel requests. It depends on the availability of flights and clearances from rebel forces. I feel like we’re becoming a travel agency. Too many people are coming to us for flights. We need more staff in the field. The Humanitarian Affairs mission doesn’t give us many resources but we’re trying to do it.”

MONUC’S BUREAUCRACY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO WORK WITH.

But what is particularly hard to work with is the MONUC bureaucracy. All flight requests from anywhere in the country must be approved at MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. That is a process that can take many days. And even if a flight request is approved and an NGO has its supplies ready at the airfield, the priority can change without notice, leaving the NGO and supplies on the ground. This happens frequently and all decisions are final – unarguable, non-negotiable, no appeal. As one NGO said, “When we need to get food and medicine to people in need, we can’t wait until 2004.”
CONGO: INHERENCY: MONUC FAILS

MONUC HAS BECOME RIDDLED WITH RED TAPE AND INEFFICIENT.
Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, Refugees International, MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success, May 2003

NGOs also complain about other aspects of coordinating and communicating with MONUC. Many complain that too much communication is one-way, flowing from NGOs to MONUC, but not in the other direction. They complain that in places like Kisangani, Kalemie, Goma, Bukavu and other cities where there is a large NGO and MONUC presence, the NGOs have organized weekly meetings for sharing information. MONUC is always invited to attend. But the MONUC representatives rotate frequently and do not establish a rapport with the NGOs. Many times, the representative does not speak French and therefore does not contribute beyond a short, prepared security briefing, in English, based many times on information provided by the NGOs, who often have better access to remote areas than do MONUC personnel.

MONUC IS DEVOID OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.
Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, Refugees International, MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success, May 2003

NGOs are also concerned about the lack of MONUC humanitarian affairs, child protection and human rights staff, with whom they would like to have greater contact and coordination. Many MONUC personnel in these areas share this frustration. One MONUC Child Protection Officer said, “My role in MONUC? There are two of us here in this location. [There are eight international Child Protection Advisors and several national assistants throughout the DRC.] We’re not implementing anything. We have no budget. We observe, monitor and report. We establish links between partners and donors.”

MONUC IS UNABLE TO PERFORM ITS MISSION.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

MONUC proved totally incapable of fulfilling its protection mandate, even though it managed to help a few of the close to 20,000 IDPs who remained throughout the fighting. On 11 May, 5.5 tons of wheat, beans and oil, clean water and medical kits were, for example, distributed at Bunia airport. On 12 May, the UPC retook the town and started to repeat the atrocities the Lendu militias had committed the week before. In the end more than 400 people were killed in the two weeks, with the assassination campaign and systematic ethnic cleansing organized successively by both militias.

MONUC’S MANDATE IS TOO WEAK TO BE EFFECTIVE.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

Ituri’s pacification remains highly uncertain. The IEMF is conceived only as a stopgap, to hold the line until additional MONUC troops are deployed in September. Yet, if it does not urgently demilitarize Bunia, it is likely to be caught in a crossfire of accusations from all militias that almost certainly will lead to conflict. If MONUC cannot deploy outside the town and lacks a robust mandate to support the cantonment and disarmament of the militias and protect civilians in rural areas, Ituri pacification will be stillborn, and acts of genocide could be committed within a few kilometres of Bunia while peacekeepers watch helplessly.

THE UN MISSION IN CONGO CURRENTLY HAS NO HOPE OF CREATING A SUSTAINED PEACE.
ANSA English Media Service February 16, 2004

All these troops are an enormous and expensive effort, which does not bring peace but only contains damage at the best. Such is the case with the Democratic Republic of Congo, where wealthy northeastern province of Ituri, controlled by rivalling militias, is a true bloody hell. The only peaceful area in the province is its capital Bunia.
THE MONUC MISSION HAS BEEN A TOTAL FAILURE.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele The UN in Congo: The Failure of a Peacekeeping Mission International Herald Tribune May 10, 2004

The charter of the United Nations is to ensure world peace, but this mandate is being sorely tested in Congo, where the organization has 10,800 peacekeepers. The United Nations Mission in Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC, embodies the failure and all the contradictions that have characterized the organization worldwide in the last decade. In eastern Congo, where rape and insecurity are the daily lot of hopeless civilians, the mission has, in fact, become the symbol of impunity. The UN troops were sent to Congo in 1999, in the midst of a civil war that killed more than 3.3 million people. The war drew in many of Congo's neighbors, including Uganda and Rwanda - which accused President Laurent Kabila of supporting the Rwandan insurgents who had participated in genocide. In a 2002 agreement that established a power-sharing government in Kinshasa, the foreign troops were supposed to withdraw while the UN and Congo pledged to send home the insurgents. Rwanda, however, saying that Congo hasn't held to its part of the agreement, has repeatedly violated the agreements with impunity, sending troops in and saying they are searching for rebels that stage raids on Rwandan villages. A run-in between UN troops and hundreds of Rwandan soldiers in eastern Congo last month underscores the mission's ineffectiveness. In the confrontation, on April 21, the Rwandan Army ordered UN troops to withdraw from the area, and in a shocking reversal of roles, they complied - even though under their mandate they can use force to protect the peace. This incident, which is denied by Rwanda, is the latest to leave Congolese wondering what exactly is the purpose of the UN troops. In addition, in the last three months, several weapons caches have been found in areas in the eastern provinces that are controlled by Rwandan and Ugandan proxies. As far as is known, the UN has neither seized these weapons nor arrested anyone in connection with them, even though they signal another war on the horizon. Instead, the UN seems reluctant to disturb the status quo. But the trading of accusations about insurgents is merely a front for the real issue at stake, Congo's natural resources. A report last year by a UN expert panel led by Mahmoud Kassem, Knight-Ridder newspapers reported, accused both Rwanda and Uganda of prolonging the civil war so that they could illegally siphon off Congo's wealth with the help of Western corporations. While neither Uganda nor Rwanda have gold or diamond deposits of significance, both countries have become important exporters of these minerals. The Security Council, however, refused to publish the report in its entirety. By classifying the most damning portions of the report, the United Nations has become an accomplice to those who are guilty of atrocities and human rights violations so they and their patrons can continue to plunder Congo. Warlords will continue to endanger the peace process as long as their patrons go unchallenged and unrecognized. Rwanda and Uganda have no incentive to stop the financing and arming of their proxies. The UN needs to take a stand by pushing for sanctions, like an arms embargo and the withholding of financial aid from international institutions, on Rwanda and Uganda and by using force, if necessary, to keep their troops out of Congo. Today, the Congolese disillusionment is all too obvious. Children throw rocks at the UN mission trucks as they pass on the road. The current transitional government in Kinshasa includes several officials who have been accused of war crimes. For the frightened civilians in eastern Congo, neither the so-called transitional government nor the UN matters. They face mass rape and violence on their own. The United Nations must take an active and forceful role in its Congo mission. Their passive presence has become a mockery of peace.
THE FRENCH FORCE FAILS TO PROVIDE SECURITY
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

Yet, the IEMF falls far short of what is needed to pacify Ituri or even consolidate the IPC’s interim administration authority. Its mandate even seems to back-track from the objectives stated in the resolution’s preamble, in which the Security Council claims to be: Reaffirming its full support for the political process initiated by the Ituri Pacification Commission, calling for its swift resumption and for the establishment of an effective inclusive security mechanism in this framework, to complement and support the existing Ituri interim administration, [and r]ecognising the urgent need for a secure base to allow the full functioning of the institutions of the Ituri Interim Administration, and recognising that the Engagement to Relaunch the Ituri pacification process, signed in Dares- Salaam on 16 May 2003, reaffirms the Ituri parties’ commitment to the Ituri interim administration, and commits them to join a process of cantonment and demilitarisation. The mandate requires that the IEMF provide protection for the civilians remaining in the internally displaced camps around Bunia and that it intervene to restore security in case of an outbreak of violence, such as an attack by Lendu militias against the UPC. To a certain extent, the IEMF could be considered by the FRPI as an ally of the UPC since it is not going to challenge its presence in the town or contribute to either Bunia’s demilitarisation, the UPC’s cantonment or its disarmament, as required in the pacification process. As long as the UPC keeps its troops under control on the streets of Bunia and leaves the humanitarian agencies in the IDP camps alone, it should have no problem with the IEMF and can still intimidate and undermine the authority of Ituri interim administration officials through its armed presence inside town. Moreover, since Bunia is currently almost uninhabited, the humanitarian impact of the intervention is likely to be limited unless displaced civilians return massively.

RWANDA AND UGANDA WON’T LISTEN TO THE FRENCH.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

Despite their official support for the IEMF, Rwanda and its Congolese proxies perceive the deployment of a French-dominated force in North-Eastern Congo with hostility, because of Paris’s alignment with Kinshasa’s interests and the possibility of covert military support and political gains that the peacekeeping operation could facilitate for the Congolese government. France was the first country to answer UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call for a coalition of the willing to intervene in Ituri, and it is now in the process of deploying, together with Canadian, South African, Nigerian, Pakistani, German and probably British peace-keepers. The Ituri intervention is highly risky. The French do not want to get involved in a quagmire similar to the 1994 “Turquoise” operation in Rwanda and end-up being accused of protecting génocidaires as much as displaced civilians. This is why they conditioned their deployment on participation of other forces and limited their operation to the town of Bunia, until 1 September, under a chapter VII mandate of the UN Charter authorising the use of force when necessary.
CONGO: INHERENCY: NEW PEACE DEAL WILL FAIL.

THE NEW PEACE DEAL WILL FAIL BECAUSE IT EXCLUDES THE CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY REBEL GROUP.
The Independent (London) June 1, 2004, Pg 25

The renegade fighters hail from the Congolese Rally For Democracy (RCD), the main rebel group that signed a power-sharing agreement with the government of Joseph Kabila, the President, last June. But some RCD military officers have been openly hostile towards the deal. In an interview with The Independent last November, Brig- Gen Nkunda said that his Banyamulenge ethnic group had been "marginalised" by the peace deal and "betrayed" by their political leaders. He warned that the rising tensions could "blow" if not acted upon. "All of us will be in a position of fighting," he said. Those threats were realised when troops loyal to another Banyamulenge commander, Colonel Jules Mutebusi, mutinied against the Congolese army in Bukavu last Wednesday. Three days of heavy fighting ensued, fuelled by hidden stockpiles of weapons and ammunition around the lakeside city. Shops were looted and several rapes were reported. At least 27 people died.

CEASEFIRES ARE BROKEN QUICKLY.
Voice of America News June 1, 2004

U.N. officials say fighting broke out near the U.N. controlled airport located outside the eastern city of Bukavu. There are no immediate reports of causalities. Monday, the rebel troops, once members of the former Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy, agreed to stop fighting to allow a DRC government delegation to travel to Bukavu to Renewed fighting has erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo between renegade troops and the army, one day after the two sides agreed to a ceasefire.

SIDES AGREE TO A TRUCE AND THEN CONTINUE FIGHTING.
Channel NewsAsia May 31, 2004

BUKAVU AIRPORT, DR Congo : A group of "dissident" troops in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) pledged to observe a unilateral ceasefire with regular forces in the wake of clashes that have left almost 50 people dead, but fresh fighting was reported just hours later. The group, estimated to number about 1,000, had also pledged to make further advance on the eastern town of Bukavu, where at least 27 people were killed in clashes last week. But the two sides clashed again for several hours late Monday, according to the UN brigade in the region.

LAST YEARS PEACE DEAL WILL COLLAPSE BECAUSE GROUPS WON’T JOIN THE UNIFIED MILITARY.
Voice of America News May 31, 2004

A power-sharing peace deal negotiated last year provides for a unified national army. But several groups of former rebels have been reluctant to join, and have periodically disrupted the consolidation effort, even though their leaders are in the national reconciliation government.
CONGO: INHERENCY: NOT ENOUGH PEACEKEEPERS

THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PEACEKEEPERS ISN’T ENOUGH.
The Independent (London) June 1, 2004, Pg 25

UN peace-keepers restored calm by opening fire on the belligerents, and by Sunday night had established a front line down the main street and shepherded the rebel soldiers back to barracks. Last night the city was again under threat. UN sources said they believed the Congolese army had been weakened by defections. Efforts by the transitional government to negotiate its way out of the crisis were also hampered. President Kabila sent a high-level delegation from Kinshasa - including Azarias Ruberwa, the Vice-President and former RCD leader - to the eastern capital, Goma. But as soon as the team's plane landed, they were put under UN guard following reports - subsequently proved false - that rebels had surrounded the airport. "The government delegation ... decided they didn't feel secure any more," said Jacqueline Chenard, a UN spokeswoman. They are due to travel to Bukavu by helicopter today. The turbulence underscores the risks run by the 10,800 UN peace-keeping mission in eastern Congo, where a dangerous power vacuum exists. Hutu militiamen terrorise villagers; other armed groups have yet to be demobilised; and the formation of a national army appears in greater jeopardy than ever.

THE CURRENT PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE CONGO IS INSUFFICIENT.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003
The district of Ituri, in Oriental Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, has been the theatre of spiralling violence bordering on genocide that urgently needs to be stopped. A French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) is being deployed to restore peace and order in the administrative centre – Bunia – and facilitate humanitarian relief. However, this intervention, authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, is on the face of it totally insufficient.

THE FULL UN MANDATE OF TROOPS HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED.

There is nothing uniquely African about this tragedy, and no particular mystery about how to stop it. It just takes political will on the part of the international community, and a sufficient number of peacekeeping troops with the authority to use "all necessary means" to stop the killing. An emergency force of 1,000 troops in one province isn't enough. Neither is the larger force that the U.N. has maintained in the Congo since the first ceasefire agreement in 1999. It only has 3,800 troops scattered in small pockets across the centre and east of the country (its authorized strength is 8,700, but too few countries were willing to contribute troops), and, in any case, it is an observer force with no right to conduct military operations.
CONGO: INHERENCY: DDR FAILS NOW

DDR CAN'T BE SUCCESSFUL UNTIL RWANDAN HUTU'S IN THE CONGO ARE DISARMED.
Africa News February 27, 2004

Nevertheless, obstacles remain, particularly with regard to Hutu Rwandan militants. "The attitude, the hostility and the suspicion of the extremist leadership of the FDLR [Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda], and the power they exercise over Rwandan combatants and their dependents living in the DRC, constitutes the major obstacle to DDRRR," Peter Swarbrick, head of MONUC's DDRRR unit, told IRIN.

THE FDLR BLOCKS MONUC'S ATTEMPTS AT DDR.
Africa News February 27, 2004

The lack of cooperation from certain leaders of the FDLR - a political/military movement whose presence on Congolese territory was banned by the Kinshasa government following the signature of a peace accord between presidents Joseph Kabila of the DRC and Paul Kagame of Rwanda in July 2002 - has continued to impede MONUC's efforts to reach its target of 10,000 foreign ex-combatants repatriated by 30 April 2004.

THE RWANDAN'S WANT TO RETURN HOME BUT THEIR LEADERS WON'T LET THEM.
Africa News February 27, 2004

Some 3,000 Rwandan ex-combatants and their dependents are believed to be camped in the region of Rusemambo, located in Congo's eastern North Kivu Province. "The majority of Rwandan ex-combatants and their dependents want to return to their country, but they have been prevented from doing so by their extremist leaders," Swarbrick said. This situation has persisted since October 2003, despite repeated intervention by MONUC in an effort to persuade the Rwandans to go home. "They set up surveillance points along the edge of the forest, carrying out intimidation and intoxication campaigns to prevent eligible candidates from being [voluntarily] repatriated," Hamadoun Toure, the MONUC spokesman, said. "Sometimes they carry out raids into nearby villages."
Congo: Inherency: US Policy

The US is cutting money for peacekeeping in the DRC.  
The East African Africa News July 21, 2003

The Bush team is also seeking to cut US expenditures for peacekeeping operations in Africa from $40 million to $24 million. Even deeper cuts are to be made in the contributions the United States makes to United Nations peacekeeping missions in Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

The US supported increasing the UN peacekeeping force size and mandate in the DRC.  
Orlando Sentinel (Florida) July 10, 2003, Pg. A11

United Nations -- The United States will support Secretary-General Kofi Annan's recommendation to increase the U.N. peacekeeping force in Congo by 2,100 troops, Security Council diplomats said Wednesday. France and many African nations have backed Annan's call for a larger U.N. peacekeeping force with a more robust mandate, but the United States has been reluctant to agree. The mandate for the force was extended until the end of July to try to reach an agreement.

US animosity towards France will ultimately stop the US from fully supporting the Congo.  

The European Union and Canada and various other countries are contributing small numbers of troops. The United States is not, although it voted in the Security Council for the expansion of the UN presence. Besides its small size, however, two things threaten to sap the effectiveness of that force. One is that it is led by France, and Bush is still enraged over French opposition to his conquest of Iraq. The other problem is that Congo's immense bloodletting does not threaten to spill over into the United States and Europe, nor does it threaten to cut off the export of strategic minerals. In such circumstances, will the leaders of countries contributing troops be willing to tolerate having their soldiers killed and wounded? The real test of the UN as a peacekeeping power is in a situation like this, where there is not yet a peace to keep.

Too many believe the Congo is beyond help.

On the rare occasions when outsiders do consider Congo, they tend to assume that it is beyond help. Its war is too complicated. At various points, six other African countries have sent substantial forces to attack or defend the Congolese government. In the chaos, countless rebel groups and tribal militias are slaughtering peasants and stealing their goats. The country is vast (five times bigger than Iraq), thickly forested, barely governed and practically roadless. All parties to the war are looting Congo's minerals, which gives them a reason to stay embroiled. Some also have legitimate security concerns. Rwanda, for instance, has good cause to fear the veterans of the genocide of 1994, some of whom are hiding in eastern Congo. The task of restoring peace and putting Congo back together again seems quite impossible.

While the US has said it supports an expanded mandate and deployment to the Congo, it has worked to undermine the effectiveness of the force.  
Francois Grignon There Will Be No Excuses For Not Knowing Observer May 25, 2003

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations also have to share the blame for the severity of the crisis in Ituri. The Bush Administration's refusal to support MONUC's request for extra troops last year delayed deployments in Ituri for months. When Washington finally did give approval for an extra 3,000 MONUC soldiers back in December, it insisted that the deployment be split into two and conditioned to additional reports from the Secretary General - ensuring it takes far too long for any boots to hit the ground where they are most urgently needed.
THE WAR IN THE CONGO IS THE WORST IN HISTORY.
James Sifiore, Special to the Star, The Toronto Star June 2, 2004; Pg. A03

The hostilities involve soldiers loyal to Jules Mutebuzi, a former commander of a Congolese movement controlling Eastern Congo, and pro-integration elements led by transition government-appointed Mbuza Mabe, who is in charge of the province of South Kivu. Between 1998-2003, an estimated 3 million people died in what many consider to be the worst war in the history of Africa.

AT LEAST 3.5 MILLION HAVE ALREADY DIED.

FROM your sofa, you can watch the Iraqi conflict unfold, in real time, through the eyes of hundreds of reporters "embedded" in allied units or holed up in Baghdad. The television footage of Congo's war is less gripping, because there isn't any. According to one informed guess, this forgotten inferno has claimed 3.5m lives since 1998, though there is no accurate count of the bodies, not even to the nearest million. Despite the scale of this carnage, Congo receives little attention because it poses no threat to rich countries, nor indeed to anyone outside central Africa.

MORE EVIDENCE.
Times Newspapers Limited, March 20, 2004, Pg. L/N

More than three million people have been killed or succumbed to conflict-related starvation and disease in the Congo's war since 1998, but the inaccessibility of the interior has ensured that the agony of its people has gone largely unreported, and unaided. Those Congolese who seek to draw attention to what is happening also place themselves at risk: on December 19 last year, three weeks before we arrived, two local human rights workers were arrested and tortured at Mangina on the Beni-Mambasa road by forces of the Armee Populaire Congolaise (APC), a militia allied to the government that had taken back control of the region from the MLC.
ONE IN THREE WOMEN IN THE CONGO ARE SEXUALLY ASSAULTED
James Sifiore, Special to the Star, The Toronto Star June 2, 2004; Pg. A03

Two female volunteers from War Child Netherlands were assaulted at a residence near the hotel during the same gunfight. One was shot in the leg and the other was sexually assaulted. The perpetrators were reportedly two young teenagers carrying AK-47s. War Child executive director Samantha Nutt said the incident was not an isolated one. By one estimate, one in three women in the Congo has been sexually assaulted. "Every day there are women and children dying and raped in Africa. This incident just shows how much there needs to be done to improve the situation."

REBELS NOT ONLY WANT TO KILL, THEY WANT TO KILL PEOPLES SPIRITS. THE RAPE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IS COMMON PLACE IN THE CONGO.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Last May, 6-year-old Shashir was playing outside her home near Goma, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), when armed militia appeared. The terrified child was carried kicking and screaming into the bush. There, she was pinned down and gang-raped. Sexually savaged and bleeding from multiple wounds, she lay there after the attack, how long no one knows, but she was close to starving when finally found. Her attackers, who'd disappeared back into the bush, wiped out her village as effectively as a biblical plague of locusts. "This little girl couldn't walk, couldn't talk when she arrived here. Shashir had to be surgically repaired. I don't know if she can be mentally repaired," says Faida Veronique, a 47-year-old cook at Doctors on Call for Service (DOCS), a tented hospital in the eastern city of Goma, who took in the brutalized child. "Why do they rape a child?" asks Marie-Madeleine Kisoni, a Congolese counselor who works with raped women and children. "We don't understand. There's a spirit of bestiality here now. I've seen 2- and 3-year-olds raped. The rebels want to kill us, but it's more painful to kill the spirit instead."

RAPE BEGETS RAPE. ONCE A WOMAN IS RAPED, SHE IS VIEWED AS A LESSER BY ANOTHER GROUP AND RAPED AGAIN.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

In the DRC, rape is used to terrorize, humiliate and punish the enemy. Frequently husbands, fathers and children are forced to watch and even participate. Women sexually assaulted by members of one rebel organization are accused of being the wives of that group and raped again as punishment when a new militia takes over the area. "It's happened repeatedly to the women of Shabunda in the far east of the Congo, every time the region has changed hands," says Woudenberg.

CONGOLESE REFUGEES ARE AT RISK OF RAPE TOO.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Even the camps for internally displaced people are not safe. The barbed-wire encampment in Bunia is home to more than 14,000 people, but enemy militia infiltrate at night. Shortly before I arrived, an 11-year-old girl was dragged off and gang-raped, a not uncommon occurrence. There are more than 3 million internally displaced people made homeless by the war, many of whom have been forced to flee over and over again. UN officers admit they have nowhere near the numbers they need to be effective, or even to stay safe themselves.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO IS UNLIKE ANY SEEN BEFORE IN HISTORY, EVEN WORSE THAN RWANDA.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Trevor Lowe, spokesperson for the UN World Food Program, echoes this view. "The nature of sexual violence in the DRC conflict is grotesque, completely abnormal," he says. "Babies, children, women--nobody is being spared. For every woman speaking out, there are hundreds who've not yet emerged from the hell. Rape is so stigmatized in the DRC, and people are afraid of reprisals from rebels. It's a complete and utter breakdown of norms. Like Rwanda, only worse." Adds his colleague Christiane Berthiaume, "Never before have we found as many victims of rape in conflict situations as we are discovering in the DRC."

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO IS WORSE THAN RWANDA AND BOSNIA YET NOTHING IS BEING DONE ABOUT IT.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Yet where is the international media coverage? The outrage? The demand for justice? During the Rwanda genocide, rape as a war crime received extensive international media coverage. Despite initial reports of 250,000 women being sexually assaulted (a third more than there were Tutsi women living in the country at the time), evidence later suggested the total number was closer to one-fifth of that. In Bosnia, where the European Community Investigative Mission concluded there were some 20,000 victims, reports of systematic rape by the Serbs first made international headlines one year into the war, and remained a major news focus for the remaining three years of the conflict. It was only after the Bosnia war, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague in 1997, that rape was first prosecuted as a crime against humanity. A year later, at the Rwanda tribunal, rape was found to be a form of genocide. Everyone I spoke with in the DRC and in the international UN, NGO and human rights community said they believe the incidence of rape there greatly exceeds that in both Bosnia and Rwanda, although it will be years before precise figures are available. The systematic nature of the assaults has been amply documented by the UN, humanitarian agencies and human rights organizations. Yet for the most part the media look the other way. As one editor of a national newspaper told me, "It's just another horror in the horror that is Africa." One has to ask, Does this kind of cynicism merely reflect public opinion or help create it?

THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE ABOUT RAPE IS NOT ENOUGH. MORE MUST BE DONE TO MAKE SURE IMPUNITY IS REMOVED.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Rape as a weapon of war is as old as war itself. What has changed recently is that sexual violence is no longer considered just a byproduct of conflict but is being viewed as a war crime, says Jessica Neuwirth, president of Equality Now, a New York--based international women's human rights organization. "Rape as a violation of war was codified in the Geneva Convention, but only now is it being taken seriously. But it is still not effectively prosecuted, not proportional to the extent that sexual violence takes place," she says. Armed forces now have a legal obligation to stop rape and hold the offenders accountable. "This is a major shift in consciousness. But it needs to be followed by a major shift in conduct," says Neuwirth.

CURRENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IGNORE RAPES AND VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST WOMEN.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Kinshasa's policy-makers, who serve in a government with four vice presidents in a misguided attempt to appease various factions, now claim a new political beginning after the so-called peace accord last year. But there is a "huge and dangerous gap" between what is happening in Kinshasa and what is going on in the northeast, says Irene Khan, Amnesty International's secretary general. "In Kinshasa there is talk of peace and political progress, of regional harmony and democratic elections. But while the newly appointed members of government are wrangling for power and privilege in Kinshasa, in the Kivus and Ituri people are confronted daily with death, plunder and carnage. Mutilations and massacres continue. Rape of women and girls has become a standard tactic of warfare. It is absolutely outrageous that many of the senior members of the government and the political parties they represent are closely linked to the armed groups who are committing these abuses."
CONGO: HARMS: RACISM

LACK OF ATTENTION TO THE CONFLICT IN THE CONGO IS FROM RACISM.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Says Lowe, "Look at the square footage of Bosnia, a country that is dwarfed by the Congo, and look at the enormous number of reporters who covered Bosnia compared to the DRC. Clearly, Africa doesn't get the same coverage as Europe. The reasons are racial, geopolitical interests, ease of access, etc. The DRC conflict is an extremely dangerous one, which is one reason the press is not there. Selling Africa, and being part of an agency that does it all the time, is difficult. Africa is clearly not a place where the major powers have a lot of interest. The Congo is not on the geopolitical map. And the major-league press follows that geopolitical map." There is also media faddishness, what Lowe refers to as the CNN factor. "If CNN shows up, then other reporters become interested," he says.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE WAR IN CONGO IS DUE THE US GOVERNMENT. RAPE AND VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO ISN'T ON THE PRIORITY LIST.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Conduct a straw poll among Americans who are usually well informed and few know of the vicious campaign of sexual violence against women in the DRC. Many are even unaware that the country is six years into a brutal conflict, in which up to 4.7 million people have died--the highest number of fatalities in any conflict since World War II. Or that six countries--Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia--have been fighting proxy wars in the DRC, and helping to plunder the country's tremendous mineral wealth to fill their coffers. The indifference, according to Woudenberg, extends to the arms of government that should be most deeply concerned with the DRC's crisis. "In November I tried to raise the issue with the US Mission to the UN in New York, and they told me fairly point-blank that they were aware rape was going on in the Congo, and it was just not high on their priorities," she says. "I had a similar response from the US State Department."

US MINERAL INTERESTS HAVE FUELED THE WAR IN THE CONGO.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

Meanwhile, a UN Security Council panel has cited eighty-five multinational corporations, including some of the largest US companies in their fields, for their involvement in the illegal exploitation of natural resources from the DRC. The commerce in these "blood" minerals, such as coltan, used in cell phones and laptops, cobalt, copper, gold, diamonds and uranium (Congolese uranium was used in the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), drives the conflict. The brutality of the militias--the sexual slavery, transmission of HIV/AIDS through rape, cannibalism, slaughter and starvation, forced recruitment of child soldiers--has routinely been employed to secure access to mining sites or insure a supply of captive labor.

CORPORATE GREED IS FUELING RAPE AND CIVIL WAR IN THE CONGO.
Jan Goodwin, The Nation March 8, 2004

If that isn't enough to awaken the international community's interest, one would think it would be of concern that "blood" business practices also fund terrorism. Lebanese diamond traders benefiting from illegal concessions in the Congo have been tied to the Islamic extremist groups Amal and Hezbollah. According to a UN report, the Lebanese traders, who operate licensed diamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamonds from the DRC valued at $150 million in 2001 alone. Such linkage between African rebel groups and global terrorist movements is not new. Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front reportedly sold diamonds to Al Qaeda, thus helping to finance both organizations. The lobbies of the two luxury hotels in Kinshasa, the DRC's capital, are full of elegant, $5,000-a-day corporate lawyers from New York, London and Geneva, and scruffier diamond dealers from Tel Aviv and Antwerp, as they while away the hours waiting for government ministers and senior representatives of armed groups to smooth their way. These institutional fortune-makers are 1,800 miles away from the nightmares of northeastern Congo. Yet they are not so far removed from the atrocities perpetrated there. Rape is a crime of the war they are fueling with their greed.
CONGO: HARMS: GENOCIDE

THE VIOLENCE IN ITURI WAS/IS GENOCIDAL IN NATURE.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The violence in Ituri has, since 1999, progressively spread to all territories of the district and virtually all its communities. Initially unleashed in Djugu, it rapidly spread to Irumu and finally reached Mahagi, Aru and Mambasa, with other communities creating their own ethnic militias and sometimes taking sides between the Hema and the Lendu militias. Over the past four years, one constant feature boosted the violence: Uganda’s divide-and-rule tactics with its Congolese rebel proxies. For four years, every Congolese rebel in charge of Ituri was enthroned by Uganda, then replaced by another of its creatures. Wamba dia Wamba, Mbusa Nyamwisi, John Tibasiima, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Thomas Lubanga, Chief Kahwa, and others all briefly ruled Ituri as protegés of one or another Ugandan generals. This is not to exonerate Congolese responsibility in the massacres. Most of the above-mentioned leaders could be convicted for crimes against humanity for involvement in what happened during their rule of Ituri. But Uganda continuously spread oil on the fire, trained and armed militias, sided with the Hema and manipulated rebel lieutenants to turn against their leaders. All this makes its officers accomplices to the acts of genocide that were committed. Similarly, Rwanda and Kinshasa’s recent involvement, including heavy arming of Hema and Lendu militias, imply the same burden of responsibility. The total collapse of administrative authority after the war began was never corrected by any of the rebel leaderships responsible for Ituri under Ugandan influence. Ituri was far from the main theatre of military operations where the rebel coalition allied to Rwanda and Uganda fought the alliance led by the then Congolese president, Laurent-Desiré Kabila. Situated on Uganda’s doorstep, Ituri fell under direct Ugandan administration and into the hands of whomever Uganda imposed. The first wave of violence started in June 1999, when a Hema businessman with fake deeds attempted to evict Lendu families from land he claimed to have acquired. This sparked six months of continuous violence – a succession of attacks and reprisals, resulting in destruction of villages and manhunts throughout Djugu. 4

GENOCIDE AND ATTEMPTS AT ETHNIC CLEANSING ARE THROUGHOUT THE CONGO CIVIL WAR.
ICG Africa Report N 64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The UPC takeover of Bunia was celebrated with the ethnic cleansing of Nande, Bira and Lendu families and the looting of shops belonging to Nande businessmen by both UPC and UPDF soldiers. The APC and Lendu militias reacted with one of the worst massacres of the conflict – a clear act of genocide – at Nyakunde on 5 September. After an additional UPC attack on the Ngiti community at Songolo, twenty km southeast of Nyakunde, the APC carefully planned revenge. Close to 1,000 Hema civilians were mutilated and slaughtered, including the sick and elderly and the women and children who had sought refuge at the local Hospital. Bira civilians were also massacred.14 From August 2002 to March 2003, Lubanga’s leadership was no better than Nyamwisi’s and led to another escalation. Non-Hema or Lendu communities, like the Bira or the Alur, were punished by both Hema and Lendu militias and the APC for lack of support or for collaboration with the enemy. By the fall of 2002, arbitrary arrests, abusive taxation, intimidation of humanitarian NGOs, and systematic torture had all become synonymous with Lubanga’s reign of terror, while a direct war with the APC continued in the rural areas.15
FEARS OF EXTERMINATION ARE THROUGHOUT EASTERN CONGO.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The total absence of judicial process entrenched a fear of extermination in both communities that recalls the psychology leading to the Rwanda genocide. The many casualties and civilian displacements reinforced a destitution that became the engine for the massacres. Fear of attacks based on rumours led to pre-emptive strikes followed by reprisals. The trauma of violence also led to an escalation in ritual killing among both communities. In a public orgy of violence on 19 January 2001, Hema youths paraded in Bunia with the heads of three Lendu victims, after they had been asked by Ugandan officers to kill infiltrators who had attacked their airport positions that morning. Similarly, body mutilation, cannibalism and exhibition of body parts as trophies were regularly reported to be systematically practiced by Lendu militias since 2000 as part of a protection ritual. With time, traumatised displaced civilians resorted more and more to witchcraft and rituals. Whereas initially a drink mixture combined with drugs was believed sufficient to protect against bullet wounds, the consumption of human body parts slowly became a must. This is now reported to be also practised by the Hema.16 Dehumanisation of the enemy became a justification for extermination. Ethnic stereotyping gave way to genocidal intent. The ethnic –based cultural and self-help associations – LORI for the Lendu and ENTE for the Hema – that had spread in the Congo in the early 1990s to compensate for the total collapse of state welfare institutions, provided an intellectual vehicle for mobilising and justifying violence and became the prime propagators of hate.
CONGO: HARMS: KIVUS REGION

KIVUS IS IN DIRE NEED OF ASSISTANCE AND RISKS TUBING THE ENTIRE PEACE PROCESS.
UNFORTUNATELY, MONUC’S MANDATES DON’T INCLUDE KIVUS.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The situation in Ituri that has captured today’s headlines is grim but it is part of a larger set of inextricably linked challenges to peace that apply throughout all of Eastern Congo. The situation in the Kivus is arguably more tragic yet, with potentially farther reaching consequences. Very serious fighting continues there in what has been the main theatre for both direct and proxy confrontation between local, national and regional participants in the Congo conflict since the Lusaka ceasefire was signed in 1999. The population is suffering while international attention is almost completely absent. The Kivus were the powder keg where ethnic massacres first exploded in the 1990s and regional war in 1996 and 1998. The situation is now complicated by direct military involvement of external actors, multiplication of local warlords and active exploitation of natural resources by both. All regional actors are making strong efforts to mould the provinces to their own strategic needs. The withdrawal of most Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 2002 has not fundamentally changed this dynamic. Neither MONUC’s plans nor finalisation of an inclusive political agreement will be enough to make a difference in the Kivus. MONUC’s mandate is insufficient for disarming the Hutu and Congolese militias, and the political agreement for a national unity government and elections after two years does not address the reality of power in the Kivus or provide credible solutions to the nationality, ethnicity and land crises that fuel the local war. If fighting does not stop, all plans to restore national authority and reunify the territory will be meaningless. Additional measures with respect to both the military and political aspects are required, as well as a new international determination to move beyond the immediate crisis of Bunia and Ituri to deal comprehensively with the wider problems of Eastern Congo.48
MONUC MUST BE GIVEN THE DDR MANDATE AND MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

MONUC, which is supposed to takeover from the IEMF by late August, needs to have the means and robust mandate to ensure
the permanent demilitarisation of Bunia, support the negotiated cantonment and DR of all militias, and deploy peacekeepers in
at least three other strategic towns of Ituri (Irumu, Mongbwalu, Aru) to support rural pacification and guarantee humanitarian
access throughout the district. This is a big order, but if it is not filled, the current effort will prove useless and with the transfer
of authority back to MONUC and its weak mandate after three months, Ituri will return to chaos.

DDR MUST BE ADDED TO THE MONUC MANDATE FOR IT TO SUCCEED IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE
CONGO.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

In the second special report on MONUC submitted to the Security Council on 27 May, the Secretary General proposed
establishment of an Ituri pacification support unit to provide comprehensive support to the Interim Administration. He also
proposed establishment of a small civilian police unit to plan the formation of an integrated police element in Ituri and the
strengthening of the human rights department in Bunia. The Secretary General further assessed that in order to establish a
framework of security in support of the on-going political process, "a brigade-size formation consisting of three infantry
battalions with appropriate support (logistics, utility, helicopter, engineering) and totalling up to 3,800 personnel would be
necessary". Such a military presence would help MILOBS access the more remote areas, and "provide limited support to
humanitarian operations in selected locations", notably along the axis towards Djjugu and Mahagi. This would definitely be a
positive step that the Security Council should approve. However, a change of the DR component of the MONUC mandate to
permit a more robust approach in support of pacification remains key to the stabilisation of Ituri and must be addressed
urgently.

EXPANDING MONUCS MANDATE AND PROVIDING SUPPORT TO PACIFY ITURI IS KEY TO THE
MISSIONS SUCCESS. IF IT WORKS, IT CAN SERVE AS A TEST CASE FOR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

These measures are similar to those discussed in detail above for Ituri. Indeed, while the plan for the Kivus would have to make adjustments
for local circumstances, one reason why Ituri has become so important is that it provides the opportunity to develop and apply a strategy that
is applicable for the wider conflict in the north and north-eastern parts of the country. Once a government of transition is formed in Kinshasa,
MONUC should take the initiative to propose the organisation of a Kivus Pacification Commission, involving the government of transition
(with the current government, RCD-ML and RCD-Goma representatives included) and all local civilian and militia players. Its objective
would be to establish a roadmap for the sustained pacification of the Kivus. Ituri has become another fighting ground for the proxies of
Rwanda, Uganda and Kinshasa. If the current stalemate over the last leg of negotiations for the beginning of the Congolese transition is not
urgently solved, it could become a prelude to a third phase of the Congo war. Central to whether that happens is the formation and growth of
the transition government and agreement on the “new national Congolese army”. The intervention in Ituri is dramatic and necessary, and
more needs to be done to ensure its success. But it is a band-aid operation on a piece of the overall problem that should not distract the
international community from the main aim as defined in Lusaka Agreement. There is no other way for Ituri to be pacified than through a
sustained, robust, and widespread UN intervention. Only by doing this can the international community prove that it is determined to end the
Congo conflict and the UN show that it is indeed able to support the transitional government effectively and help alleviate the sufferings of
the hundreds of thousands of civilians who have been displaced and traumatised by this war. There is only one honourable exit strategy from
Ituri. It is to hand over the Ituri Interim Administration to a legitimate transitional government with adequate police and military capabilities
and that will guarantee future elections in the Congo will not reignite the fires of recent years. The pacification of Ituri, however, is also a test
case for the pacification of the entire eastern Congo. Today in the Kivus, the fighting continues unabated, producing more civilian casualties
than Ituri has ever had. A local consultative process, sidelining criminal warlords and supported by a strong multinational force, could also be
the winning formula for the DR of the Hutu armed groups and pacification in the Kivus. Yet, the international community has first to prove
that it is capable of succeeding in Ituri, and this means giving a robust mandate to MONUC.
A STRONGER MANDATE AND MORE SUPPORT IS KEY TO MAKING MONUC WORK. ANYTHING LESS WILL LEAVE THE COUNTRY DIVIDED.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

Only a more forceful and geographically more extensive UN intervention maintained for much longer than IEMF is envisaged can lead to sustainable peace. It must have the physical capability and political backing to use its Chapter VII mandate robustly against some degree of potential armed opposition and be geared towards restoration of Congolese state sovereignty. The UN intervention must also be supported by sustained international pressure on the conflict’s regional actors and their proxies to support pacification and finalise negotiations toward establishment of a legitimate transitional Congo government. Anything less is likely to leave the Congo divided, insecure, and a source of further instability throughout Central Africa.

A STRONGER, MORE ROBUST MANDATE THAT STARTS WITH PACIFYING ITURI CAN SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE CONGO.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The IEMF has only been conceived as a bridging facility, to hold the line for the deployment of additional regular MONUC troops in September 2003. Yet, if MONUC forces cannot deploy outside Bunia and do not also have a robust mandate to support the cantonment, and demilitarisation of the militias as well as protect civilians in the rural areas, the pacification of Ituri will remain stillborn. Only a sustained and strong UN intervention geared towards restoring Congolese State sovereignty can lead to a sustainable pacification of Ituri. Any lesser commitment is likely to be defeated by the vested interests involved in the conflict. The stakes are higher, however, than just Ituri. The pacification of that district should provide a winning formula for the pacification of the Congo’s entire east. That is what this report seeks to outline.

THE UN MANDATE MUST BE INCREASED BOTH IN SIZE AND GEOGRAPHY.
End Genocide 2003 http://www.endgenocide.org/warnings/congo.htm

This Security Council Resolution is insufficient. A UN intervention force needs to be more extensive geographically as well as be more robust in the force it can use to protect civilians. The UN intervention must be supported by sustained international pressure on the conflict's regional actors and their proxies to support pacification and move towards the establishment of a legitimate transitional Congo government.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST INCREASE IT'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO.
Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Political Scientist Traveling in Africa, When Will the Congo Find Peace? Africana , March 25, 2004

In Bunia, I met with young Congolese activists at an organization called Justice Plus. Though armed with only minimal resources, these young activists are working to document human rights abuses in the region, seeking to make the rebel movements more accountable for their actions. If given the chance, it is not hard to imagine that these activists could do much to develop the region into the powerhouse it has the potential to be. But therein lies the region's constant predicament. Since the horrific days of Belgian colonialism, through the western-sponsored kleptocracy of Mobutu, and the current meddling of African states in the region, the people of Eastern Congo have never been given the chance to control their own destiny. While greater attention by the international community is critical if there is to be a genuine resolution to the conflict, the region will have any hope for success only if the interests and desires of the Congolese people are put first. As long as the international community's interests remain more with what lies under the ground than with the people living there, hope itself may be the rarest commodity.
CONGO: SOLVENCY: SMALL ARMS

CUTTING OFF SMALL ARMS FLOWS IS KEY TO STOPPING CONFLICT.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

Cutting off the arms flow to Ituri is another central element to the pacification process. As long as the different militias are able to obtain cheap weapons from private means (an AK47 sells for U.S.$30-$50 on the Bunia market) or from foreign backers, the conflict will not end. There are currently six to eight known roads, four Lake Albert delivery sites and a dozen airstrips through which weapons suppliers deliver their cargo. MONUC must enhance its presence along these sights to stop or at least contain these small arms flows.

CONGO: SOLVENCY: AT CAN’T STOP RWANDA

PACIFICATION OF THE ITURI REGION WILL STOP RWANDAN ADVENTURISM.
ICG Africa Report N  64 Congo Crisis: Military Intervention In Ituri June 13, 2003

The settlement of the Ituri conflict is intended to take place within the framework of the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the Ugandan and DRC governments, in which Kinshasa traded withdrawal of Ugandan troops against establishment of a joint security mechanism at the common border and the holding of an Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) to which Uganda would be party. Uganda sought to perpetuate its political influence in Ituri while exploiting the natural resources of a district that contains the world’s largest gold reserves. The agreement also sealed a new alliance between Angola, the DRC and Uganda. Through the IPC, Kinshasa hoped to consolidate its presence in North- Eastern Congo and, with Uganda, block Rwanda’s influence in Orientale Province. Should the IPC, supported by the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) succeed, Rwanda knows international pressure would mount for the Kivus, where it has long been active, to be next. While Rwanda and its ally, the RCD-Goma, risked losing ground in the Congo peace process, another armed group, its local proxy, the UPC, which gained control of Bunia in August 2002, stood to lose all influence in Ituri if the IPC took place. Its leader, Thomas Lubanga, opposed its holding until he was removed from Bunia by Uganda, which recaptured the town and flushed out all Rwandan presence from the district on 6 March 2003. By mid-April, the IPC was finally organised under MONUC patronage. A civilian Ituri Interim Administration (IIA) was elected by 32 participating delegations. MONUC promised to fill the security vacuum left by Uganda’s withdrawal and support IIA implementation of an agreement for all militias to canton and disarm their troops and form a joint police force. The UN, however, dramatically failed. The town was thrown into chaos by two weeks of fighting between Lendu and Hema, and ethnic cleansing occurred next to the UN compound. The UPC retook Bunia on 12 May and is intimidating and threatening the IIA, the only legitimate authority elected to run Ituri until the government of transition can takeover.
RESOLVING POLITICAL ISSUES WILL TO DISARM AND DEMOBILIZATION.
Africa News February 27, 2004

Progress in the DDRRR programme appears to be closely linked to political progress in the DRC and throughout the Great Lakes region, with the number of repatriations increasing as transitional government institutions have been installed in the DRC. The first 1,200 foreign combatants to leave the DRC did so in December 2002, just several days after the signature of the global peace accord on the 17th of that month. The peace agreement called for the end of hostilities and the establishment of a two-year power-sharing government comprising representatives of the former Kinshasa government, rebel movements, unarmed political opposition groups and civil society. That group was made up primarily of Rwandan combatants and their dependents, who were assembled at the Kamina military base in DRC's southern Katanga Province. A mutiny led by some of the camped ex-combatants, however, delayed the process. Waves of repatriation have also followed the inauguration of various transitional government institutions. A government of national unity was inaugurated on 30 June 2003, ostensibly bringing an end to nearly five years of war and leading to nationwide elections in 2005. Other transitional institutions were subsequently inaugurated. Following the first 1,200 ex-combatants to be repatriated in December 2002, the total reached 1,400 by April 2003, around the time that the inter-Congolese dialogue was concluding. In June and July 2003, the figures reached 1,900 and 2,500 total repatriations, respectively, at the time that the government, the military and other transitional institutions were being inaugurated. "The political situation changed in the DRC, as did the situation on the ground, to some degree," Col Jean-Pierre Boutroy, MONUC's deputy director of DDRRR, told IRIN. "The security situation is better, the general environment is better. People know that there is momentum toward peace, and want to be part of this return to normality."
CONGO NEG: HARMS ANSWERS: PEACE IN THE CONGO

THE PEACE PROCESS IS BACK ON TRACK

Congolese army troops swept into Bukavu after dawn yesterday, bloodlessly regaining control of the turbulent eastern city a week after it was seized by renegade soldiers. The offensive gave an immediate boost to the Democratic Republic of Congo's flagging peace process, which has been badly buffeted by the recent surge in violence.

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE OVER THE PEACE PROCESS.
M2 PRESSWIRE February 18, 2004, Pg.

Substantial progress had been made in the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi since the Council mission to the region in June 2003, Tuliameni Kalomoh, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, told the Security Council today. Introducing the Secretary-General's progress report on the recommendations of the Council mission to the subregion, he said, however, that much work remained to be done to consolidate those historic advances and to build sustainable peace in the region as a whole. The international community's commitment to continue supporting peace efforts in the subregion was, therefore, as critical as ever.

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS ARE BEING REACHED AND FIGHTING HAS STOPPED.
M2 PRESSWIRE February 18, 2004, Pg.

Describing developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he said significant progress had been made in normalizing relations between that country and its neighbours, and the pace of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of ex-combatants. In Bunia, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) had been enforcing a weapons-free policy. The prospects for peace in Burundi had improved considerably with a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the Transitional Government and the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces nationales pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) in November 2003 and subsequent integration of FDD representatives in the transitional institutions. The President and a high-level Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) delegation had met for the first time in the Netherlands in January.

NEW ADVANCES INCREASE MOMENTUM TOWARDS A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.
M2 PRESSWIRE February 18, 2004, Pg.

Advances achieved in the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi over the past six months had created a new momentum in favour of the convening of an international conference of the Great Lakes region. The first summit of the conference is scheduled to be held in November 2004, in the United Republic of Tanzania. However, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region required additional staff resources.
CONGO NEG: MONUC MANDATE SOLVES NOW

MONUC CAN USE FORCE NOW.
Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire February 20, 2004

Kinshasa, DR Congo (PANA) - The UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) is operating on an estimated US $ 641 million under its fiscal 2003/2004 budget, William Lacy Swing, special representative of UN secretary general to DR Congo, has revealed. MONUC constitutes one of the largest peacekeeping operations in the world with a workforce of more than 14,000 that includes over 10,800 troops. It comprises nationals from 109 countries, with 52 of them providing military forces while policemen come from 19 others, Swing said during his weekly press briefing here Wednesday. He said the Mission operates 24 offices throughout DR Congo. The UN mandates MONUC to use force when necessary, particularly in the Ituri region, to instil peace and security to DR Congo. It is charged with overseeing the UN arms embargo, helping to demobilise Congolese militiamen and mobilising the international community to support the holding of elections and re-organise the national army and police.

CONGO NEG: HARMS ANSWERS: GOVERNMENT STRONG

THE DRC’S GOVERNMENT IS STRONG. IT JUST PUT DOWN A COUP.

KINSHASA, Congo - Congolese troops put down a coup attempt by a small band of dissidents within the presidential guard Friday, the government said, after heavy gunfire and tank shelling echoed across the central African nation's capital for several hours. The clashes had centered around a military base, state media stations and the presidential mansion. President Joseph Kabila later went on television and said his power-sharing government, assembled after a devastating 1998-2002 war, was in control. "Stay calm, prepare yourself to resist — because I will allow nobody to try a coup d'etat or to throw off course our peace process," Kabila said. "As for me, I'm fine."

THE GOVERNMENT IS STRONG. IT SUPPRESSED THE COUP AND RETOOK BUKAVU

Friday's coup attempt was the second security-force uprising against the transition government led by Kabila, who took power in 2001 after his father, rebel-leader-turned-president Laurent Kabila, was killed by one of his own bodyguards. In March, a few hundred soldiers attacked several military installations in the capital. That attempt was defeated, and it was unclear whether it was a coup attempt or a more limited mutiny. On Wednesday, government forces recaptured the eastern town of Bukavu from renegade ex-rebel forces, ending a seven-day takeover that had posed the greatest military and diplomatic challenge to the government.
THE EU WILL SEND MORE TROOPS.

Fresh fighting broke out yesterday near Bukavu in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo, seized by renegade forces last week, and the European Union was considering sending troops to stop the violence threatening the country's shaky peace process. The fighting is the most serious challenge yet to President Joseph Kabila's struggle to restore authority across Africa's third-largest country, after five years of war, and has reignited tension with its tiny neighbour Rwanda. Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, commander of one of two renegade groups that captured Bukavu from the army last week, said government troops had attacked his forces. "General Mbuza Mabe's troops came from Walungu, south-west of Bukavu. They were many but they didn't get very far," Col Mutebutsi said. He added that the situation was now calm. A United Nations spokesman in Bukavu said he could not confirm the presence of government troops, but a UN source said he thought General Mabe's forces were involved in the clashes. Residents said sporadic gunfire could still be heard in the early evening and most people remained indoors. Soldiers loyal to another renegade commander, General Laurent Nkunda, left Bukavu on Sunday under international pressure after helping Col Mutebutsi seize the town last Wednesday. But Col Mutebutsi and his 300 or so troops remain in the town. President Kabila has vowed to retake Bukavu. In the capital, Kinshasa, Louis Michel, Belgium's Foreign Minister, said the EU was considering an emergency intervention force similar to the 1,100-strong French-led mission sent to restore peace in the north-eastern town of Bunia last year. He said: "We are in agreement on the principle of deployment." He said the EU was expected to discuss the matter on Monday. (Reuters)

THE EU WILL SEND MORE TROOPS TO MONITOR THE PEACE.
The Los Angeles Times June 8, 2004

JOHANNESBURG, South Africa — As rebels continued to battle government soldiers in eastern Congo on Monday, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel sought to mediate the conflict and suggested that European troops might be deployed in a bid to save the country's fragile peace deal. Congolese troops were battling rebels on the outskirts of Bukavu, where fighting has killed nearly 100 people in recent weeks. The combat threatens last year's pact to end a five-year civil war, which left 3.3 million dead from the fighting and its related famine.
CONGO NEG: AT: SMALL ARMS

THE UN HAS TIGHTENED THE ARMS EMBARGO ON THE CONGO.
XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE March 12, 2004, Pg. L/N

The United Nations Security Council decided on Friday to tighten its arms embargo on the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a bid to cut off the illegal flow of arms into the area plagued by tribal conflicts. In a resolution passed earlier in the day, the council demanded all states take measures to prevent the supply of arms and any related materiel to armed groups operating in the eastern DRC. It authorized the UN peacekeeping force in the region to use all means to implement the embargo, including seizing and collecting any arms brought into the DRC illegally. The council also decided to establish a committee to monitor the implementation of the arms ban, which was put in place under a council resolution in July. In the first half of 2003, the Ituri region, eastern DRC, witnessed a string of fierce fighting between the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups. The violence prompted the Security Council to reinforce the UN force in the region and impose an arms embargo on all armed groups there.

CONGO NEG: HARMS: AT: KATANGA VIOLENCE

MONUC IS NOW FOCUSING ON KATANGA
Africa News (South Scan) March 8, 2004, Pg. L/N

Despite criticism, MONUC has finally decided to take more seriously the so far neglected situation in Northern Katanga. At the beginning of March Medecins Sans Frontieres reported that 10,000 to 20,000 people fleeing violence by two Mai-Mai groups and Congolese government armed forces in the Kitenge. At least 50 villages were looted, abandoned and in some cases burnt, says MSF. At the end of February MONUC had called on the leader of one of these groups, a General Shinja-Shinja ('throat cutter' in Swahili) who reportedly has become notorious for drinking the blood of his victims, to stop these atrocities. This followed the killing between February 7 and 17 of eight Congolese Armed Forces soldiers and of three civilians, in the Kitenge area. MONUC's spokesman, Hamadoun Toure, said at least 30 people were killed by the Shinja Shinja group. Last October three Congolese NGOs including the human rights group ASADHO lodged a complaint about atrocities in Northern Katanga at the International Criminal Court. The report mentioned the Shinja-Shinja group and another one led by Bakanda Bakoba ('The Irreducible'). The same organisations had earlier reported the case of a third Mai-Mai leader called Kabale who became notorious for wearing a dead foetus around his neck. He was killed last May by the local population. These events may embarrass the entire transitional government and specially Joseph Kabila, since they began in territory under his control as far back as 2001, after the death of his father. The three NGOs say that there is no reason why some cases of cannibalism, such as those perpetrated by Jean-Pierre Bemba's troops, should be dealt with by the ICC, while those in Northern Katanga should be ignored.
TTHHEE  CCAAPPIITTOOLL  CCLLAASSSSIICC  DDEEBBAATTEE  IINNSSTTIITTUUTTEE
CCAATTHHOOLLIICC  UUNNIIVVEERRSSIITTYY,,  WWAASSHHIINNGGTTOONN,,  DD..CC..

CONGO NEG: HARMS: RAPE ANSWERS

PEACEKEEPERS IN THE CONGO ARE GUILTY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN.
Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) May 29, 2004, Pg. F10

Faëla is 13 years old; Joseph is just under six months. Sitting on the dusty ground in Bunia's largest camp for internally displaced people, she cradles Joseph in her arms and talks about how she ensures that she and her son are fed. "If I go and see the soldiers at night and sleep with them, then they sometimes give me food, maybe a banana or a cake," she says, looking down at her son. "I have to do it with them because there is nobody to care, nobody else to protect Joseph except me. He is all I have and I must look after him." It is a story that might not sound out of place in any part of the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo but for one thing: the soldiers Faëla is talking about are not from the rebel groups who have devastated Ituri province, in the northeast of the country, during the past four and a half years of conflict. Rather, they are part of the United Nations peacekeeping force, Monuc (UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo) and are stationed on UN orders next to the IDP camp in Bunia. The UN has taken over the local airport, once a bustling trade point that served the entire Ituri province. The region is rich in natural resources, including uranium and huge, newly discovered oil reserves.

PEACEKEEPERS EXTORT SEXUAL FAVORS OUT OF WOMEN IN THE CONGO.
Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) May 29, 2004, Pg. F10

In this world of lost hopes and shattered dreams, Faëla's story is a common one. It is a story of war, of soldiers, of sex and, most of all, fear. If she is indifferent to her future, it is because violence and submission are what she has known much of her short life. Her world, once filled with parents and siblings, with the ordinary rhythms of everyday life, has slowly shrunk, its focus narrowing each day until all that remains is her son and what she must do to feed him. "I came to this camp nearly six months ago, when the fighting got bad in our village," she explains. "The soldiers, different ones, were coming every night and we didn't know what was going on, we were all scared. Every night, the soldiers would come to our hut and make my sisters and I do it with them. "We had no choice. If we said no, then they would hurt us. Sometimes they put their guns against my chest and sometimes between my legs. I was really scared." Scared enough to leave the village where she was born and begin the long walk through the jungle of Ituri province to the displaced persons camp. She knew before she left that she was pregnant, her child's father one of the anonymous band of soldiers. "I had Joseph in the forest," she says. "My father cannot help me anymore. He is ashamed of me because I had this baby when I am not married. He has my brothers and sisters to look after." Faëla expected to be safe in the camp. She believed life would be hard, but at least there would be no more late night visits. She felt she would be fed, clothed and protected. Instead, she slowly discovered, as people refused her food, turned away from her, and talked of her "shame" that she was a pariah. "It is hard in the camp for the girls like me with little babies and no husbands," she says. "We have no men to look after us. "We have been dirtied by the soldiers who came to our villages. No one will now take us as their wives and it is hard to get food in the camp for us." Faced with starvation and worried for her son, Faëla, along with other girls in a similar predicament, turned to the only salvation they felt they had -- the Uruguayan and Moroccan Monuc soldiers stationed directly across from the camp. "It is easy for us to get to the UN soldiers. We climb through the fence when it is dark, sometimes once a night, sometimes more."

MONUC KNOWS THAT THE PEACEKEEPERS ARE COMMITTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND IS FAILING TO ACT.
Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) May 29, 2004, Pg. F10

Dominique McAdams, head of the UN in Bunia, admitted there was a problem. "I have heard rumours on this issue," she said. "It is pretty clear to me that sexual violence is taking place in the camp." McAdams is not the only member of Monuc to be concerned about the behaviour of the soldiers. At the beginning of this month, the UN announced it would launch a full investigation into abuse in the camp. Monuc's spokesman in New York, Fred Eckhard, said: "Monuc is committed to completing a full and thorough investigation into (events at the camp) as a matter of urgency. We will apply all available sanctions against any personnel found responsible." Yet the gap between the intention to investigate and the reality of investigation remains large. "I have requested evidence and proof on this matter, but I have not received anything from anyone," said McAdams. "UN policy with regard to sexual misconduct, both military and civilian, is very strict. All staff are fully briefed on the consequences of such misconduct."
MONUC INVESTIGATES INTO SEXUAL ABUSE ARE A SHAM.
Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) May 29, 2004, Pg. F10

Nor is there any real sign that such investigations bring change. In 2002, similar allegations of the sexual exploitation of refugees by humanitarian workers in West Africa made headlines across the world. The UN responded by establishing a code of conduct for its workers and Secretary General Kofi Annan announced a policy of zero tolerance regarding sexual misconduct. Despite this, a recent report by a Non-Governmental Organization, Refugees International, into events in Liberia suggests such a policy is hard to implement. This report says that the head of the United Nations Mission to Liberia, Jean Paul Klein, has stressed that any member of the UN caught having sex with someone under 18 will be repatriated and a midnight curfew has been implemented for his UN staff. The report suggests such measures are not enough. "(The Liberia mission) lacks a clear and transparent process for reporting sexual exploitation incidents," says Sarah Martin, author of the report. Her report suggests the situation is further complicated by the fact that UN procedures for investigating a case against military personnel are different from those for investigating a case against civilians.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IS HELPING THE WOMEN OF THE CONGO.
M2 PRESSWIRE March 5, 2004

ANNE MARIE MAKOMBO, President of the Commission for Women, Children and Family in the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, said her country had been devastated by years of war, which had taken hundreds of thousands of lives. During the conflict, women and girls had paid a high price due to sexual violence, torture and rape. As a result, HIV/AIDS had spread further. Unfortunately, women still suffered in the aftermath of war and in light of tensions in the eastern part of the country. At the same time, there was now hope for a better future. With international assistance, women were beginning to organize themselves and to play a part in the peace process.
**CONGO NEG: HARMS: DDR ANSWERS**

**DDR EFFORTS IN THE CONGO ARE WORKING.**
*Africa News (IRIN), May 28, 2004*

At the end of a week-long visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on Thursday, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno, speaking at a news conference in the capital, Kinshasa, urged the transitional government to accelerate the process of unifying the army in order to foster peace and stability. During his tour, Guehenno also made brief visits to Rwanda and Uganda, where he held talks respectively with Presidents Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni. While in the DRC, Guehenno toured the major conflict areas, these being in the northeastern provinces, specifically Ituri District in Orientale Province and the town of Bukavu in South Kivu Province. Referring to fighting that broke out in Bukavu on Wednesday between rival groups of the DRC army, Guehenno said: "The events in Bukavu are testament to the urgent need to unify the national army. The volatile situation is caused, in part, by the apparent divisions within the Congolese army." [see earlier IRIN story: Fighting breaks out in Bukavu "It is essential that the Congolese find a solution to this problem by themselves," he added. He said the consolidation of the government's authority across the vast nation was a step that would help quell the violence brought on by the presence of Rwandan Hutu rebels and elements of the former Rwandan army soldiers in the DRC. The Rwandan Hutu extremist Interahamwe militia has been accused of playing the major role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that claimed 937,000 lives, according to Rwandan government estimates. Guehenno said the process of voluntary disarmament of former combatants under the auspices of the UN Mission in the DRC, known by its French acronym MONUC, was proving successful, even if many of them remained hostages of extremists refusing to re-enter Rwanda. To date, MONUC has helped repatriate more than 6,000 Rwandan former combatants. However, more than 10,000 remain on DRC territory.

**THE DDR PROGRAM IN THE CONGO IS SUCCESSFUL.**
*Africa News February 27, 2004*

Since its inception some two years ago, more than 8,500 Burundians, Rwandans and Ugandans have been repatriated through the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) programme for foreign armed combatants and their dependents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), under the aegis of the country's UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) and partner organisations. Recent figures have shown a significant increase in the process since October 2003, when the total number of repatriated ex-combatants virtually doubled, with a steady stream of repatriations since then.
THE UN IS MAKING MOVES TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN EASTERN CONGO.
Agence France Presse March 5, 2004

A 3,500-strong brigade of UN peacekeeping troops has taken up positions in the increasingly tense town of Bukavu in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations announced in a statement. The UN mission in DRC (MONUC) added Friday that it was investigating charges made this week by 17 DRC non-governmental organisations that Rwanda still had troops in the town, 18 months after announcing its total military withdrawal from the DRC. Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu provinces on DRC's eastern borders, largely controlled by former rebels who last year joined a national unity government, are the most tense and violence-prone parts of the central African nation.

THE UN IS FOCUSING EASTERN CONGO NOW.
BBC Monitoring International Reports February 19, 2004

Kinshasa, 18 February: MONUC, known as the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is now focusing its troop deployment in the eastern regions of the vast central African country following improved security conditions elsewhere, the head of the mission, William Swing, told reporters on Wednesday (18 February). "The situation has improved to such a degree that today the front-line that once separated former belligerents is now a part of history," he said. "MONUC will, therefore, adapt the deployment of its troops to areas where they are most needed." Swing said most of the 10,800-strong MONUC force was currently deployed throughout a zone ranging from Ituri District in the northeast of the country, southward through provinces of Nord and Sud-Kivu, down to northern part of Katanga Province in the southeast - roughly the same area where the majority of armed elements from neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda remain. "The second brigade, known as the Kindu (the main city of Maniema Province, eastern DRC) Brigade, which will ultimately consist of some 4,000 soldiers, is currently being deployed, while the Ituri Brigade, comprising 4,700 peacekeepers, is already deployed in Ituri," Swing said. He added that the Kindu Brigade would be involved in the disarmament of Congolese armed groups and in enforcing an arms embargo throughout east of the country. "We have already proposed deploying our boats on the lakes in order to support the arms embargo," Swing said. "To this end, we are working together with all of the countries in the region and in the world who have called for an end to arms entering the Congo."
CONGO NEG: SOLVENCY ANSWERS

STRENGTHENING THE MONUC MANDATE WILL ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE.
Africa News (South Scan) March 8, 2004, Pg. L/N

The cohesion of the DR Congolese transitional government has been shaken over the past few weeks by ongoing violence in east of the country. At the same time the role of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) is becoming extremely difficult as it engages in armed clashes with rebels. On March 3 the Hema community in Kinshasa accused Dominique Macadam, the officer in charge of MONUC in Ituri, of responsibility for massacre of civilians on February 29 and March 1 when 10 people died. The Hemas want William Swing, the US representative of the UN Secretary General in the Congo and MONUC's chief, to withdraw all the peacekeeping forces from Ituri and they have threatened to charge the perpetrators in the International Criminal Court. This followed a UN attack under its new 'robust' rules of engagement on a Hema militia camp of the Congolese Patriots Union (CPU) at Niamamba, 62 km to the East of Bunia. The MONUC troops destroyed the camp and a spokesman said this was a reprisal raid for an earlier attack against UN personnel by the CPU rebels. The operation was also part of a UN programme to disarm the militias, but the pacification process is looking more difficult than expected.

RIVAL PARTIES WILL LIMIT THE MOBILITY OF MONUC. PLAN CAN’T SOLVE.
Africa News (South Scan) March 8, 2004, Pg. L/N

MONUC is also having a hard time in the Equator region. In a communique released on February 26, the UN complained about "unacceptable and unjustifiable" obstacles to the movement of its observers in the region of Gbadolite, which hosted the former headquarters of Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement of Liberation of Congo (MLC). MONUC observers were prevented by a MLC liaison officer from gaining access to two aircraft which landed on February 21 and 23 on the local airstrip. It was an incident that seemed to demonstrate that the process of unification of the armies and of the administrations in the rebel territories is still far from complete. A deep distrust continues between the leaders of the different factions who share power in Kinshasa and the slightest event may threaten the entire transitional process. On February 26 President Joseph Kabila was forced to suspend for one month the minister of transport and communications, Joseph Olenghankoy, who belongs to the political opposition. This followed the MLC's decision to boycott cabinet meetings in a bid to force him to sack Olengankoy because he had allegedly insulted Jean-Pierre Bemba in an interview with the London-based 'Grands Lacs Magazine'.

OUTSIDE PRESSURE WON’T SOLVE.

Peace requires more than this. First, the warring parties must want it. Congo's government may, but the bandit-militias in the east do not. Suppressing them would require thousands of well-armed troops, and probably several years. It would help if the militias were not armed by rival governments. The culprits--Rwanda, Uganda and Congo itself--all depend on aid, and so might be bullied into stopping.

NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES RAID THE CONGO FOR IT'S RESOURCES DESTABILIZING THE COUNTRY.

Blessed with natural resources and cursed by nations willing to do anything to obtain them, the DRC has never been the master of its own fate. From 1908 to 1960, the country was colonized by Belgium, which ruthlessly looted the Congo for its rubber and ivory and other resources. The exploitation of the DRC’s resources has continued ever since, by neighboring countries and by western nations as well. It has also been exploited by its own leaders. For most of the time since its independence in 1960, the country has been ruled by despot's more interested in personal wealth and power than in the welfare of their people or the good governance of the nation. The men who have risen to power have led the country with the same cruelty, greed and disregard for the Congolese population as did their colonial masters.

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
FOREIGN OCCUPATION IS THE PROBLEM, NOT CIVIL WAR.
Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, Refugees International, MONUC: Flawed Mandate Limits Success, May 2003

Ituri is a district that can serve as an example of the suffering endured by Congolese civilians. In northeastern DRC Province Orientale, Ituri has been occupied by the UPDF (Ugandan army) since 1998. The most recent rounds of clashes involve new groups and breakaway factions that have all, at one time or another, received support from Uganda, as reported by the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Resources, and by Human Rights Watch. Six Red Cross workers were targeted and killed in this area in 2001, prompting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to withdraw all of its workers from Ugandan-held territories pending an investigation that appears to be stalled. The rebel groups operating in the area, each seeking power on its own behalf, represent an alphabet soup of acronyms and a spaghetti highway of links to foreign governments, primarily Rwanda, Uganda and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe. Rather than try to explain each group in the body of the report, a list of forces and their affiliations is attached (Appendix C).

PEACEKEEPING DOESN'T SOLVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF CIVIL WAR IN THE CONGO.

Crucial problems have not been mastered. The country, so large, has not been even physically sufficiently integrated. Surrounded by 9 bordering countries, the country’s well understood national interest can only be articulated with some consideration of its relation to those of the neighboring countries. 6 out of the 9 countries have had or are still undergoing civil wars—which, due to the decomposition of our State, have been slipping over the DRC, making it easier for external interventions into the country. The international dimension of the country has not been mastered. The nature of the post-colonial State, as a colonial legacy, i.e., a State created through conquest and non-responsive to the basic needs of the conquered peoples, has not been problematized and transformed to make it responsive to the needs of all Congolese. The economy, dominated by a problematic of extraction of natural resources whose markets are outside of the country, entertains violent forced labor relations of production and a dynamics of looting. This makes it unresponsive to the basic needs of impoverished masses of people. The centuries’ history of the Congo’s foreign capital investment and wealth creation based on resource extraction has been a complete and total failure in terms of human and socioeconomic conditions of the Congolese society. In the absence of a true middle class and a patriotic political class, it is difficult to achieve and sustain the necessary structural break from the existing political economic structure. This break, if accomplished, would allow both foreign investors and Congolese society conceptualize, define and articulate their respective interests, requirements and needs as equal stakeholders in mutual beneficial partnership based relationships. The primary sources of conflict, in the Congo, are political and socioeconomic structural problems. They have national, regional and global dimensions.

UNLESS RWANDA IS STOPPED, THERE IS NO HOPE FOR ENDING THE WAR IN THE CONGO.
Pual Harris Power and Interest News Report August 5, 2003

Even the possibility of peace until 2005 depends on containment of the ethnic violence in the Ituri and the Kivu provinces. And much of that depends on the good behavior of DRC’s neighbors. For now, at least, the main area protagonists -- Rwanda and Uganda -- are in the U.S. camp and can be expected to refrain from further upsetting the balance of power in the region. But for Rwanda, a resolution of its internal racial problems is necessary and would help to ward off the possibility of further eruptions in DRC.

CONGO WOULD NEED AT LEAST 100,000 PEACEKEEPERS TO SOLVE.

To expand the Bunia operation nationwide could require a U.N. army as large as 100,000. There is no chance of the Security Council’s sending or paying for a force that large. Peace will come to Congo, if it comes at all, only by strengthening diplomatic efforts to bring together the country’s main factions in a transitional government. Even that won't have a chance unless the neighboring governments of Rwanda and Uganda order their local proxies to stop fighting.
CONGO NEGATIVE: PRESSURE CP

THE US MUST PRESSURE UGANDA AND RWANDA TO STOP SUPPLYING WEAPONS AND MOTIVES FOR FIGHTING IN THE CONGO.
The International Herald Tribune November 12, 2003

WASHINGTON When President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo visited Washington last week, he was promised continued humanitarian aid. He needs far more than that: today, our country is going through a transition that will certainly fail without a firm political and financial commitment from the United States. This is no time to waver, or to play double games, sending mixed signals to warring factions and their sponsors. Since this last round of fighting started five years ago, 3.3 million have died out of a population of 56 million, some of them fighters, but most innocent people. In the United States, that would amount to Sept. 11 happening every day for three consecutive years. No other conflict since World War II has claimed so many victims. Yet so far the major powers have offered only excuses for their inadequate involvement. They are uneasy to intervene and bring justice. The pundits have dismissed Congo's deaths, citing ethnic strife, low-intensity conflict, starvation and even cannibalism. No. These people died in the name of "border security," mineral exploitation, and geopolitical ambitions. They died because world powers consistently ignored their cries for help. The United States is the principal power backing the two main sponsors of this war - Rwanda and Uganda. Both of these countries continue to support militias in eastern Congo. They fuel the conflict even while they sign peace agreements. They use U.S. military assistance and economic aid to support warlords within our borders. Unless the United States exercises meaningful pressure on Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, our Great Lakes region will not see peace in the near future. We will not rest quietly while our neighbors plunder our country under the cover of border security. Hundreds of thousands of our women and children have been systematically raped, leaving the very soul of our society bleeding. The United States should draw on the lessons it learned from its inaction during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Washington should ask Presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda to respect Congo's sovereignty.

US PRESSURE ON RWANDA AND UGANDA IS CRITICAL TO STOPPING THE FLOW OF ARMS INTO THE CONGO.

To reduce the flow of arms, curb violence, and curtail the role of DRC’s neighbors in stoking the fires of conflict, the U.S. should work with other governments: 1. To improve bilateral relations between the DRC transition government and each of its immediate neighbors; 2. To monitor and curtail (especially in Ituri and the Kivus) the relationships between the neighboring states and rebel movements or militias in Congo; and 3. To enforce the U.N. embargo on the flow of arms into the DRC. The U.S. should reinstate its own bilateral arms embargo on Rwanda, one of the sources of arms flows into DRC, and it should condition its bilateral assistance to Rwanda and Uganda on their ceasing to support armed militias in the DRC.
EXTERNAL PRESSURE ON OUTSIDE ACTORS KEY TO STOPPING WAR IN THE CONGO.

To promote accountable governance, the U.S. and other key donors should reinforce technical assistance that builds basic state capacity, and promote reform in the natural resource and mineral sectors. International donors should also support the engagement of Congolese civil society in policy and decision-making processes. They should use the development assistance they provide to leverage greater political space and freedoms that would allow the Congolese people to create demand-side pressure for accountable governance. To provide international pressure for a successful transition, the U.S. and other bilateral donors, as well as the U.N. and multilateral aid agencies, should reinforce the International Committee to Support the Transition with a strategic framework of conditionality for the DRC government and neighboring states. The international community must compel leaders of the transition government to place political will behind the transition agenda, and hold Rwanda and Uganda to their commitments to support peace in Congo. A regime of individually-targeted sanctions should be developed and implemented by donor countries against Congolese political leaders and others who violate peace accords or continue participating in the plunder of Congo’s resources.

EXERTING PRESSURE PUTS OUTSIDE AGGITATORS ON NOTICE.

In order to consolidate the transition process and curb violence in the east, the international community must make its policies towards Uganda and Rwanda consistent with the overall objectives of the DRC peace process. It would be counterproductive for donors and key powers to implement a Congo policy divorced from their policies towards Congo’s neighbors. Ignoring the DRC crisis in their diplomatic dialogues and relationships with Rwanda and Uganda deprives the U.S. and other influential foreign actors of the potential to leverage these relationships and the development assistance that flows from them to curb the mayhem in eastern Congo. Several key countries, including the U.S., have been slow in sending unequivocal signs to the DRC’s neighbors that they must allow Congo to move towards peace.
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DA AND AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DA COACHING GUIDE

Introduction

One of the cornerstones of American Foreign Policy is the spread of democracy globally. Part of the purpose of peacekeeping is to do the same.

The US doesn’t always look very good in terms of exporting democratic values. Our past history of supporting dictators that turn out to ruthless tyrants (Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Manuel Noriega in Panama to name a few) has besmirched our good name. Recent attempts at securing democracy in Iraq are not helping matters either. Basically, right now, the US is not looking like the beacon of democracy it once was.

All of that, of course, can change quickly with the Affirmative Plan.

Link Story

The Negative would argue that the plan’s support of UN peacekeeping operations is merely an attempt to push democracy on countries coming out of internal conflict. Attempts to monitor elections, promote human rights, and broker power transitions can all be a part of democracy promotion.

Further, the Negative could argue that using peacekeeping would make the US look credible. This in turn would lead to more countries listening to the US about democracy and trying it for themselves. This is your typical modeling link story.

Impact Story

The impact story is not that complex. Pushing democracy on countries in transition causes conflicts to reoccur. The argument is that the transition to democracy is volatile because it requires the general population to accept the will of the voters. Additionally, there are a few pretty good cards that talk about how someone will be upset with the outcome in developing countries and start a civil war.

Strategically, the Democracy Promotion Bad Disadvantage makes sense since it can be used to turn the case. At worst it would help mitigate solvency. It is probably not the best disadvantage to run as a net benefit to an international actor counter plan because it is likely to get the link just as much as the plan, especially if the impacts are not specific to US style democracy promotion.

Answering the Democracy Promotion Bad Disadvantage

This disadvantage is weak on a few different levels. First, the uniqueness for the impact is tough to prove right now. Even though the US does not look successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the goals of each of those occupations is the establishment of democracy.

Second, history has a tendency to be on the Democracy Promotion Good side of the coin. No two democracies have ever fought a war against each other. Democracies have fought non democracies before but the goal of democracy promotion is to increase the number of democracies so there is less chance of war.

Third, the Affirmative has to cut off the case turn. Make arguments about how the impact is inevitable because the current UN mission will fail and civil war will come again to the country in question.
### DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DA INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INC Shell</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniqueness: Democracy Promotion</td>
<td>69–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniqueness: Middle East</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Peacekeeping</td>
<td>73–74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Unilateralism/Multilateralism</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Peace-building</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Elections</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Iraq</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Links: US is key</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: War</td>
<td>77–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>82–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: Civil War</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: Oppression</td>
<td>85–86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: AT: Democracy Promotion Good</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2AC Front Line</td>
<td>88–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniqueness Demo Promo</td>
<td>90–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact: Solves War</td>
<td>92–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact: Solves Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact: Solves Genocide</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact: Solves Famine</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Transition Wars</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Demo Promo Bad</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. THE PRISON SCANDAL IN IRAQ HAS LEFT THE US's ABILITY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN TATTERS.
Fred Hiatt, The Times Union, May 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

"Of course our hands have never been completely clean," says a friend in the human-rights-and-democracy-promotion world. "But this is different. Our hands are unclean in a way we haven't known about since My Lai." Is this an exaggeration? You might dismiss some of the domestic criticism, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seems to, as the carping of political opponents. You might discount some of the reaction of the Arab world, too, where official newspapers have long delighted in proclaiming U.S. hypocrisy.

B. LINKS: PEACEKEEPING IS USED AS A FORM OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Using Democracy To Manage Conflicts: How The UN Is Transforming Peacekeeping Missions, International IDEA, Retrieved May 2004
http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_global_cooperation/Article_UN_and_Democracy_Norway.pdf

The critical role of the UN in promoting democracy in East Timor is no longer the exception, but becoming the rule when it comes to UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Indeed, prominent among the challenges that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan listed in accepting the 2001 Nobel Prize for Peace last year in Oslo were the prevention of conflict and the promotion of democracy: "

C. IMPACTS: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION LEADS TO WAR
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

The idea that democracies never fight wars against each other has become an axiom for many scholars. It is, as one scholar puts it, "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." This "law" is invoked by American statesmen to justify a foreign policy that encourages democratization abroad. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton asserted that no two democracies had ever gone to war with each other, thus explaining why promoting democracy abroad was a pillar of his foreign policy. It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy -- like contemporary Russia -- are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.
THERE'S TOO MUCH OF A CREDIBILITY GAP IN US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION POLICY NOW. NO ONE WILL LISTEN.
The Weekly Standard February 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

WHY, AFTER ALL, should Arab democrats believe us? Both "anti-imperialist" Arab intellectuals and American analysts note the credibility gap we confront in preaching democracy to the Middle East. Acknowledging our past support for autocrats, as President Bush did in November, is a start. But actually overcoming the credibility gap and building an effective democratization program requires a firmness of purpose the Bush administration has thus far not displayed. Whether it can and will do this remains to be seen.

SEPTEMBER 11th FORCED THE US TO BUILD RELATIONS WITH DICTATORS AND NON DEMOCRATIC REGIMES. THIS SENT THE SIGNAL THAT THE US WAS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Fred Hiatt, The Washington Post, December 1, 2003, Pg. L/N

The foreign-service bureaucracy he directs, after all, is a product of that mentality of the past 60 years -- a mentality that considered democracy unrealistic for Arab countries and, as Bush said, cherished stability as the primary goal. Even his own political administration was formed by a president -- the pre-9/11 George W. Bush -- for whom democracy in the Middle East wasn't a consideration. The momentum of the "failed" policy is strong. The administration directed $29 million in fiscal 2002 and $100 million in fiscal 2003 toward its efforts to promote reform throughout the region. Meanwhile it continues to give Egypt alone $2 billion every year, so far without regard to whether democracy there advances or regresses. And the continuity isn't solely due to inertia. The Sept. 11 attacks brought Bush and many others to an understanding that U.S. security ultimately is harmed by repressive Arab regimes that maintain power in part by striking bargains with intolerant Islamist movements. But the attacks, by illuminating U.S. vulnerability, also pushed the administration to cooperate more closely than ever with the police forces, skilled in torture, of the regimes that Bush now decries.

EMBRACING TYRANTS DECREASES THE US'S ABILITY TO PUSH CREDIBLE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

It is on and around the front lines of the campaign against al Qaeda that the tensions between America's pressing new security concerns and its democracy interests are most strongly felt. The most glaring case is Pakistan. The cold shoulder that Washington turned toward General Pervez Musharraf after he seized power in 1999 has been replaced by a bear hug. In recognition of the Pakistani leader's critical supporting role in the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has showered Musharraf with praise and attention, waived various economic sanctions, assembled a handsome aid package that exceeded $600 million in 2002, and restarted U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation.

THE CURRENT US POLICY OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS HOLLOW.
Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

Bush officials insist that they combine their embrace with frequent private messages to Musharraf about the importance of returning to democracy. But during the past year the Pakistani president has steadily consolidated his authoritarian grip, a process punctuated by a clumsy referendum last spring and a sweeping series of antidemocratic constitutional amendments in the summer. Bush and his aides have reacted only halfheartedly to this process, publicly repeating tepid calls for democracy but exerting no real pressure.
WHEN THE US EMBRACES AUTOCRATIC REGIMES IT DECREASES IT'S ABILITY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY.

Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

Running throughout all of the new U.S. security relationships in South and Central Asia is an institutional divide that weakens the administration's ability to balance security and democracy. The State Department has shown some real commitment to raising human rights and democracy issues with these countries. The Pentagon, on the other hand, often focuses more on the immediate goal of securing military access or cooperation and less on the politics of the relevant host government. Given the importance that foreign leaders place on the U.S. military, they may sometimes assume that friendly words from the Pentagon mean they can ignore other messages they are receiving. Ensuring a consistent U.S. front on democracy and human rights, therefore, is a prerequisite for a coherent approach.

GETTING INVOLVED WITH BRUTAL DICTATORS SENTS A SIGNAL THAT THE US IS NOT SERIOUS ABOUT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

The tensions posed by the war on terrorism for U.S. support of democracy abroad have quickly spread out beyond the immediate front lines. Southeast Asia is one affected region. Indonesia has become an important theater in the U.S. antiterrorist campaign, because of U.S. fears that al Qaeda leaders are taking refuge there and that the country's numerous Islamist groups are connecting with extremist networks. The White House continues to support Indonesia's shaky, somewhat democratic government. But in a setback on human rights policy, the administration has proposed restarting aid to the Indonesian military. That aid was progressively reduced during the 1990s in response to the Indonesian forces' atrocious human rights record and was finally terminated in 1999, when Indonesian troops participated in massacres in East Timor. Administration officials have downplayed this decision to renew military aid, stressing that most of the proposed $50 million package is directed at the police rather than the military. But the willingness of the U.S. government to enter into a partnership with a security force that just a few years ago was involved in a horrendous campaign of slaughter and destruction against civilians sends a powerful negative message throughout the region and beyond. Some officials argue that the new training programs will give U.S. military personnel a chance to instruct their Indonesian counterparts in human rights. But U.S. officials repeatedly made the same argument in defense of these programs in previous decades, right up to when the Indonesian military committed the human rights abuses that sank the relationship.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM IS DECREASING US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION CREDIBILITY.

Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

One can look even further afield and identify possible slippage in U.S. democracy policies resulting from the war on terrorism, such as insufficient attention to the growing crisis of democracy in South America or inadequate pressure on oil-rich Nigeria's flailing president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to turn around his increasingly poor governance of Africa's most populous nation. Ironically, and also sadly, however, the greatest source of negative ripple effects has come from the administration's pursuit of the war on terrorism at home. The heightened terrorist threat has inevitably put pressure on U.S. civil liberties. But the administration failed to strike the right balance early on, unnecessarily abridging or abusing rights through the large-scale detention of immigrants, closed deportation hearings, and the declaration of some U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" with no right to counsel or even to contest the designation. The Justice Department's harsh approach sent a powerful negative signal around the world, emboldening governments as diverse as those of Belarus, Cuba, and India to curtail domestic liberties, supposedly in aid of their own struggles against terrorism. In the United States, an independent judiciary and powerful Congress ensure that the appropriate balance between security and rights is gradually being achieved. In many countries, however, the rule of law is weak and copycat restrictions on rights resound much more harmfully.
THE USE OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS A POLITICAL STRATEGY TO FURTHER US INTERESTS HAS UNDERMINED US CREDIBILITY.

Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:[1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

Aggressive democracy promotion in the Arab world is a new article of faith among neoconservatives inside and outside the administration. However, it combines both the strengths and the dangers typical of neo-Reaganite policy as applied to any region. Perhaps the most important strength is the high importance attached to the president's using his bully pulpit to articulate a democratic vision and to attach his personal prestige to the democracy-building endeavor. But two dangers are also manifest. One is the instrumentalization of prodemocracy policies -- wrapping security goals in the language of democracy promotion and then confusing democracy promotion with the search for particular political outcomes that enhance those security goals. This was often a problem with the Reagan administration's attempts to spread democracy in the 1980s. To take just one example, for the presidential elections in El Salvador in 1984, the Reagan administration labored mightily to establish the technical structures necessary for a credible election. The administration then covertly funneled large amounts of money to the campaign of its preferred candidate, Jose Napole-n Duarte, to make sure he won the race. This same tension between democracy as an end versus a means has surfaced in the administration's press for democracy in the Palestinian territories. Bush has urged Palestinians to reform, especially through elections, yet at the same time administration officials have made clear that certain outcomes, such as the reelection of Yasir Arafat, are unacceptable to the United States. A postinvasion process of installing a new "democratic" regime in Iraq would likely exhibit similar contradictions between stated principle and political reality. The administration demonstrated worrisome signs of the same tendency last April during the short-lived coup against Venezuela's problematic populist president, Hugo Chvez. Washington appeared willing or even eager to accept a coup against the leader of an oil-rich state who is despised by many in the U.S. government for his anti-American posturing and dubious economic and political policies. But given that it came in a region that has started to work together to oppose coups, and that other regional governments condemned Chavez's ouster, the administration's approach undermined the United States' credibility as a supporter of democracy. If democracy promotion is reduced to an instrumental strategy for producing political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests, the value and legitimacy of the concept will be lost.
US ATTEMPTS TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN MODEST.
The Weekly Standard, February 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

BECAUSE OF THESE LONGSTANDING CONCERNS, American democratization efforts in the Arab world have traditionally been modest, undertaken in consultation with the region's governments, and aimed at delivering technical assistance rather than altering the distribution of political power. Despite the new imperative driving the president's strategy, the policies devised to implement it so far--setting aside the unique case of Iraq--have not escaped these constraints.

THE US HAS EMBRACED MIDDLE EAST’S REGIMES STRATEGY OF CONTROLLED LIBERALIZATION.
The Weekly Standard, February 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

In effect, the Bush administration has embraced the Arab regimes' own survival strategy of controlled liberalization. Most of the 22 Arab states themselves recognize their systemic failures, and seek to reform in ways that improve government and economic performance without changing the distribution of political power. While a few forward-leaning regimes have placed some power in the hands of their peoples through constitutional and electoral reforms, many others are trying to create just enough sense of forward motion and participation without power to alleviate the building public pressure for change at the top.

THE US APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN GRADUAL LIBERALIZATION, NOT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
The Weekly Standard, February 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

The premise underlying America's embrace of this gradual approach is that we can avoid the risk of Islamist victories and minimize bilateral tensions if we help existing governments reform, even if they resist opening up political competition and sharing power. In theory, our new assistance under the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the National Endowment for Democracy is also supposed to identify liberal forces within civil society, give them funding and training, and help them grow to the point where they can bring about velvet revolutions. This gradualist strategy assumes that, over time, liberalization will take on such momentum that the regimes will no longer be able to avoid devolution of power.

THE US HAS NO CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

This first paper, Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, highlights a problem of fundamental importance—the lack of credibility that the United States has in the Arab world when it presents itself as a pro-democratic actor. Although many Americans may feel that America’s bona fides as a pro-democratic actor are unquestionable, the stubborn fact remains that many people in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, have a different opinion. If left unaddressed, this credibility gap will undermine even the most well-intentioned efforts by the United States to promote positive political change in the region. While recognizing that there are no instant solutions to this problem, the paper identifies ways the United States can begin to alleviate the gap and in so doing pave the way for a genuine, lasting democratic engagement with the Middle East.
DEMO PROMO: LINKS: PEACEKEEPING

DEMOGRAPHY PROMOTION IS BECOMING A PART OF PEACEKEEPING.
Using Democracy To Manage Conflicts: How The UN Is Transforming Peacekeeping Missions, International IDEA,
Retrieved May 2004
http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_global_cooperation/Article_UN_and_Democracy_Norway.pdf

In zones of conflict around the world, the United Nations often plays a role in securing peace and in containing conflict, but what role can the UN play in actually managing conflict and in promoting democracy in these war torn societies? While in the past, in places like Cyprus, Kashmir, the Middle East and even in the early years of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, traditional UN peacekeeping was limited to the separation of warring parties, today’s peace operations are much Rather than simply accept a limited UN role as a maintainer of cease fires and limited truces, Annan, both as Secretary-General and earlier, as the head of UN Peacekeeping, has presided over UN deployments that included more aggressive “peacemaking” by multinational military forces acting on behalf of UN mandates in places like Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor to ensure that warring parties do not resume conflict, as well as powerful mandates both in these countries and in other missions to use conflict resolution and conflict management tools to develop alternatives to violence for settling of political differences.

DEMOGRAPHY PROMOTION IS LINKED TO UN ACTIVITIES.
Using Democracy To Manage Conflicts: How The UN Is Transforming Peacekeeping Missions, International IDEA,
Retrieved May 2004
http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_global_cooperation/Article_UN_and_Democracy_Norway.pdf

“There is a strong linkage between democracy and other fields where the UN is active, such as peacekeeping, development and human rights. Democratic institutions and processes are seen increasingly as effective tools for preventing violent conflicts, protecting human rights, fighting poverty and achieving development,” argues Erling Olsen, acting Secretary-General of International IDEA.

DEMOGRAPHY PROMOTION RESPONSIBILITIES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS INCREASING.
Using Democracy To Manage Conflicts: How The UN Is Transforming Peacekeeping Missions, International IDEA,
Retrieved May 2004
http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_global_cooperation/Article_UN_and_Democracy_Norway.pdf

The trend in recent peacekeeping missions, participants noted, is to give the UN responsibility for increasingly complex issues, either during a violent conflict as a “peacekeeping” mission, seeking political resolution of the conflict; or after a peace agreement has been reached as a “peace-building” mission. Whereas once UN missions were strictly limited to military issues, these new missions include a host of new issues: Resolving humanitarian problems; Restoring respect for human rights; Establishing and maintaining security and stability; Promoting reconciliation, planning and initiating reconstruction; and In some cases setting up entire transitional authorities, in missions such as Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ARE CHANGING TO INCLUDE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Using Democracy To Manage Conflicts: How The UN Is Transforming Peacekeeping Missions, International IDEA,
Retrieved May 2004
http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_global_cooperation/Article_UN_and_Democracy_Norway.pdf

Despite the lack of success with many of the UN missions in Africa, the change in peacekeeping the world over is clear to most observers. Whereas, historically, missions were limited to military issues and only operated in instances where both sides to a conflict between states had agreed to the UN’s presence, today’s missions are much more complex, and much broader in their authority and responsibility. Human rights – hardly ever mentioned in earlier peacekeeping – is now an essential task of UN military and police monitors in virtually all missions. Military officers who train for eventual peacekeeping duty in the Nordic countries, in Canada, and elsewhere, are trained to look for human rights violations just as surely as cease fire violations along a truce line. The UN now recognises that conflict must be managed early on, before it erupts into violence. But building democracy as a tool of conflict management is not easy, noted many of the participants. Since 1990, in Cambodia, in Bosnia and Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia, and in East Timor, and in other countries, the international community has been involved in training local persons, in deploying thousands of officials, monitors and experts to “democratise” whole countries. Without significant political will on the part of the developed countries in the North, the UN often, as is the case with many missions in Africa, can do little more than observe.
US UNILATERAL ACTIONS LEAD TO DISTRUST OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION. THE WORDS BECOME SYNONYMOUS WITH US OCCUPATION.
The Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N

For much of the past decade, we've worked to promote democracy in the Middle East, largely with funding from US government grants. Since 9/11, the Bush administration has moved the promotion of democracy in the Middle East to center stage, dedicating unprecedented funding and political rhetoric to it - and, ironically, our work has never been harder. Across the region, we've encountered increasing reservations about the new American initiative to support political reform. The primary reason is a growing perception that the Bush administration acts in a way that is inconsistent with the democratic values and respect for human rights that it rhetorically espouses. This isn't just about the Iraqi prisoner abuses, which seem only to have confirmed a regional perception of American double talk on democracy and freedom. Incommunicado detention of terror suspects and the muted criticism of human rights violations by American allies are cited as reasons for hesitation in cooperating with US organizations promoting democracy and human rights. The perceived gap between rhetoric and deeds isn't mere fodder for Bush critics; it has had a tangible adverse effect on the work of Americans attempting to assist Middle Eastern democratic reformers. In many previously friendly quarters, the US has become positively radioactive. Ties to America - always the subject of some suspicion in the Middle East, prone to conspiracy theories as it is - now certainly damage the credibility of legitimate activists. On a recent trip to Syria, Bahrain, and Jordan, reformers told us, with great distress, they can no longer even use the words "democracy" and "human rights" in their communities, let alone work publicly on US-funded democracy promotion projects. Sadly, these terms have become synonymous with military occupation, civilian casualties, and abuse of prisoners in Iraq and around the globe.

PEACE BUILDING IS A TOOL OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

For instance, the active promotion of democracy and conflict management programs, as part of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, these programs have been a component of political restructuring processes linked to globalization. They have emerged parallel to broad-based structural economic reforms aimed at encouraging market activity and a deeper integration into the global world economy. In fact, it is no coincidence that it was during the mid-1990's, parallel to the emergence of a "new or post"-Washington Consensus that the OAS commitment to democracy promotion and conflict management expanded.

PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ARE USED TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY.
Timothy D. Sisk, Beyond Intactability, 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/democ_con_manag.jsp

In many deeply divided societies today, parties turn to democracy in the course of negotiating peace agreements to exit intractable conflicts. The international community has routinely assisted such efforts, through mediation of the terms of peace agreements, expert and technical assistance in negotiation, to fielding monitors for transitional elections, to helping with the creation and training of new or established political parties. In many cases, former rebel groups (such as the ANC) have made the transition from war-wagers to political candidates. Internationally assisted efforts to democratize after bitter internal conflicts have, in recent years, featured prominently in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, East Timor, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, to name a few. Hopes are pinned on the ballot box replacing the battlefield as the principal way in which social conflicts are waged. Today, countries such as Burundi, Sri Lanka, Russia (Chechnya), and Kosovo are seeking to design new systems of democracy to help manage long-standing conflicts.
ELECTIONS ARE A CRITICAL TOOL FOR THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY.
Michael Bratton, Prof. Political Science @ MSU, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9 #3, 1998

But while elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections remain fundamental, not only for installing democratic
governments, but as necessary requisite for broader democratic consolidation. The regularity, openness, and acceptability of
elections signal whether basic constitutional behavioral and attitudinal foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic
rule.

SUCCESS IN IRAQ IS CRITICAL TO RECLAIMING THE US'S IMAGE OF A LEGITIMATE VEHICLE FOR
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
The Weekly Standard February 23, 2004, Pg. L/N

To be sure, the administration has taken an irrevocable step with the invasion of Iraq. Having committed many billions of
dollars to the democratization program there, America must make its success our first priority. One obvious reason is that if
democracy takes hold in Iraq, it really might provide a powerful demonstration effect to the neighborhood. Less obvious is the
fact that America's current problems in Iraq--especially the insistence in Washington on a timetable and procedure for
transferring sovereignty driven more by our own needs than Iraqis'--are right now providing a powerful negative demonstration
effect to the neighborhood. The more repressive governments in the region are tightening their domestic controls, confident
that we are distracted. Skeptical Arab commentators point out that American liberation has seemingly brought Iraqis nothing
but chaos and death. Because President Bush linked the American democracy project in Iraq to reform in other Arab countries,
the fate of democracy activists elsewhere in the Arab world now hangs on the success of the new Iraq. If the United States
leaves Iraq's political reconstruction half-finished, Washington will have hung Arab democrats out to dry.

THE US IS THE KEY PLAYER IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution Research Fellow. 1992 (Foreign policy p. 46)

It will be a long struggle more than a generation. But democratic successes will their neighbors and increase become models
and ins authoritarians worldwide. If the United States stays the course of this struggle, as it did in the Cold War, it can
create a different world: a community of states under law, a global civilization.

THE US MUST LOOK CONSISTENT INORDER TO PUSH DEMOCRACY.
The Hindu June 12, 2000, Pg. L/N

It is in this scenario that the international community has to deal with the problems of nascent democracies an do
what it can to promote and protect democratically elected Governments. Institutions and capacity building encouraging debate and consensus on key or sensitive issues, sharing experiences and practices and identifying
possible threats to democracy are some of the ways in which the established democracies can help. One thing is
becoming clear. The days of sanctions are over. They only make life more miserable for the people and seldom hurt
the rulers. It is important for the champions of democracy to come up with clear guidelines and norms for
international action. The world cannot view a coup in one country as being unacceptable and put up with a military
regime elsewhere. There can be no double standards linked to economic or strategic interests. The international
community must lay down transparent norms or yardsticks for any intervention.
Because we view democratization as a gradual process, rather than a sudden change, we test whether a transition toward democracy occurring over one, five, and ten years is associated with the subsequent onset of war. To assess the strength of the relationship between democratization and war, we construct a series of contingency tables. Based on those tables, we compare the probability that a democratizing state subsequently goes to war with the probabilities of war for states in transition toward autocracy and for states undergoing no regime change. The results of all of these tests show that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no change in regime. This relationship is weakest one year into democratization and strongest at ten years. During any given ten-year period, a state experiencing no regime change had about one chance in six of fighting a war in the following decade. In the decade following democratization, a state's chance of fighting a war was about one in four. When we analyze the components of our measure of democratization separately, the results are similar. On average, an increase in the openness of the selection process for the chief executive doubled the likelihood of war. Increasing the competitiveness of political participation or increasing the constraints on a country's chief executive (both aspects of democratization) also made war more likely. On average, these changes increased the likelihood of war by about 50 percent and 35 percent respectively. The statistical results are even more dramatic when we analyze cases in which the process of democratization culminated in very high levels of mass participation in politics. States changing from a mixed regime to democracy were on average about 50 percent more likely to become engaged in war (and about two-thirds more likely to go to war with another nation-state) than states that remained mixed regimes. The effect was greater still for those states making the largest leap, from full autocracy to high levels of democracy. Such states were on average about two-thirds more likely to become involved in any type of war (and about twice as likely to become involved in an interstate war) than states that remained autocracies. Though this evidence shows that democratization is dangerous, its reversal offers no easy solutions. On average, changes toward autocracy also yielded an increase in the probability of war, though a smaller one than changes toward democracy, compared to states experiencing no regime change.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY REQUIRES NATIONALISM BUT IT CAN’T BE CONTROLLED IN THE TRANSITION, THIS RISK WAR.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

THE CONNECTION between democratization and nationalism is striking in both the historical record and today's headlines. We did not measure nationalism directly in our statistical tests. Nonetheless, historical and contemporary evidence strongly suggests that rising nationalism often goes hand in hand with rising democracy. It is no accident that the end of the Cold War brought both a wave of democratization and a revival of nationalist sentiment in the former communist states. In eighteenth-century Britain and France, when nationalism first emerged as an explicit political doctrine, it meant self-rule by the people. It was the rallying cry of commoners and rising commercial classes against rule by aristocratic elites, who were charged with the sin of ruling in their own interests, rather than those of the nation. Indeed, dynastic rulers and imperial courts had hardly been interested in promoting nationalism as a banner of solidarity in their realms. They typically ruled over a linguistically and culturally diverse conglomeration of subjects and claimed to govern by divine right, not in the interest of the nation. Often, these rulers were more closely tied by kinship, language, or culture to elites in other states than to their own subjects. The position of the communist ruling class was strikingly similar: a transnational elite that ruled over an amalgamation of peoples and claimed legitimacy from the communist party's role as the vanguard of history, not from the consent of the governed. Popular forces challenging either traditional dynastic rulers or communist elites naturally tended to combine demands for national self-determination and democratic rule. This concoction of nationalism and incipient democratization has been an intoxicating brew, leading in case after case to ill-conceived wars of expansion. The earliest instance remains one of the most dramatic. In the French Revolution, the radical Brissotin parliamentary faction polarized politics by harping on the kin's slow response to the threat of war with other dynastic states. In the ensuing wars of the French Revolution, citizens flocked to join the revolutionary armies to defend popular self-rule and the French nation. Even after the revolution turned profoundly antidemocratic, Napoleon was able to harness this popular nationalism to the task of conquering Europe, substituting the popularity of empire for the substance of democratic rule.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: WAR

DEMOCRATIZATION LEADS TO VIOLENT NATIONALISM.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

The interconnection among nationalism, democratization, and war is even clearer in new states. In today's "Weimar Russia," voters disgruntled by economic distress backed belligerent nationalists like Zhirinovsky, put ostensible liberals like President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on the defensive on ethnic and foreign policy issues, and contributed to the climate that led to war in Chechnya. In "Wilhelmine Serbia" the political and military elites of the old regime, facing inexorable pressure for democratization, cynically but successfully created a new basis for legitimacy through nationalist propaganda and military action, and they recently won elections that were only partially manipulated. Until its recent decree suspending the activities of the main opposition party, Armenia had moved quite far toward full democracy while at the same time supporting an invasion of its ethnic foes in Azerbaijan. The Azeris have been less successful in sustaining momentum toward democracy. However, in Azerbaijan's one relatively free and fair presidential election, the winner, Abulfaz Ali Elchibey, attacked the incumbent for being insufficiently nationalist and populist. Elchibey's platform emphasized Turkic identity and the strengthening of the Azeri nation-state to try to mount a counteroffensive against the Armenians. In other ethnically divided societies, where holding an election is like taking a census, democratization has often become an opportunity to exercise the tyranny of the majority.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES IN DEMOCRACIES INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

ALTHOUGH DEMOCRATIZATION in many cases leads to wars, that does not mean that the average voter wants war. Public opinion in democratizing states often starts off highly averse to the costs and risks of war. In that sense, the public opinion polls taken in Russia in early 1994 were typical. Respondents said, for example, that Russian policy should make sure the rights of Russians in neighboring states were not infringed, but not at the cost of military intervention. Public opinion often becomes more belligerent, however, as a result of propaganda and military action presented as faits accomplis by elites. This mass opinion, once aroused, may no longer be controllable. For example, Napoleon III successfully exploited the domestic prestige from France's share of the victory in the Crimean War to consolidate his rule, despite the popular reluctance and war-weariness that had accompanied the war. Having learned this lesson well, Napoleon tried this tactic again in 1859. On the eve of his military intervention in the Italian struggle with Austria, he admitted to his ministers that "on the domestic front, the war will at first awaken great fears; traders and speculators of every stripe will shriek, but national sentiment will [banish] this domestic fright; the nation will be put to the test once more in a struggle that will stir many a heart, recall the memory of heroic times, and bring together under the mantle of glory the parties that are steadily drifting away from one another day after day."(2) Napoleon was trying not just to follow opinion but to make public opinion bellicose, in order to stir a national feeling that would enhance the state's ability to govern a split and stalemated political arena. Much the same has happened in contemporary Serbia. Despite the memories of Ustashe atrocities in World War II, intermarriage rates between Croats and Serbs living in Croatia were as high as one in three during the 1980s. Opinion has been bellicized by propaganda campaigns in state-controlled media that, for example, carried purely invented reports of rapes of Serbian women in Kosovo, and even more so by the fait accompli of launching the war itself. In short, democratizing states are war-prone not because war is popular with the mass public, but because domestic pressures create incentives for elites to drum up nationalist sentiment.
COMPETITION FOR POPULAR SUPPORT INTENSIFIES NATIONALISM AND INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995

Competing for popular support. The trouble intensifies when elites in a democratizing society try to recruit mass allies to their cause. Threatened elite groups have an overwhelming incentive to mobilize mass backers on the elites' terms, using whatever special resources they might retain. These resources have included monopolies of information (the Wilhelmine navy's unique "expertise" in making strategic assessments), propaganda assets (the Japanese army public relations blitz justifying the invasion of Manchuria), patronage (Lord Palmerston's gifts of foreign service postings to the sons of cooperative journalists), wealth (the Krupp steel company's bankrolling of mass nationalist and militarist leagues), organizational skills and networks (the Japanese army's exploitation of rural reservist organizations to build a social base), and the ability to use the control of traditional political institutions to shape the political agenda and structure the terms of political bargains (the Wilhelmine ruling elite's agreement to eliminate anti-Catholic legislation in exchange for Catholic support in the Reichstag on the naval budget). This elite mobilization of mass groups takes place in a highly competitive setting. Elite groups mobilize mass support to neutralize mass threats (for instance, creating patriotic leagues to counter workers' movements) and counter other elite groups' successful efforts at mass mobilization (such as the German Navy League, a political counterweight to the Junker-backed Agrarian League). The elites' resources allow them to influence the direction of mass political participation, but the imperative to compete for mass favor makes it difficult for a single elite group to control the outcome of this process. For example, mass groups that gain access to politics through elite-supported nationalist organizations often try to outbid their erstwhile sponsors. By 1911, German popular nationalist lobbies were in a position to claim that if Germany's foreign foes were really as threatening as the ruling elites had portrayed them, then the government had sold out German interests in reaching a compromise with France over the Moroccan dispute. In this way, elite mobilization of the masses adds to the ungovernability and political impasse of democratizing states.

DEMOCRACY CREATES WEAK CENTRAL AUTHORITIES FORCING LEADERS TO INSPIRE NATIONALISM WHICH LEADS TO WAR.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995

DEMOCRATIZATION typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics. It brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage. Political leaders, finding no way to reconcile incompatible interests, resort to shortsighted bargains or reckless gambles in order to maintain their governing coalitions. Elites need to gain mass allies to defend their weakened positions. Both the newly ambitious elites and the embattled old ruling groups often use appeals to nationalism to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions. Needing public support, they rouse the masses with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized by passionate appeals, are difficult to control. So are the powerful remnants of the old order--the military, for example--which promote militarism because it strengthens them institutionally. This is particularly true because democratization weakens the central government's ability to keep policy coherent and consistent. Governing a society that is democratizing is like driving a car while throwing away the steering wheel, stepping on the gas, and fighting over which passenger will be in the driver's seat. The result, often, is war.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: WAR


Inflexible interests and short time horizons. Groups threatened by social change and democratization, including still-powerful elites, are often compelled to take an inflexible view of their interests, especially when their assets cannot be readily adapted to changing political and economic conditions. In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will maintain the social position of the group. For Prussian landowners, it was agricultural protection in a non-democratic state; for the Japanese military, it was organizational autonomy in an autarkic empire; for the Serbian military and party elites, it was a Serbian nationalist state. Since military bureaucracies and imperial interest groups occupied key positions in many authoritarian great powers, whether monarchal or communist, most interests threatened by democratization have been bound up with military programs and the state’s international mission. Compromises that may lead down the slippery slope to social extinction or irrelevance have little appeal to such groups. This adds to the difficulty of finding an exit from the domestic political impasse and may make powerful domestic groups impervious to the international risks of their strategies.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS CREATE BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT.
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting To Violence, 2000 Page 297

Democratic transitions have also tended to coincide with involvement in international wars over the past two centuries. The chance of war in any given decade for the average state has been about one in six, whereas democratizing states it has been about one in four during the decade following democratization. The democratizing states were more likely to be the attackers than the target of aggression in these wars. The most war-prone states are those at the beginning stages of democratization, rather than those that: have nearly completed the consolidation of democracy. Especially at risk for war are newly democratizing countries that lack a strong centralized state to lay down firm rules for regulating popular participation in politics and for enforcing state authority. Similarly, domestic political opposition to free trade rises significantly at the beginning of democratization, whereas successful consolidation of democracy tends to Make states free-trading. Thus, the rise in nationalistic and uncooperative thinking affects economic relations as well as military matters. This pattern of war-proneness during the early stages of democratization echoes the history of virtually every great power. France, Britain, Germany, and Japan fought aggressive wars, fueled in part by popular nationalism, on the heels of their initial phase of democratization.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION CAUSES LEADERS TO RESORT TO FORCE.
Christopher Gelpi, Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Journal Of Conflict Resolution, April, 1997

The marginal effects of rebellion on the propensity of authoritarian states, mixed regimes, and democracies to initiate force in international crises are displayed in Table 5. A quick comparison of Tables 2 and 5 reveals that violent protests have almost exactly the same influence on the challenger's initiation of force as do nonviolent protests. Because these marginal effects are so close to those described earlier, I will not review the results in Table 5 in detail. I will, however, draw the reader's attention to the lower right-hand corner of Table 5. Here we can see that violent protest continues to increase the probability that democratic states will initiate major force in an international crisis, even when this violent protest reaches very high levels. In particular, even the increase from three violent protest incidents per month to five such incidents increases the probability that a democratic leader will initiate major force by 16%. Overall, the increase from no unrest to five rebellions per month increases the probability that a democracy will initiate major force from 37% to 83%.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: WAR

DEMOCRACIES WILL FIGHT WARS OF DISTRACTION.
Christopher Gelpi, Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Journal Of Conflict Resolution, April, 1997

My results indicate that the diversionary initiation of force is generally a pathology of democratic states. Ironically, the protections that democratic systems provide for their citizens against domestic repression, combined with the public's willingness to rally behind their governments' attacks on external foes, have the unfortunate consequence of creating incentives for democratic leaders to use force against noncitizens. These results help to bridge the gap between the quantitative research on diversionary conflicts and the many historical case studies on this topic. My findings indicate that many historical studies may have been correct in suggesting that domestic unrest has caused state leaders to initiate force internationally.

DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WILL USE WARS OF DISTRACTION TO BOLSTER POPULAR SUPPORT.
Christopher Gelpi, Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Journal Of Conflict Resolution, April, 1997

In addition to the general studies of regime type and diversion, a number of scholars have analyzed diversionary behavior in American politics during the post-World War II era. A substantial literature on the "rally 'round the flag" effect has established that the president enjoys a boost in popularity following the use of force internationally (Mueller 1970; Biechman and Kaplan 1978; Russett 1990a; for a dissenting view, see Lian and O'Neal 1993). For obvious reasons, however, the documentation of rally effects has not been replicated in authoritarian states. In addition to demonstrating its existence, studies have indicated that recent American presidents may have taken advantage of the rally effect in cynical attempts to strengthen their chances for reelection (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and O'Neal 1991). Subsequent analyses have amended these findings but have not overturned them (Morgan and Bickers 1992; DeRouen 1995). These studies all leave the strong impression that American presidents have used force internationally as a response to domestic problems. However, they also leave significant questions unanswered. In particular, these studies cannot tell us whether such diversionary actions are a characteristic of American politics or are common to all democratic states. Nor can these works shed any light on whether democratic states are generally more or less likely to initiate diversionary conflicts than other types of regimes.

WARS OF DISTRACTION ARE USED TO MASK OPPRESSIVE POLICIES.
Christopher Gelpi, Center for International Affairs at Harvard, Journal Of Conflict Resolution, April, 1997

In responding to popular unrest, therefore, I argue that leaders in both democratic and authoritarian states will generally be faced with a choice between suppression and diversion. Domestic suppression is more easily accomplished by some kinds of states than others. For several reasons, democratic leaders will find it more difficult to suppress dissent with violence than will authoritarian leaders. First, democratic leaders are subject to electoral recall. Because the use of violence against one's own citizenry is likely to be unpopular, democratic leaders run a serious risk of losing office by ordering militarized repression. Second, democratic states tend to have legal or constitutional restraints on the executive's authority to use force domestically. Finally, in democratic governments, power is likely to be divided among two or more ~ institutional centers, leaving room for those who oppose taking repressive action to block a democratic leader from doing so. Because domestic repression is a relatively unattractive option for democratic leaders, I expect them to be more likely to respond to internal unrest by initiating force at the international level in the hopes of rallying public support.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: ETHNIC CONFLICT

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION LEADS TO ETHNIC CONFLICT.
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting To Violence, 2000 Page 297

Many observers in the international community; such as the non-governmental activist organization Human Rights Watch, have seen Rwanda and Burundi as examples of the dangers of authoritarian elites who "play the ethnic card" in order to save their position of domination over society. Such groups, argue that these cases demonstrate the need to promote democratization free speech, civil society and power sharing and to bring authoritarian human rights abusers to justice in order to prevent ethnic violence. In fact, these cases show exactly the opposite. They demonstrate how such reforms can intensify conflict in poor, ethnically divided countries where elites are threatened by democratization, civic institutions are absent, and populations lack the education and civic skills to make democracy work.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTIONS CAUSES CULTURAL WARS.
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting To Violence, 2000 Page 297

Even Human Rights Watch acknowledges that it was the free and fair election of Burundi's First Hutu resident in June 1993 that set the stage for the killing-of some 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi. Pressure from international donors was one of the main reasons that the Tutsi-dominated ethnic minority government of Pierre Buyoya agreed to hold these risky elections. An October 1988 mission of World Bank officials to Burundi stressed the need for "transparency in the judicial process" and a reversal of prosecutions of open critics of the government. At the same time, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution urging a comprehensive reassessment of aid policies in light of human rights abuses by the Burundian military." The Buyoya government responded by developing plans for more extensive power sharing with the Hutu majority and for elections. By 1992, says Rene Lemarchand, the premier student of Burundian politics, "there was more freedom of expression and association than at any time since 1972." In early 1993, on the eve of the elections, nongovernmental organizations descended on the Burundian capital of Bujumbura to facilitate the transition to democracy. The U.S.-based National Democratic Institute arrived to train election monitors. A Swedish think tank mounted a symposium on human rights and development. The African-American Institute, at the behest of Buyoya himself, held a conference on the role of the military in a democracy. Thus, the financially dependent regime gave the international community what it wanted. Buyoya seems to have been surprised when the 85% percent Hutu electorate turned his largely Tutsi regime out of office in favor of a moderate Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye. The Tutsi military fearing that the elected governments power sharing scheme would neutralize the army as a security guarantee for the Tutsi minority, launched a coup to protect its monopoly of force, touching off a series of bloody reprisals and leaving the country on the brink of all-out civil war. This was hardly foreseeable. Indeed, on the eve of these events, even the pro-liberalization Lemarchand had warned that "how the officer corps, an all-Tutsi preserve, may react to a large influx of Hutu recruits is anybody's guess." Despite the debacle caused by international efforts to promote pluralism and power sharing in Burundi in 1993, the international community failed to learn that these policies were dangerous. Continuing to pursue a similar strategy in Rwanda, they catalyzed an even bigger human rights disaster the following year.

ETHNIC CONFLICTS STEMMING FROM DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SPILL OVER TO FOREIGN WARS.
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting To Violence, 2000 Page 297

A very simple explanation for, the link between democratization and nationalist conflict sees nationalism as deeply rooted in popular attitudes at long precede democratization. If people of different cultures naturally want their own state, and if they inhabit the same territory, giving them the vote will unavoidably put them at loggerheads. In principle, these conflicting aims might cause conflict even if the contending groups had no pre-democratic history of violence toward each other. However, if people of different cultures had learned through long-term rivalries to hate or distrust each other, that would make the rivalry even worse: the - democratic process would xpress hose entrenched popular animosities. In the popular rivalries view, national strivings can be suppressed by empires and authoritarian regimes, whereas democratization gives voice to the true nationalist preferences of the average voter. Elections become a census rather than a deliberative process. Democratization will tend to produce either the tyranny of the majority or a pitched battle between competing state-building goals of rival nations Democratization in this view, may also give rise to international conflicts, if a newly democratic nation nationalizing state seeks to capture foreign territory where its ethnic brethren reside.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: ETHNIC CONFLICT

DEMOCRACY CAUSES VIOLENT CULTURE AND ETHNIC WARS THAT RISK GENOCIDE.
Jack I. Snyder, From Voting To Violence, 2000 Page 297

After the genocide, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch and Africa Rights, as well as many independent scholars, drew the lesson that the international community still needs to encourage Rwanda and Burundi to democratize, to foster an independent press, and to bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice "to deter further slaughter." However, upon closer examination, it is clear that these organizations own analyses of the causes of the Rwandan genocide contradict their prescriptions. After the genocide, NGOs continue to advocate precisely those measures that their analyses show to have triggered the killings: an increase in political pluralism, the prospect of trials of the guilty, and the promotion of antigovernment media. The real lesson of these cases is that the ideals of democratic rights, civil society, uncompromising justice, and free speech must make pragmatic accommodations to recalcitrant reality. The examples of Rwanda and Burundi bear out the theory presented in this book: democratization is likely to spark nationalist conflict in countries that have an underdeveloped economy; a population with both poor civic skills and underdeveloped representative and journalistic institutions; and elites who are threatened by democratic change.

DEMOCRACY FUELS THE ROOT CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS.
Thomas Fleiner, Constitutional Law Professor @ University of Fribourg, 1998, Cardoza Journal Of International And Comparative LAW, Spring, 1998

A major cause for deep ethnic conflicts can be found in the majority rule of the modern democracy, which condemns ethnic minorities to being perennial losers and seduces the dominant ethnicity to develop into a tyrant of the minority. In fact, the ethnic conflicts in the area of the former Yugoslavia are essentially a logical consequence of the majority principle. There have been several democratic referendums to legitimize constitutions, secessions, governments, self-declared parliaments and self-declared republics. In most of those cases the minorities boycotted the referendums or the majorities declared the referendums of minorities illegal. Democracy based only on the majority principle cannot be a legitimate decision-making procedure in multiethnic societies with regard to issues perceived by ethnic communities as essential for their survival and development.

EMPIRICALLY, DEMOCRACY LEADS TO MASSIVE ETHNIC CONFLICTS.
Donald Horowitz, law professor at Duke, 1994, NATIONALISM, ETHNIC CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY, eds. By L. Diamond & M. Platter, p. 35

Democratization is a worldwide movement, but it is neither universal nor uniformly successful where it has begun. Some authoritarian or semidemocratic states may be untouched by the democratic movement; others may find ways to thwart the movement at the outset; still others may move along a democratic path, only to have the changes aborted. There are many reasons, of course, why democratization and democracies may fail, among them the resistance of entrenched civilian or military elites, the absence of conducive social or cultural conditions, and inaptly designed institutions. In many countries of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, a major reason for the failure of democratization is ethnic conflict.
Turning to the third section of Table 2, however, we can see that domestic unrest has precisely the opposite effect on the conflict behavior of democratic states (challenger democracy score of 20). Specifically, an increase from no protests to an average of one protest per month raises the probability that a democratic state will initiate major force in an international crisis by 10%. A further increase from one to three protests per month results in a striking 20% increase in the probability that a democratic state will initiate major force. Finally, an increase from three to five protests per month generates an additional 16% increase in the probability of initiating major force. Overall, this increase from no protests to an incidence of five protests per month increases the probability that a democratic leader will initiate major force in an international crisis from 35% to nearly 82%. This striking impact reflects the expected propensity of democratic states to engage in diversionary activity when facing domestic unrest. These increases in the probability that democracies will initiate major force are so large that they actually generate decreases in the likelihood that these states will initiate minor force. I must emphasize that these reductions are matched by reductions in the probability that democracies will not initiate force. Thus these reductions in the probability of initiating minor force are a result of predicted crisis outcomes shifting toward the initiation of major force, not by shifts away from the initiation force. Specifically, as the level of protest prior to a crisis increases from no protests to one protest per month, the probability that a democracy will initiate minor force drops by 4%. Similarly, a further increase from one to three protests per month decreases the probability that such a state will initiate minor force by 12%. Finally, an increase from three to five protests per month results in an additional 13% decrease in the probability that a democratic leader will initiate minor force. Overall, these changes reduce the probability that a democracy will initiate minor force from 46% to less than 17%. Finally, as I mentioned earlier, increases in domestic unrest also decrease the probability that democratic states will not initiate force at any level in an international crisis. An increase from no protests to an average of one protest per month reduces the probability that democratic leaders will not initiate force by 6%. An increase from one to three protests per month decreases the probability that no force will be initiated by an additional 8%, and an increase from three to five protests decreases this probability by yet another 3%. Once again, the decreased marginal effect of unrest is due to floor effects rather than by any attenuation of the relationship between unrest and the initiation of force. When an average of only three protests per month have occurred within a democracy during the 3 months prior to an international crisis, the probability that it will not initiate force in the crisis is only 5%. Thus, overall, the increase from no protests to an average of five protests per month decreases the probability that a democracy will not initiate force from nearly 19% to just over 1%. Again, this represents a dramatic increase in the propensity of democracies to initiate force.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: OPPRESSION

ELITES USE NATIONALISM TO MASK CLASS CLEAVAGES ALLOWING THEM TO STAY IN POWER.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

Ideology takes on particular significance in the competition for mass support. New entrants to the political process, lacking established habits and good information, may be uncertain where their political interests lie. Ideology can yield big payoffs, particularly when there is no efficient free marketplace of ideas to counter false claims with reliable facts. Elites try out all sorts of ideological appeals depending on the social position they are defending, the nature of the mass group they want to recruit, and the kinds of appeals that seem politically plausible. A nearly universal element of these ideological appeals, however, is nationalism, which has the advantage of positing a community of interest uniting elites and masses. This distracts attention from class cleavages that divide elites from the masses they are trying to recruit.

ELITES ARE ABLE TO RIG ELECTIONS TO PROTECT THEIR POWER.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

The weakening of central authority. The political impasse and recklessness of democratizing states is deepened by the weakening of the state's authority. The autocrat can no longer dictate to elite interest groups or mass groups. Meanwhile, democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Parties are weak and lack mass loyalty. Elections are rigged or intermittent. Institutions of public political participation are distrusted because they are subject to manipulation by elites and arbitrary constraints imposed by the state, which fears the outcome of unfettered competition.

ELITES WILL DO ANYTHING TO STAY IN POWER.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

Prestige strategies. One of the simplest but riskiest strategies for a hard-pressed regime in a democratizing country is to shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad. During the Chechen intervention, newspaper commentators in Moscow and the West were reminded of Russian Interior Minister Viacheslav Plehve's fateful remark in 1904, on the eve of the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, that what the tsar needed was "a short, victorious war" to boost his prestige. Though this strategy often backfires, it is a perennial temptation as a means for coping with the political strains of democratization. German Chancellor Johannes Miquel, who revitalized the imperialist-protectionist "coalition of iron and rye" at the turn of the century, told his colleagues that "successes in foreign policy would make a good impression in the Reichstag debates, and political divisions would thus be moderated."(4) The targets of such strategies often share this analysis. Richard Cobden, for example, argued that military victories abroad would confer enough prestige on the military-feudal landed elite to allow them to raise food tariffs and snuff out democracy: "Let John Bull have a great military triumph, and we shall have to take off our hats as we pass the Horse Guards for the rest of our lives."(5) Prestige strategies make the country vulnerable to slights to its reputation. Napoleon III, for example, was easily goaded into a fateful declaration of war in 1870 by Bismarck's insulting editorial work on a leaked telegram from the kaiser. For those who want to avoid such diplomatic provocations, the lesson is to make sure that compromises forced on the leaders of democratizing states do not take away the fig leaves needed to sustain their domestic prestige.
DEMO PROMO: IMPACTS: OPPRESSION

DEMONRATIZATION RISKS INJUSTICE, OPPRESSION AND INEQUALITY.
Saine, Abdoulaye, S.M., Professor of Political Science at the Washington State University, Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa. 1995.

Thus it has been a remarkable three years in Africa, so remarkable that it has been dubbed the ‘Second African Revolution’; yet political analysts at the Carter Emory Center of Emory University in Atlanta, which tracks emerging democracies in Africa think the continent has backslid on the promise of democratization in the past year. African leaders are increasingly using their powers to destabilize, discredit, and where necessary, bludgeon the forces demanding democratic renewal. What then are the limits and prospects for sustained democratization in Africa? What kind of democracy would be relevant for Africa? These questions are important because the democratization process is intrinsically paradoxical. And regardless of whether these reforms towards democracy succeed or fail, its most salient initial product will be suffering – injustice, inequity even repression, perhaps the very thing that democratization intends forever to banish from society.

DEMOOCRACY PROMOTION CREATES POLITICAL STEALEMATES AND BELIGERENT NATIONALIST COALITIONS.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War From Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995

Political stalemate and imperialist coalitions. Democratization creates a wider spectrum of politically significant groups with diverse and incompatible interests. In the period when the great powers were first democratizing, kings, aristocrats, peasants, and artisans shared the historical stage with industrialists, an urban working class, and a middle-class intelligentsia. Similarly, in the post-communist world, former party apparatchiks, atavistic heavy industrialists, and downwardly mobile military officers share the stage with populist demagogues, free-market entrepreneurs, disgruntled workers, and newly mobilized ethnic groups. In principle, mature democratic institutions can integrate even the widest spectrum of interests through competition for the favor of the average voter. But where political parties and representative institutions are still in their infancy, the diversity of interests may make political coalitions difficult to maintain. Often the solution is a belligerent nationalist coalition.

DEMOOCRACY PROMOTION ONLY CREATES SHALLOW DEMOCRACIES WHERE LEADERS EASILY CORRUPT REFORMS.
Philippe Schmitter, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 1996.

Dictablandas and democraduras have become increasingly common, especially in Central America and Africa as authoritarian introduce democratic mechanisms into their polities in order to placate international forces demanding democratization Guatemala was one such democraudura in which elections have. been held regularly - since 1984-85 but where civilian officials have found their actions restricted by the military. El Salvador, where elections since 1982 have been accompanied by the systematic violation of political and human rights is such case, although it may cross the threshold to democracy if UN-negotiated peace accords manage to guarantee a different context for the 1994 elections. Kenya, Togo, Gabon, Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, and many other African cases seem more like dictablandas—increased contestation and even multiparty activities tolerated, but elections (if held at all) are manipulated to favor the governing clique. In neither region o hybrid regimes seem capable of providing a stable solution to the problems of transition. In Central America one can hope that their likely demise will give rise to genuine experiments with democracy. In Africa, the may e more usefully viewed as improvisations by rulers who are buying time, waiting for international climate change so they can engineer a regression to autocracy.
DEMO PROMO: AT: DEMOCRACY GOOD

EVEN IF DEMOCRACY IS A GOOD THING, THE PROBLEM IS THAT NO NATION, ESPECIALLY THE US, WILL COMMIT TO LONG TERM REBUILDING.

Thomas Carothers directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror:|1], Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 1; pg. 84

The second danger is overestimating America's ability to export democracy. U.S. neoconservatives habitually overstate the effect of America's role in the global wave of democratic openings that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, they often argue that the Reagan administration brought democracy to Latin America through its forceful anticommunism in the 1980s. Yet the most significant democratization that occurred in Argentina, Brazil, and various other parts of South America took place in the early 1980s, when Reagan was still trying to embrace the fading right-wing dictators that Jimmy Carter had shunned on human rights grounds. Excessive optimism about U.S. ability to remake the Middle East, a region far from ripe for a wave of democratization, is therefore a recipe for trouble -- especially given the administration's proven disinclination to commit itself deeply to the nation building that inevitably follows serious political disruption.

LACK OF A UNIFORM DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY MEANS THAT THERE IS NO EVALUATE ITS BENEFITS.


The logic of democratic peace is hard to comprehend. It lacks intellectual clarity. In the absence of any global consensus on the definition of democracy it is hard to ascribe the degree of democracy to the nations. Countries like Malaysia and China view the western concept of democracy as being far from comprehensive. Furthermore, the spread and the acceptability of the idea of democratic peace could have a detrimental impact on the stability and peace in the world, because it promotes the trend-'with me or against me.' The stratification of nation-states on the basis of their polity challenges the equality between nation-states and their political sovereignty. The legitimisation of 'interventions' and the use of force against non-democratic states, to promote political homogeneity in the world do not augur well for world peace, because of its potential to push the world towards the medieval age, 'just war' paradigm.

THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT IS IRRELEVANT. PEACE, NOT DEMOCRACY MUST BE THE IDEOLOGY.


With so much of destructive material in the arsenal of both the autocrats, democrats, and also terrorists, it is increasingly difficult to trust any of them to be peace loving. Like all religions, all ideologies also talk about establishing peace. But the harsh realities of nationhood, nationalism and the lure of lucre always emerge stronger, to scuttle most of the peace initiatives. Therefore, one could safely argue that peace cannot be tied to any ideology, because peace itself is an ideology and needs to be promoted rather peacefully.
1. **NON UNIQUE: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS INCREASING.**

Ray Takeyh, *Uncle Sam in the Arab Street*. The National Interest. Washington: Spring 2004, Iss. 75; pg. 45, 7 pgs

It is established U.S. policy that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is vitally necessary to secure America's strategic interests. Washington policymakers and pundits routinely proclaim the virtues of a democratic order and the seamless compatibility of America's interests and ideals. In light of the tragedies of September 11, Washington's long-standing approach that saw authoritarian rulers as the most suitable custodians of America's strategic imperatives seems naive, even reckless. President Bush's disdain for such realpolitik calculations was all too evident when he proclaimed that "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long-run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."

2. **THE US MODEL OF DEMOCRACY CAN SOLVE WAR AND TERRORISM.**

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution Research Fellow. 1992 (Foreign policy p. 46)

It will be a long struggle more than a generation. But democratic successes will become models and inspiration to their neighbors and increase pressure on authoritarians worldwide. If the United States stays the course of this struggle, as it did in the Cold War it can create a different world: a community of states under law democratic civilization. If it retreats from this challenge and watches the world descend anew into fascism, bigotry, and strife, there could be decades of needless danger and suffering before the democratic movements arrives again. A more democratic world would be safer, saner, and more prosperous for the United States. The experience of this century bears important lessons. Democratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terrorism against other democracies. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to threaten one another. Democratic countries are more reliable, often and enduring trading partners. And offer more stable climates for investment. Because they must answer to their own citizens, democracies are more responsible. They are more likely to honor international treaties and value legal obligations since their openness makes it much more difficult to believe the lie of a totalitarian political regime. Rather than being a means for resolving differences in views, they try to impose on society a particular ideology, religion or solution to social problem, regardless of the opposition. For this reason such regimes try to control all aspects of society and deal with conflict by force, coercion, and fear, that is, by power. Moreover, such power breeds narrow ruling group. This is the over rule and would execute those now in power. Finally, there is one single coercive organization, one hierarchical pyramid of power rather than a multitude of such pyramids as in a democracy. This turns all sociopolitical and economic issues and problems into a matter of us versus them of those with power versus those without. We should therefore find that the less democratic a regime, the more unchecked and unbalanced power at the center, the more it should commit democide. Democide becomes a device of rule, as in eliminating possible opponents, or a means for achieving one's ideological goal, as in the purification of one's own dominions within an alien race or the reconstruction of society.

3. **TURN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SOLVES GENOCIDE.**

RJ Rummel, University of Hawaii at Manoa, "Journal of Conflict Resolution", 1995

The theoretical hypothesis is that the more democratic freedom a nation has the less likely its government will commit foreign or domestic democide. In brief summary, the theory is that through democratic institutions social conflicts that might become violent are resolved by voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation. The success of these procedures is enhanced and supported by the restraints on decision makers of competitive elections the cross-pressures resulting from the natural pluralism of democratic-, spontaneous-societies and the development of a democratic culture and norms that emphasizes rational debate, toleration negotiation of differences, conciliation and conflict resolution. Moreover, democratic leaders see others even political opponents, as within the same moral universe, as equally nonviolent, as disposed of negotiating differences peacefully. On the other side are totalitarian political regimes. Rather than being a means for resolving differences in views, they try to impose on society a particular ideology, religion or solution to social problem, regardless of the opposition. For this reason such regimes try to control all aspects of society and deal with conflict by force, coercion, and fear, that is, by power. Moreover, such power breeds narrow ruling group. This is the over rule and would execute those now in power. Finally, there is one single coercive organization, one hierarchical pyramid of power rather than a multitude of such pyramids as in a democracy. This turns all sociopolitical and economic issues and problems into a matter of us versus them of those with power versus those without. We should therefore find that the less democratic a regime, the more unchecked and unbalanced power at the center, the more it should commit democide. Democide becomes a device of rule, as in eliminating possible opponents, or a means for achieving one's ideological goal, as in the purification of one's own dominions within an alien race or the reconstruction of society.
4. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SOLVES WAR.
DEMOCRACY SOLVES WAR, TERRORISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
Talbott Strobe, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996, Pg. L/N

The larger and more close knit the community of nations that choose democratic forms of government, the safer and more prosperous Americans will be, since democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other.

5. TURN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STOPS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS.
Tharoor, Special Projects Office at Secretary General of the United Nations, World Policy Journal, 1999

And even if there are unique aspects to the Indian case, it is no accident that pluralist democracies have dealt better with civil conflict than other types of societies. The proposition that pluralist democracy is therefore the best antidote to the risk of infection of civil conflict seems to me an unexceptionable one. This does not mean democracy will satisfy every extremist minority group—as some Basques have proven in Spain and some Tamils in Sri Lanka. But democracy, both as precept and practice, has never sought or assumed the mantle of perfection. Instead of looking at post-conflict military interventions for which the mandate or the resources required may not be available, should the world not be devoting more attention to the promotion of democracy and pluralism across the globe? There are obvious political dangers in such a course, and there is no doubt that democracy, like love, must come from within; it cannot be instilled from the outside. But encouraging democracy for all the peoples of the world would be an eminently worthwhile objective for policymakers. This century has, despite all its setbacks, given us a world safe for democracy; let us work, in the next century, to establish a world safe for diversity.

6. TURN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION SOLVES FAMINE.
Talbott Strobe, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996, Pg. L/N

In some of the world’s poorest countries, such as Nicaragua and Malawi, elected leaders have proved more inclined than their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to adopt policies that benefit their people. Democratic authorities, because of the way they came to power, have an important additional source of legitimacy that can reinforce their ability to make painful but necessary economic choices, including the allocation of scarce natural resources. Amartya Sen, an economist at Harvard University, has argued that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press.”

7. NON UNIQUE: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS A CENTRAL FEATURE OF US POLICY.
Paua J. Dobriansky and Thomas Carothers. Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 3; pg. 141

Bilateral efforts aside, a great deal of our multilateral diplomacy, including American engagement at the UN and the Organization of American States, is shaped by the imperatives of human rights and democracy promotion. Although greatly distressed by the selection of Libya to chair the UN Human Rights Commission, the United States intends to remain a driving force at the commission and will challenge this forum to fulfill its mandate to uphold international standards on human rights. We have also worked hand in hand with other democracies to strengthen the Community of Democracies (CD). I led the American delegation to last November’s CD meeting in Seoul, where delegates adopted an ambitious plan of action with many specific initiatives designed to enable emerging democracies from different parts of the world to share "best practices" and help each other.
THE US IS PUSHING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION NOW.
Paula J. Dobriansky and Thomas Carothers. *Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 3; pg. 141*

Carothers alleges that, driven by imperatives related to the war on terrorism, the administration has come to cooperate with a number of authoritarian regimes and turned a blind eye to various antidemocratic practices carried out by these newfound allies. This claim is incorrect. The administration's September 2002 National Security Strategy, which lays out our post-September 11 strategic vision, prominently features democracy promotion. The strategy describes it as a core part of our overall national security doctrine and commits us to help other countries realize their full potential: In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.... America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. It is also a matter of record that this administration, whenever it encounters evidence of serious human rights violations or antidemocratic practices in specific countries, has raised a voice of opposition to such violations and sought to address these problems. This is certainly the case with such countries as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as Russia, Uzbekistan, and China. In general, we do this irrespective of the identity of the offender and, when circumstances merit it, criticize even some of our close allies. We manifest our concerns through a variety of channels, including diplomatic dialogue, both public and private, and the State Department's reports on human rights, international religious freedom, and trafficking in persons.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IS STILL A MAJOR FACET OF US FOREIGN POLICY.
Paula J. Dobriansky and Thomas Carothers. *Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 3; pg. 141*

For the Bush administration, democracy promotion is not just a "made in the U.S." venture, but a goal shared with many other countries. We also seek to broaden our partnerships with local and global nongovernmental organizations and international organizations, so that we can work together on democracy promotion, advancement of human rights, and humanitarian relief. In fact, the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, and other organizations have played pivotal roles in the development of a democratic culture and the strengthening of civil society.

THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IS A KEY GOAL OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION.
Paula J. Dobriansky and Thomas Carothers. *Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 3; pg. 141*

Overall, the promotion of democracy is a key foreign policy goal of the Bush administration. This sentiment is reflected in all of our international endeavors and is animated by a mixture of both idealistic and pragmatic impulses. We seek to foster a global society of nations, in which freedom and democracy reign and human aspirations are fully realized.
DEMOCRACY IS THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT THE DISASTERS OF TERRORISM, WAR, REFUGEES, STATE COLLAPSE, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, 1995; Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, www.ceip.org

On any list of the most important potential threats to world order and national security in the coming decade, these six should figure prominently: a hostile, expansionist Russia; a hostile, expansionist China; the spread of fundamentalist Islamic, anti-Western regimes; the spread of political terrorism from all sources; sharply increased immigration pressures; and ethnic conflict that escalates into large-scale violence, civil war, refugee flows, state collapse, and general anarchy. Some of these potential threats interact in significant ways with one another, but they all share a common underlying connection. In each instance, the development of democracy is an important prophylactic, and in some cases the only long-term protection, against disaster.
DEMO PROMO ANSWERS: SOLVES WAR

THE US IS A MODEL FOR THE WORLD TO SEE.
Larry Diamond, Editor of the Journal of Democracy, "Foreign Policy, 1992,

There are compelling reasons to reject the cold calculations of realpolitik One reason is moral. What distinguishes America most as a people and a nation is its commitment to political and economic freedom, to openness, pluralism, democracy, and the rule of law. For that reason millions of people want to immigrate to the United States, and US universities and research centers are bursting with foreign-born talent. That commitment is why America is so widely admired around the world, and why the products of American culture are everywhere in demand. Just as much the US military and economic power, the US commitment to freedom and democracy is the reason so many countries and peoples continue to look to America for international leadership. US commitment to promote democracy abroad has real political and strategic ramifications as well. With national borders becoming less constraining, Americans are increasingly affected by the forms of government in other countries. For reasons of principle alone, no democrat would prefer to live in a world composed primarily of dictatorships; but as the world d shrinks and international exchanges intensify, such a prospect increasingly becomes a direct threat. Whether they are traveling, studying or doing business abroad, citizens of the United States and other democracies are less secure in non-democratic countries, and their transactions and contracts less protected by rule of law. Countries lacking stable democracy are more often in the grip of revolution, terrorism, and other forms of disorder that threaten the safety of Americans.

DEMOCRACIES DON’T FIGHT WARS WITH EACH OTHER.
Talbott Strobe, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996, Pg. L/N

Woodrow Wilson called democracy, “the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars,” and Franklin Roosevelt said that “the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace.” A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other—and more likely to win wars against autocratic states.

DEMOCRACY IS KEY TO PREVENTING GLOBAL CONFLICT.

The political culture argument relies heavily on the work of Immanuel Kant (especially as formulated and advanced by Doyle, 1986). In this argument the 'norms fostered by a democratic culture' (to use Morgan & Schwebach's terms) are the central explanatory factors regarding the creation of a zone of peace among democratic states. An initial premise of Kant's position is that, because democratic states require the consent of its citizens to go to war, war will be less likely as the citizens themselves will have to bear its costs. In addition, the 'republican' civil constitution of a state signifies that 'a political society has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism and social order' (Doyle, 1986, p. 1157). That is, democracies require the development of norms of orderly and peaceful conflict resolution within society; norms held by both the citizenry and the policy-making elite drawn from that society. These are expectations that all citizens hold for themselves and others. Leaders of democratic states bring these norms to their management of conflict with leaders of other democratic states. Thus, pairs of democracies do not go to war.

THREE REASONS DEMOCRACIES DON’T FIGHT WARS AGAINST EACHOTHER.

They outline three hypothesis (called hunches) as to why this may be: (1) that democracies are like-minded, sharing similar liberal economic and political policies; (2) that democracies share a political culture based on individual rights and liberties, and thus abhor violence to resolve conflict; and (3) that the democratic process makes it relatively easier for domestic opposition groups to mobilize against the use of force, constraining leaders and making them more unwilling to use force against other similarly constrained.

DEMO PROMO ANSWERS: SOLVES WAR

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
FOUR MORE REASONS DEMOCRACIES DON’T FIGHT WARS AGAINST EACHOTHER.

There are a number of propositions that might account for the rarity with which democracies go to war with one another. Russett & Antholis (1991) derive four competing hypotheses from the literature. Democracies are peaceful towards one another because (1) they share common ties through a network of international institutions; (2) up to World War II, the few democracies rarely shared common borders which often generated the opportunities for war; (3) in the post-World War II era democracies faced a common enemy in the Soviet Union and its allies; and (4) the cost-benefit ration of war for one advanced industrial state against another was not attractive and most post-World War II democracies were stable economically advanced states.

FEAR OF LOSING VOTES PREVENTS DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS FROM
The Hindu, June 12, 1999, p. L/N

At least four reasons have been offered why democracies are reluctant to wage war. The most obvious is that politicians who are used to pleading for votes will naturally be reluctant to tell their citizens that they are likely to be sent into extreme danger. Voters will want to be assured that everything possible has been done to avoid bloodshed, even if the result is a significant appeasement of the enemy in the early stages of diplomacy. The powerful tendency to avoid casualties has had several clear consequences. Democracies will prefer to have professional armed forces, so at least the politicians can pretend that they are merely putting people at risk whose job it is to be at risk. Democracies will also prefer, as we saw in the Balkan conflict, to use high tech weapons and airpower both to minimize their own and their casualties.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY STOPS WARS.
The Hindu, June 12, 1999, p. L/N

Second, in an age of tight monetary policy and cuts in welfare services, democratic politicians will have trouble arguing why one day's cruise missile firings are a greater priority than building a new hospital. If democracy is about accountability, then as the wagers of war become more accountable, they will tend to become more cautious.

A FREE MEDIA KEEPS WAR WAGERS IN CHECK.
The Hindu, June 12, 1999, p. L/N

And finally, democrats will always find it natural to lay to the gallery and in so doing encourage often a debilitating ‘g debate about military strategy In any democracy with a free and competitive media there will be flamboyant Opposition politicians making demagogic arguments against even the most just of wars. No matter how damaging to the war effort, or simply logically absurd is their argument, a free media will feel it is merely doing its duty by treating reports from Belgrade as if they were as credible as from Brussels. Mr. Tony Blair’s ability to be such a hawk on the Balkans owed a great deal to the pathetic state of his domestic Opposition.
DEMO PROMO ANSWERS: SOLVES ETHNIC CONFLICTS

DEMOCRACY PROTECTS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS.
David A. Hamburg, Carnegie Commission.; Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, 1995
www.ceip.org

In a world full of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and violent conflict, there is a vital need for core democratic values to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts and to prevent their escalation to violence. The absence of democratic mechanisms to sort out conflicts within a country often makes it easy for conflicts to spill over into violence.

EVERY INSTANCE OF GENOCIDE HAS HAPPENED UNDER AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Inst, Stanford Univ., 1999; Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation

Beyond the violence between states and between or against ethnic groups within states lies a more stunning generalization: "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely. Rudolph Rummel's exhaustive study of deaths from war, genocide, mass murder, and domestic violence in this, history's most murderous, century, demonstrates that every instance of mass murder by a state against its own people has happened under authoritarian rule and that the more absolutist the regime the greater the tendency toward democide (genocide and mass murder of innocent civilians. Thus, "the way to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom.

DEMOCRACY IS CRITICAL TO PROTECTING ETHNIC PLURALISM.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, 1995; Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, www.ceip.org

Overwhelmingly, theory and evidence show that the path to peaceful management of ethnic pluralism lies not through suppressing ethnic identities and superimposing the hegemony of one group over others. Eventually, such a formula is bound to crumble or be challenged violently. Rather, sustained interethnic moderation and peace follow from the frank recognition of plural identities, legal protection for group and individual rights, devolution of power to various localities and regions, and political institutions that encourage bargaining and accommodation at the center. Such institutional provisions and protections are not only significantly more likely under democracy, they are only possible with some considerable degree of democracy.
DEMOCRACY IS THE ONLY WAY TO ELIMINATE GENOCIDE.
Larry Diamond, Editor of the Journal of Democracy, Developing Democracy, 1999
Beyond the violence between states and between or against ethnic groups within states lies a more stunning
generalization "Power kills, absolutely, absolute power kills absolutely." Rudolph Rummel's exhaustive study of
deaths from war, genocide mass murder and domestic violence in this, history's most murderous, century demonstrates
that every instance of mass murder in a state against its own people has happened under authoritarian rule and that the
more a absolutist the regime the greater the tendency toward democide (genocide and mass murder of innocent
civilians). Thus, the way to virtually eliminate genocide and mass murder appears to be through restricting and
checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom.

THE BEST ASSURANCE AGAINST GENOCIDE IS DEMOCRACY.
R.J. Rummel, University of Hawaii at Manoa, "Journal of Conflict Resolution", 1995
Among a variety of social diversity (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion, language), socioeconomic, cultural, geographic, and other
indicators, the best way to account for and predict democide is by the degree to which a regime is totalitarian along a
democratic-totalitarian scale. That is, the extent to which a regime controls absolutely all social, economic, and cultural
groups as an institutions, the degree to which its elite can rule arbitrarily largely accounts for the magnitude and intensity of
genocide and mass murder. The best assurances against democide are democratic openness, political competition leaders
responsible to their people, and limited government. In other words, power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely.

EMPIRICALLY, DEMOCRACIES CAN WITHSTAND CROP FAILURES AND NOT HAVE FAMINE.
Talbott Strobe, Former Deputy Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996, Pg. L/N
Similarly, famine prevention programs run by democratically elected governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe enabled those
nations to withstand crop failures in the early 1980’s. During the same period, Sen notes, Sudan and Ethiopia, faced with
relatively smaller declines in food output but ruled by authoritarian regimes, suffered severe famines.
DEMO PROMO: AT: TRANSITION WARS

TRANSITIONAL WOES ARE MINOR. THE END RESULT OF DEMOCRACY OUTWEIGHS.
Larry Diamond, Editor of the Journal of Democracy, Developing Democracy, 1999

Although the process of democracy may stimulate ethnic conflicts and induce weak states to meet communal rebellion with repression rather than accommodation, the resolution of ethno-political conflicts in institutionalized democracies depends most fundamentally on the implementation of universalistic norms of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens . . . and pluralistic accommodations of [group] desires for separate collective status. In democracies, particularly ones with well-institutionalized representative processes, minority groups have the political scope to mobilize and to win response within the democratic process, and they lose support when they turn to violence and terrorism.

DEMO PROMO: AT: DEMO PROMO BAD

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION HAS BEEN REVAMPED. YOUR IMPACT TURNS ASSUME THE OLD WAY.

Democracy promoters are also changing their earlier tendency to dictate pre-cooked solution ideas, that do not fit in reality. And even when Americans came in with good ideas, the lack of local input often kept them from being embraced and sustained. A more persistent problem is the tendency to emphasize form over substance. Democracy programs have largely helped foreign countries replicate certain practices -- congressional hearings, for example. Today, Mr. Carothers believes, activists are beginning to see that these forms of democracy are easily manipulated by autocratic leaders, and that governments reform only when they want to. In Guatemala, he writes, a 10-year American effort to train the police did not limit police abuses. What did work was the election of new leaders who pressed the security forces to reduce brutality. Today Mr. Carothers writes, democracy promoters try to be more attuned to the political realities of the countries they work in. This understanding has not yet meant the abandonment of unrealistic efforts to work with authoritarian governments. But where governments resist reform, American consultants now try to strengthen democratic forces by boosting grass-roots groups, local governments women’s organizations. Americans increasingly stay for months or years of intensive work rather than a few days. In many places, American organizations use regional experts sending, sending Filipinos to Indonesia or Poles to Bulgaria -- people who are often better received an know more about local realities.
BUDGET DEFICIT DISADVANTAGE & 
AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
This is essentially a standard budget deficit position. The budget deficit is the difference between expenditures (what the government spends) and revenue (mostly taxes). The argument is that when the United States supports United Nations’ peacekeeping operations it hurts the ability of the United States to reign in the budget deficit. Much like if you borrowed too much money on your credit cards, a high deficit in the United States risks hurting the economy by forcing increases in interest rates (when the government is competing to borrow with the private sector) and decreasing our economic credibility globally.

This is a very generic position and the links are not specific to any plan in particular. You should look in 1ac solvency evidence to find portions of affirmative cards that discuss how expensive their particular proposal would be and use those arguments as specific links. You can also use the solvency takeout/link card to your advantage by arguing that if the plan is not very expensive then it does not spend enough to effectively use peacekeeping so the plan cannot solve.

Probably the most useful strategic tip to keep in mind when running an economy disadvantage like this one is to remember to describe the effects of a global economic meltdown on the ability of peacekeeping to be effective. If the global economy crashed it would probably make civil wars more likely and would probably decrease the incentive for the international community to participate in US led peacekeeping. Arguments like these can seriously erode the affirmative’s ability to solve their harms.

Finally, the economy is very dynamic, so it is extremely important to make sure you update your spending and economy positions before every tournament. What works well at the beginning of the year will not work indefinitely.
BUDGET DEFICIT DISADVANTAGE INDEX

Shell
100

Uniqueness
US Economy Improving 101
Trump Card – Small Slowdown Now is Good 102
AT: Trade Deficits 102
AT: Unemployment 102
AT: Interest Rates 103
AT: Oil 104 – 105
Global Economy Recovering 106
Global Economy – Japan Recovering 107
Budget Deficits Decreasing 108
AT: US Increasing Support for Peacekeeping Now 108

Links
Peacekeeping is Expensive (general) 109
Effective Peacekeeping is Expensive (Solvency Takeout) 110
The UN has No Money 111

Internal Links
Increased Budget Deficits will Wreck the Economy 112 - 113
US Economy Key to the World Economy 114

AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
2ac Frontline 115 - 116

Uniqueness Answers
US Economy Collapsing Now 117 – 118
Budget Deficit Increasing Now 118 – 119
US Peacekeeping Funds High Now 120
General US Spending Increasing Now 121

Internal Link Answers
Budget Deficits don’t Hurt the Economy 122
BUDGET DEFICIT SHELL

A: UNIQUENESS – A CONSENSUS OF ECONOMIC FORECASTERS PREDICT STRONG ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES


The average forecast of 53 economists is that the gross domestic product, adjusted for inflation, will grow at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the third quarter and 4 percent in the fourth quarter, down from a 4.9 percent pace in the 12 months ended in March, according to Blue Chip Economic Indicators. On a year over year basis, growth is forecast to slow to a 3.8 percent rate next year, from 4.6 percent this year.

A2: THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES THAT THE BUDGET DEFICIT IS SHRINKING RAPIDLY

The New York Sun, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N

The tax cuts "were enacted when they were clearly needed," said economist Ward McCarthy of Stone and Mc-Carthy Research Associates in Princeton, N.J. "They have helped revitalize the economy," he said. But the tax cuts and spending came at the price of a budget deficit. "The flip side was that the deficit grew, but monetary policy kept interest rates low, and the deficit did not slow the economy," Mr. McCarthy said. He projects a budget deficit in the $460 billion to $485 billion range for 2004 - significantly lower than the $521 billion projected by the administration earlier this year. This month, the CBO said its 2004 deficit of $477 billion would be about $30 billion to $40 billion lower due to higher than expected tax receipts. Receipts from individual income taxes are about $21 billion this fiscal year, or 4% below the figure for the corresponding period last year, mostly due to an increase of $18 billion in refunds of income taxes.

B: LINK – THE PLAN PROMOTES US PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS. EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CAN COST ALMOST A BILLION DOLLARS

Mark Turner, Staff Writer, Financial Times, May 18, 2004, Pg. L/N.

Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary-general, said yesterday that a surge in demand for UN peacekeeping missions worldwide might outstrip the organisation's capacity to support them. Some 53,000 UN troops are already active and new or expanded missions for Haiti, Burundi, Ivory Coast and Sudan are expected soon. "By the end of this year we may need an extra $1bn for the UN peacekeeping budget," Mr Annan said. Mark Turner, United Nations

B2: FAILURE TO MAINTAIN DEFICIT REDUCTION PRESENTS THE BIGGEST RISK OF RECESSION IN THE US


Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned on Thursday that rising federal deficits may be the biggest threat to the nation's longterm economic stability. In a speech that ranged from Americans' household debt to the nation's huge foreign debt, Mr. Greenspan said he was optimistic that most financial imbalances could be reduced smoothly through the effect of normal market forces. "But that is certainly not the case for our yawning fiscal deficit," he told a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. "Our fiscal prospects are, in my judgment, a significant obstacle to long-term stability because the budget deficit is not readily subject to correction by market forces."

C: IMPACT: ECONOMIC COLLAPSE CAUSES WORLD WAR III


The United States and the world are facing what could grow into the greatest threat to world peace in 60 years. Forget suicide car bombers and Afghan fanatics. It's the financial markets, not the terrorist training camps that pose the biggest immediate threat to world peace. How can this be? Think about the mother of all global meltdowns: the Great Depression that started in 1929. U.S. stocks began to collapse in October, staged a rally, then the market headed south big time. At the bottom, the Dow Jones industrial average had lost 90% of its value. Wages plummeted, thousands of banks and brokerages went bankrupt, millions of people lost their jobs. There were similar horror stories worldwide. But the biggest impact of the Depression on the United States—and on world history—wasn't money. It was blood: World War II, to be exact. The Depression brought Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, undermined the ability of moderates to oppose Joseph Stalin's power in Russia, and convinced the Japanese military that the country had no choice but to build an Asian empire, even if that meant war with the United States and Britain. That's the thing about depressions. They aren't just bad for your 401(k). Let the world economy crash far enough, and the rules change. We stop playing "The Price is Right" and start up a new round of "Saving Private Ryan."
UNIQUENESS: US ECONOMY IMPROVING – QUALIFIED ESTIMATES

NON-PROFIT, NONPARTISAN ESTIMATE IS FOR HEALTHY US GROWTH THIS YEAR
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
LINK is a nongovernmental international research activity that integrates independently developed national econometric models into a global projection. The program is jointly coordinated by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the Project LINK Research Center at the University of Toronto. LINK anticipates Annual growth of better than 4.5% in 2004 in the United States, moderating to a little over 3.5% in 2005; growth in Japan of a little over 3% in 2004, and easing off to 2% in 2005; and 2004 growth slightly below 2% but rising to almost 2.5% in 2005 in Europe (see table).

LEADING ECONOMIC INDICATORS POINTING TO SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE US
AFX.com, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N
The U.S. index of leading economic indicators rose 0.1 percent in April, the Conference Board said Thursday. The rise was just below the forecast of Wall Street economists, who had expected a 0.2 percent gain. There was a large upward revision to the March data. The leading index for March was revised to a 0.8 percent rise, more than double the previous estimate of a 0.3 percent gain. "Net of the revisions, the index is now up 4.9% year-over-year, consistent with GDP growth of about 6-3/4%. Hard to see a second half slowdown here," said Ian Shepherdson, chief U.S. economist at High Frequency Economics.

THE US COMMERCE DEPARTMENT IS ESTIMATING THAT GROWTH IS INCREASING NOW
CNNMoney.com, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N.
On Thursday, the Commerce Department will revise its estimate of first-quarter GDP growth. Despite a bigger-than-expected trade gap in the quarter, which usually subtracts from GDP, economists expect the department to revise the annualized growth rate up to 4.5 percent from an original estimate of 4.2 percent.

US PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME SET TO RISE
CNNMoney.com, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N.
Friday brings the Commerce Department's measure of personal income and spending in April. Economists, on average, believe income rose 0.5 percent after rising 0.4 percent in March. Spending is expected to rise 0.2 percent from 0.4 percent in March

CONSUMER CONFIDENCE SET TO INCREASE
CNNMoney.com, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N.
Finally, the University of Michigan will revise its measure of May consumer sentiment on Friday. Economists expect the index to be revised up to 94.6 from an initial reading of 94.2.

CORPORATE EARNINGS ON THE RISE NOW
The consensus among Wall Street analysts is that earnings will increase 13.5 percent for the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 index in the second half of the year, compared with a year earlier. That would be a decline from the 22.7 percent increase forecast for the first half of this year by Thomson Financial.
A SLIGHT SLOWDOWN IN THE US ECONOMIC GROWTH WILL RELIEVE PRESSURE AND GUARANTEE LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY

"The best news we could have is that the economy is beginning to slow down," said Stuart Schweitzer, global markets strategist at J.P. Morgan Fleming Asset Management. Though he acknowledges that both job growth and earnings would also be reduced, he said the impact could be offset as interest rates stop rising -- or even fall -- and as inflation expectations are contained. "A moderation in growth, when it comes, will be good news first for bonds and then for stocks," he predicted. Stocks could use some good news. After reaching recent peaks on Feb. 11, the Dow Jones industrial average is down 7.5 percent since then and the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index has dropped 6 percent. The Nasdaq composite index, which reached its recent peak on Jan. 26, has fallen 11.9 percent since then.

HIGH TRADE DEFICITS ARE SUSTAINABLE AND POINT TO ECONOMIC STRENGTH

The San Francisco Chronicle, May 16, 2004, Pg. L/N

Catherine Mann, an expert with the Institute for International Economics, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., said that while the persistent trade deficit isn't good, the forces creating the imbalance will keep things stable for the foreseeable future. In recent years, much of the recycling of dollars back into the United States has involved China, Japan and other Asian nations buying Treasury debt to finance the U.S. budget deficit. Those countries will continue to pump dollars back into the United States because they want Americans to keep buying their products.

MOST RECENT DATA PROVES THAT UNEMPLOYMENT IS DECREASING

The Boston Herald, May 22, 2004, Pg. L/N

Massachusetts joined 28 other states reporting lower jobless rates yesterday, including 11 of 17 "battleground" states where the presidential election could be decided. "The economy is robust, new jobs are growing and the unemployment rate is dropping across the country," crowed Labor Secretary Elaine Chao. She was among several Bush administration officials who fanned out across the nation yesterday to tout the economy's strength.

ALL SIGNS POINT TO REBOUNDING EMPLOYMENT

AFX.com, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N

Separately, the Labor Department reported that initial weekly jobless claims rose by 12,000 to 345,000 in the latest week. At the same time, the four-week moving average fell 2,750 to 333,500. That's the lowest four-week average since the week ended Nov. 18, 2000.
UNIQUENESS: US ECONOMY IMPROVING – AT: INTEREST RATES

INTEREST RATE INCREASES BY THE FED WILL BE SLOW, SOLVING ECONOMIC RISKS
Australian Financial Review, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N
Basically, the bond professionals have accepted that rises are coming, bond prices have fallen and yields have risen. As Alliance Capital Management's senior vice-president in the fixed-income area, Douglas Peebles says, last year was a time to take larger risks; this year, Alliance is reducing its risk stance. Or, as Bridgewater Associates' Bob Prince puts it, after taking its most aggressive stance on bonds for about 10 years, Bridgewater now recognises the inevitable. "There's a 100 per cent chance of a rise in rates at each of the next three meetings," he says of the outlook for action from the Federal Reserve Board. In other words, the fixed-income world has come to grips with the outlook but the stockmarket still seems to be coming to grips with a change in the interest-rate climate even as the economy and corporate profits continue to improve. Peebles takes some comfort from the Fed's statements about moving interest rates at "a measured pace". He doesn't share the concerns of a few people that 2004 might turn out to be a replay of 1994, when the Fed raised rates from 3 per cent to 6 per cent in the year, triggering a major bond market sell-off and a slide in share prices.

PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES WILL OFFSET ANY INTEREST RATE HIKES
Australian Financial Review, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N
Out in leafy Connecticut, Bridgewater's Prince, co-chief investment officer with the founder, Ray Dalio, doesn't share some views that, now that the bond market has fully discounted a 0.25 per cent increase next month, the Fed might even look to raise rates 0.5 per cent. Frankly, he says, the odds of a 0.5 per cent increase are about the same as no move at all. Look at things through the Fed's eyes, he says: economic growth is being driven by productivity growth, there's a lot of excess capacity in the economy and inflation numbers are still low. "So why should it tighten?" he asks.

ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS TOO STRONG FOR AN INTEREST RATE INCREASE TO MATTER
AFX.com, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N
Treasury prices remained higher after the report was released. Stocks remained higher in early trade. Researchers at the Conference Board said the index was signaling continued solid economic growth through the third quarter. "While there are growing concerns about rising gasoline prices this spring, as well as worries about what happens after all the tax refunds have been spent, the indicators are not signaling an softening in America's basic economic fundamentals," said Ken Goldstein, an economist at the board. "Even a short-term hike in interest rates is probably not likely to stifle economic growth or job growth," he said.

GENTLE FED INTEREST RATE INCREASES WILL SOLVE INFLATION AND NOT HARM THE ECONOMY
Over the 12 months ended in April, consumer prices rose at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, up from a rate of 1.7 percent through February and March. The core rate rose 1.8 percent over the 12 months through April, up from a 1.6 percent pace in March and 1.1 percent in January. "One of the reasons why Fed officials are so confident about the inflation outlook is that they believe that inflation expectations are low and well anchored," Louis Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP wrote in his weekly report to clients. Expectations are low, he added, because investors are confident the Fed is determined to curb price increases. But "there is a limit to how many inconvenient inflation reports the Fed can ignore before that determination is called into question," he added.
UNIQUENESS: US ECONOMY IMPROVING – AT: OIL

NUMEROUS FACTORS POINT TO DECREASING OIL PRICES SOON
Marc Chandler, Chief Currency Strategist, HSBC, CNN Money Morning, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
And so in some ways much of OPEC, leaving aside Saudi Arabia, is already near capacity in producing oil and OPEC is already producing something like 2 million barrels a day more than their quotas. And so in some ways there's not a lot that OPEC will be able to do. Yes, the Saudis look like they’re able to break ranks and independently boost output. But in the big picture, it's not clear how much impact this will have. And we also know in the United States that our refineries, that part of the economy that takes the crude oil and makes it into a finished good like jet fuel, like gasoline, is also running near capacity. So I think that in some ways we say it's better to be lucky than smart. And in this regard, the G-7 probably being lucky, oil prices looked like they had a reversal on Friday. And it looks like the technical sign is pointing to somewhat lower oil prices over the next couple of days or weeks.

EFFICIENCY INCREASES ARE SOLVING THE EFFECT OF OIL PRICE INCREASES
Marc Chandler, Chief Currency Strategist, HSBC, CNN Money Morning, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
I think in some ways it represent as one-off adjustment. We have to get used to paying x number of dollars for a gallon of gas, rather than what we used to pay. But in the bigger picture, the economies in the west, especially the United States, western Europe, Japan, have become much more energy efficient. Roughly for every output of GDP, we're like twice as efficient as we were say 20 years ago. And so in some ways, as we industrialize the economies, move towards a more service sector economy, we are less dependent on oil in some respects. On the other hand, it does seem that we have to get used to the higher emergency prices going forward.

SAUDI ARABIA OUTPUT INCREASES WILL SOLVE THE RISK OF OIL SHOCKS
CNN Street Sweep, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Secretary Abraham met Saudii's oil minister Sunday. Abraham said Saudi Arabia pledged to pump a lot more oil starting in June and said Saudi Arabia could pump even more if needed though the Saudi Arabian oil minister was given little away in front of cameras. Saudi Arabia wants lower prices so consumers don't turn to alternatives to oil. Iraq is supporting Saudi Arabia's call for OPEC to raise its production by around 8 percent.

HIGH OIL PRICES DON'T HURT THE ECONOMY – EMPIRICALLY PROVEN
CNN Street Sweep, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Now our most recent experience is this rise at the gas pumps that we're all upset about it. But oil today is cheaper than it was 20 years ago. It takes half the oil to produce a unit of GDP today than it did 20 years ago. That's because we're much more technology driven than we are manufacturing driven. But the fact remains we're not as dependent. Now, does $40 oil finally do it? Are we really going to have issues? I would have thought 30, but it hasn't. The GDP and the economy has progressed quite nicely even though the price of oil has been high because of those facts that I just mentioned.

LOW INFLATION WILL PROTECT THE US ECONOMY FROM OIL SHOCKS
THE United States has managed to thrive despite high budget deficits and a staggering level of international indebtedness. Can it also thrive if oil prices remain above $40 a barrel and gasoline costs more than $2 a gallon at the pump? The standard answer is yes, and the argument goes like this: First, oil prices are still lower, after adjusting for inflation, than they were in the 1970's. Second, the United States is much less "energy intensive" than it was 30 years ago, using about half as much oil to produce each dollar's worth of output. Third, even a big jump in oil prices is typically a one-time hit on consumer prices and not a prelude to sustained inflation. Ben S. Bernanke, a Federal Reserve governor, has argued that the biggest change since 30 years ago is the stunning decline of inflation.
GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES PROVE OIL IS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS IMPORTANT NOW THAN IN THE 1970s
The Energy Information Administration, a statistical arm of the Energy Department, estimates that energy expenditures are now about 6.5 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. By contrast, the energy share soared from 8 percent to 14 percent of gross domestic product immediately after the oil embargo of 1973.

DECREASING ENERGY INTENSITY WILL PROTECT THE US FROM OIL SHOCKS
It is soothing to think that the United States' energy intensity has declined because businesses and consumers have become more efficient and more focused on knowledge-based industries like finance, software and technology. But while that is true in part, energy intensity fluctuates with energy prices. Energy prices have been low or declining for two decades, so energy spending has played a smaller role in the total economy. But with oil and natural gas prices both near record levels, the United States is likely to look a lot more energy intensive this year.
UNIQUENESS: GLOBAL ECONOMY RECOVERING

CONSENSUS IS FOR HEALTHY AND ROBUST GLOBAL GROWTH THIS YEAR
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Continuing the strong pace of recovery that started in the second half of 2003, the world economy is expected to grow by 3.7% this year, according to a group of 100 economists from 60 countries meeting at the United Nations under the auspices of Project LINK. But the current accelerating phase, they say in Global Economic Outlook 2004, is expected to wind down in the second half of the year.

A HOST OF FACTORS POINTS TO STRENGTH IN THE DEVELOPING GLOBAL ECONOMY
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
In the meantime, however, conditions across regions and countries that favor a buoyant economy "are almost ubiquitous": low interest rates, low inflation, rising equity markets and increased demand leading to increased trade and cross-border investment. The combination is providing a welcome opportunity for many developing economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America to pull out of the slowdown they experienced in the early part of the decade. Net capital flows to developing countries since mid-2003 have increased significantly since mid-2003, finally reversing the downward trend that followed the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.

EMERGING MARKET BONDS POINT TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC STRENGTH
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Foreign direct investment is expected to rebound in 2004 after several years of downward drift, while portfolio investment is already on the rise, as most emerging market stock markets in late 2003 and early 2004 outperformed those in the developed economies in late 2003 and early 2004. Improved investor confidence has been beneficial in terms of the interest rates that developing countries have to pay for funds raised on international capital markets, and for emerging economy bond yields as well. Yield spreads of emerging market bonds over US Treasuries have declined to the lowest level since the Asian crisis, LINK says. And net commercial bank lending has turned positive for the first time in seven years.

GLOBAL DEMAND WILL SOLVE ANY RISKS OF GLOBAL UNEMPLOYMENT
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Unemployment remains a large problem, however. The cyclical recovery employment has been unusually slow in many economies. Employment in most Asian countries is still far below pre-Asian financial crisis levels, and unemployment in the transition countries also remains high. Perniciously high structural unemployment in many African and Latin American countries, reaching rates of 20% or more, cannot be resolved only by the cyclical upturn, LINK warns. But rising global demand, coupled with the linkage of commodity prices to a declining US dollar, is boosting the return on commodities, to the benefit of many commodity-exporting developing economies.
UNIQUENESS: GLOBAL ECONOMY – JAPAN RECOVERING

JAPANESE GROWTH IS STRONG
The Daily Yomiuri, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N

Personal consumption was behind the 1.4 percent real growth in gross domestic product from the previous quarter reported Tuesday. The growth in annualized terms was 5.6 percent, showing clear signs of an economic recovery. Personal consumption, which accounts for more than 50 percent of GDP, increased 1 percent. Together with exports, personal consumption was the biggest contributor to the GDP growth. Capital investment and plant construction also soared.

ALL SIGNS POINT TO JAPANESE ECONOMIC STRENGTH
Japan Economic Newswire, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N

Data on Japan's stronger-than-expected gross domestic product for the January-March quarter showed that personal consumption gathered steam as exports and capital spending held up, indicating that households have started benefiting from corporate-led growth. GDP grew 1.4 percent in real terms in the three months to March for the eighth straight quarterly increase, the Cabinet Office said Tuesday. The growth rate, translated into 5.6 percent in annualized terms, topped the average market forecast of 1.0 percent or an annualized 3.9 percent.

JAPANESE ECONOMY IS REBOUNDING AND IS RESILIENT IN THE SHORT TERM
Japan Economic Newswire, May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N

Policy-makers and analysts said they expect Japan's economy to continue on an upward trend, saying the current momentum in the recovery would help the world's second-largest economy fend off risk factors such as surges in crude oil prices and possible credit tightening in the United States and China. BOJ Governor Toshihiko Fukui said at a press conference after the policy decision, 'A scenario for expansion of the whole world economy has become increasingly clear. We have not seen irregular movements in any market.' He indicated that financial markets have begun pricing in factors including looming interest rate hikes by the U.S. Federal Reserve from four-decade lows.
UNIQUENESS: BUDGET DEFICITS DECREASING

BUDGET DEFICITS WILL BE CUT IN HALF IN FIVE YEARS
The Main Wire, May 21, 2004, Pg. L/N
U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Brian Roseboro repeated Thursday the Bush administration's stance that the current budget deficits are unwelcome but sometimes unavoidable. "Deficits matter, they're unwelcome but sometimes they're necessary," Roseboro said during a panel discussion in New York. He said the White House target of halving the current deficit within five years is still within sight.

CURRENT DEFICITS WILL PUT A LID ON SPENDING, BRINGING DOWN THE TOTAL DEFICIT
The National Journal, May 15, 2004, Pg. L/N
Government spending today is lower, relative to the size of the economy, than it was during most of the 1990s and all of the 1980s. Deficits, too, are smaller, relative to the size of the economy, than they were under Reagan. But what should alarm conservatives is the extent to which the economy has depended on government to grow for the last three years. Deficits now seem to foreclose additional tax cuts and are pushing Congress toward legal limits on spending.

AT: US INCREASING SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING NOW

SENATE BUDGET AGREEMENT WILL DECREASE PEACEKEEPING IN THE STATUS QUO
PR Newswire, April 28, 2004, Pg. L/N
The international affairs budget accounts for a small portion of the overall budget, yet it includes most of the funding for the President's Plan for AIDS Relief. It also contains funds for combating global terrorism and nuclear proliferation, as well as for security upgrades at US embassies around the world. The US contribution to the United Nations, as well as for international peacekeeping, are provided though this budget. The President had requested $31.6 billion for the international affairs budget, while negotiators are reportedly about to sign off on $29.3 billion, or $2.3 billion less than what was requested. The Senate had proposed $31.9 billion. Members of Congress that write spending bills will be bound by whatever is agreed upon and will determine where specifically the cuts will fall.

US SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING NOW IS ONLY ON TRAINING AND LOGISTICS
Taiwan News, May 19, 2004, Pg. LN
Britain's deputy U.N. ambassador Adam Thomson said the unprecedented surge in demand for peacekeepers was a challenge to the U.N. system. The risk was that the U.N. "elastic" would be stretched too thin and that somewhere, sometime soon, it would snap, he said. There are risks of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, of diminished accountability, breaches of military discipline, corruption, political mistakes and even military failure, he said. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has only 600 staff to plan, launch and oversee operations, which means fewer than 35 staff per operation - and this will diminish next year, Thomson said. U.S. deputy ambassador Stuart Holliday expressed support for complex peacekeeping operations saying U.S. efforts will focus primarily on training peacekeeping personnel, especially in Africa.

LESS THAN $14 MILLION CURRENTLY ALLOCATED TO PEACEKEEPING IN THE UN
M2 Presswire, May 13, 2004, Pg. L/N
Compared with the request for $85.97 million (reflecting a reduction of $0.5 million for staff assessment) submitted by the Secretary-General, total resources available as a result of the Advisory Committee's recommendations would be as follows: Additional gross appropriation under the proposed programme budget $40.0 million Additional amount to be cost-shared by the organizations participating in the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator $8.9 million Additional amount for peacekeeping operations of which $4.3 million would not be appropriated at this stage, but would be accommodated within existing budgets and reflected in the next performance report $13.5 million
LINKS: PEACEKEEPING IS EXPENSIVE (GENERAL)

ANY PEACEKEEPING WILL BE EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE IN THE POST-IRAQ SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The secretary-general did not specifically mention Iraq, but he spoke about the need to give U.N. peacekeepers authority to robustly defend themselves as they embark new and more dangerous missions. "Especially as the U.N. moves into non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping, our peacekeepers become targets for people who seek to disrupt the political process, in the hope that further violence will enable them to achieve their aims. It is the responsibility of all of us to ensure that those who serve the U.N. Charter in peacekeeping missions are protected," he said.

STATUS QUO OPERATIONS PROVE COST OF PEACEKEEPING IS HALF A BILLION EACH YEAR
The most expensive peacekeeping mission currently under way is in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This year's bill is $640 million. Two others, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, each cost more than $500 million a year. Planned missions in Haiti and Sudan are also expected to be among the most costly.

FAILURE TO PRIVATIZE ANY PART OF PEACEKEEPING MAKES IT DEVASTATINGLY EXPENSIVE – BURUNDI PROVES
Traci Hukill, Managing Editor, UN Wire, The National Journal, May 15, 2004, Pg. L/N.
Last month, thinking that peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, might finally yield an end to Sudan's 20-year civil war, Doug Brooks got on the telephone and started calling his contacts at private military companies. What would it cost, he wanted to know, to stage an effective peacekeeping operation in Sudan, a vast African country that is one-quarter the size of the United States? The answer came back: for one year, taking advantage of the treeless terrain to use a combination of high-tech aerial surveillance equipment and a relatively low number (3,000) of U.N. blue-helmet troops, $30 million. Forty million dollars, if the firms handled the peacekeeping payroll. This most likely represents significant savings. Although the United Nations has issued no cost estimate for a Sudan mission, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed spending $418 million on a 5,600-man mission to Burundi, a small Central African nation the size of Maryland.
UN PEACEKEEPING WILL FAIL UNLESS IT IS EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE
Traci Hukill, Managing Editor, UN Wire, The National Journal, May 15, 2004, Pg. L/N.
The United Nations is facing a peacekeeping crisis. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations began emitting distress signals months ago about the number of blue berets and blue helmets it will be expected to muster this year -- up to 20,000 for missions in Ivory Coast, Haiti, and possibly Burundi and Sudan, and all at a time when troop-contributing countries are under pressure from Washington to send soldiers to Iraq. If the Burundi and Sudan missions become reality, the U.N. will have 45,000 peacekeepers deployed, the highest number since the mid-1990s.
LINK BOOSTER: THE UN HAS NO MONEY

THE UN IS IN A SERIOUS FINANCIAL CRISIS WHICH PROVES THE US WOULD HAVE TO SHOULDER ALMOST THE ENTIRE BURDEN OF PEACEKEEPING

M2 Presswire, March 18, 2004, Pg. L/N.

Vladimir Kuznetzov, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), introducing that body's report, said that, facing an unusual, if not unique, situation, where potentially large and expensive peacekeeping missions might be coming one after another, cash available in closed missions would be required to supplement the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. While the postponement of the return of "available cash" to Member States was a policy decision to be made by the Assembly, cash from closed missions was the only source for temporary cross-borrowing when Tribunals, or active missions, ran out of cash. Other funding options, such as the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, were restricted in use. Several speakers noted that the reason for the difficulties experienced by the Organization was a result of the failure of some Member States to pay their assessments on time and in full. In that respect, the representative of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that a decision to retain funds from closed mission would not be a solution to the United Nations' ongoing dire financial situation, but merely a temporary band-aid for a much wider problem.
INTERNAL LINKS: INCREASED BUDGET DEFICITS WILL DESTROY THE ECONOMY

UNCHECKED BUDGET DEFICITS WOULD BE A ‘PERFECT STORM’ DESTROYING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
United Press International, May 19, 2004, Pg. L/N
An unprecedented rise in the deficit and the impending pressure of a retiring baby-boom generation on Social Security and Medicare are leading the United States toward fiscal crisis, according to a bipartisan forum who met in Washington this week. "The perfect economic storm is taking shape and will soon make landfall in America, unless we do something about it," Sen. Joe Lieberman, D-Conn., said Monday at the forum, held at The New America Foundation, a non-partisan, Washington-based think tank.

GREENSPAN CONCLUDES BUDGET DEFICITS WILL WRECK THE ECONOMY
In an unusual move, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan used two speeches last week to warn that the growing budget deficit is a long-term threat to the economy. Greenspan is well known for two things: Speaking with a maximum of obfuscation, and avoiding public displays of political behavior. That's why his speeches last week were so unusual. He was quite clear that the budget deficit - which is above 4 percent of GDP - is becoming a danger. In fact, if the U.S. were part of the European Union, it would be in violation of the EU's Growth & Stability pact, which limits budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP. Naturally, Greenspan's remarks made headlines across the country. But an official whose international economic clout is only slightly below Greenspan's made similar remarks late in April, and received almost no attention. Anne Krueger, the tough interim managing director at the International Monetary Fund, lumped the United States in with high-deficit nations like Japan and Argentina when she called for nations to use rapid economic growth to balance their budgets before worldwide interest rates jump. "This is an opportunity to batten down the hatches ahead of an upturn in interest rates," she said at an April news conference.

INCREASES IN THE CURRENT BUDGET DEFICIT WILL DESTROY THE ECONOMY – NORMAL ECONOMIC CHECKS NO LONGER WORK
Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2004, Pg. L/N
The nation's central bank chief, in a speech televised to bankers gathered in Chicago, repeated previous concerns about the dangers posed by the federal budget deficit, which is projected to account for about 4.5% of the nation's gross domestic product this year. "Our fiscal prospects are, in my judgment, a significant obstacle to long-term stability because the budget deficit is not readily subject to correction by market forces that stabilize other imbalances," Greenspan said. Greenspan delivered his remarks only a few days after the Federal Reserve decided to keep interest rates at historical lows but made it clear that the central bank was preparing to hike rates in the months to come amid signs of a reviving economy. Today, economists and investors will get a better idea of how the economy is doing when national employment figures for April are released. In his comments Thursday, Greenspan suggested that the normal drawbacks associated with large government deficits might have been masked by the expansion of free trade and global investment in addition to low interest rates.
INTERNAL LINKS: INCREASED BUDGET DEFICITS WILL DESTROY THE ECONOMY

BALLOONING BUDGET DEFICITS WOULD DESTROY THE ECONOMY VIA INTEREST RATE INCREASES
Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2004, Pg. L/N
However, he said the ballooning federal and trade deficits would begin to drag down economic growth as interest rates head higher and fewer benefits are wrung out of global trade and investment. "Has something fundamental happened to the U.S. economy and, by extension, U.S. banking, that enables us to disregard all the time-tested criteria of imbalance and economic danger?" Greenspan asked. "Regrettably, the answer is no. The free lunch has still to be invented."
INTERNAL LINKS: US ECONOMY IS KEY TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

HIGH US BUDGET DEFICITS WILL ERODE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY BY DESTROYING GLOBAL FISCAL DISCIPLINE
The IMF has never been shy about going into countries like Argentina, to cite a recent example, and more or less dictating measures like spending cuts, market reform and tax reductions. Its blanket prescription for austerity, in fact, is one reason globalization is under fire in developing nations. The fact that the IMF is now lecturing the United States is a sign that the world is losing faith in our fiscal discipline, and they're getting nervous about the federal budget deficit. This country is, after all, the world's most powerful economic engine. No one wants to see it stall - especially when that's preventable.

COLLAPSE OF US ECONOMY HURTS THE WORLD ECONOMY.
Ashish Gupta, Business Today May 11, 2003; Pg.65
What does an abstemious US mean for the rest of the world? Nothing short of a nightmare. If the dollar weakens, it will make imports that much more expensive for the American consumer. Particularly hurt will be Japan, the EU, Latin America and Eastern Europe, which are already in trouble because of their own nagging structural problems. And because of some relatively new risks such as terrorism and SARS, or the killer flu, which has been claiming lives in s-e Asia and spreading to other parts of the world, the global economy may be more vulnerable than ever before. The knock-on effect is already being taken for granted. A DSP Merrill Lynch report has revised downwards growth projections for most of s-e Asia's big economies. That of Hong Kong-the most visibly SARS-affected region-from 4.6 per cent to 4 per cent; of Taiwan to 3.2 per cent (3.3); of Singapore to 2.2 per cent (2.4), and of China from 7.6 per cent to 7.5 per cent. Says Surjit S. Bhalla, MD, Oxus Research: "The depression is global today. Its impact is being felt by all-some less and others more."
1. NON-UNIQUE: TRADE DEFICITS AND INTEREST RATE INCREASES WILL TUBE THE ECONOMY
The Houston Chronicle, May 6, 2004, Pg. L/N
The United States' latest economic growth benefits from large tax cuts, deficit spending and real interest rates at zero percent. However, the Federal Reserve Board stated this week that "measured" interest hikes are coming. Rates for mortgages and consumer loans are rising in anticipation. The U.S. trade deficit for 2003 was almost half a trillion dollars. Combined with the budget deficits, the imbalance could deter foreign investors from buying U.S. bonds, raising interest rates further and adding to the budget deficit in a vicious circle. Fear has been known to do more damage to markets than any financial indicator. Unchanged, the United States' fiscal policy will provide plenty of reasons to worry.

2. NON-UNIQUE: THE BUDGET DEFICIT IS THE WORST IT HAS EVER BEEN AND SHOWS NO SIGN OF REVERSING
International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
The Bush deficit is worse than the administration says. And it appears that coming deficits will be worse than previous ones in terms of the impact on Americans' financial security and on national security, for these reasons: Size. Though the Bush deficit of 2003 was already a record in pure numbers, the administration's defenders often point out that it amounted to only 3.5 percent of gross domestic product. That doesn't sound too bad compared with the modern record of 6 percent set by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. But the size of the deficit now is masked by the Social Security Trust Fund surplus. If you believe that the Social Security surplus would be put to better use by being preserved for future retirees, the Bush deficit should really amount to 5 percent of GDP. And it shows no signs of abating. It took 15 years of hard work and good luck before the Reagan deficits were vanquished. Even Reagan himself, after initially cutting taxes, raised them repeatedly. Bush shows no such intention, and that is the reason the current red ink he has unleashed will not stop flowing.

3. NON-UNIQUE: THE US IS SPENDING $660 MILLION IN A NEW PROGRAM TO TRAIN UN PEACEKEEPERS NOW
The Washington Post, April 22, 2004, Pg. L/N.
The Bush administration is preparing a partial response to this problem. It is planning a $660 million, five-year effort to train, equip and provide logistical support to peacekeepers from developing countries so that the pool of useful recruits is deepened. The focus will be on Africa, where most of the United Nations' 15 peacekeeping operations are taking place. The administration hopes to train some 75,000 foreign troops -- one and a half times as many as the United Nations currently has in all of its operations. Some of these forces might tackle the tougher assignments that the United Nations is not equipped to deal with -- ones where continued fighting requires "peacemaking" as opposed to "peacekeeping." If so, they could relieve the pressure on this country's thinly stretched armed forces: Although the United States contributes almost no troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations, it shoulders a large share of the peacemaking burden.

4. NO INTERNAL LINK: LOW INTEREST RATES MEAN BUDGET DEFICITS WON'T HURT THE ECONOMY
The National Journal, May 15, 2004, Pg. L/N
Bush's defenders counter that the proper yardstick for measuring his performance is economic growth, which has expanded at a solid 3.7 percent annual rate since 2001. In the short term, they argue, budget deficits aren't hurting growth, because interest rates can't go much lower. More important than controlling spending now, they say, is using tax cuts to lay the groundwork for much faster future economic growth, which they contend will quickly turn deficits into comfortable surpluses. After all, the Bush allies say, isn't that what happened in the 1990s, when budget surpluses seemed to appear out of nowhere?
5. TURN: PEACEKEEPING SAVES MONEY – CIVIL WAR DECREASES THE GLOBAL ECONOMY BY $128 BILLION EVERY YEAR
Taiwan News, May 19, 2004, Pg. L/N.
UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General Kofi Annan is urging the 191 U.N. member states to meet the "surging demand" for U.N. peacekeeping troops, which could add an extra US $ 1 billion to this year's US $ 2.82 billion peacekeeping budget. Last month, he said, more than 53,000 troops, military observers and civilian police were serving in 15 U.N. missions around the world from East Timor to Lebanon and Ivory Coast - the highest number since 1995. "Even more missions loom on the horizon," Annan said Monday. "The Security Council has recently authorized a new mission in Haiti and has expanded the existing mission in Ivory Coast. Missions are being planned for Burundi and Sudan." Annan told an open Security Council meeting that a recent study by Oxford University economists found that the average economic cost of civil wars averaged US $ 128 billion a year in lost revenue and local and regional output. Measured against this loss, he said, "peacekeeping is extremely cost-effective." "Our duty must be to meet this demand and to seize the opportunities to bring long-standing conflicts to an end," Annan said. "For millions of our fellow human beings, U.N. peacekeeping missions offer their best - and sometimes only - hope of emerging from conflict towards a safe and stable future." A statement adopted by the Security Council at the end of the meeting called on member states to provide the United Nations "with full political and financial support to meet these challenges effectively." It also urged them to provide sufficient levels of trained troops, police, and civilian personnel.

6. NO IMPACT: MULTIPLE NATIONS CAN SERVE AS THE DRIVER OF INTERNATIONAL GROWTH – US NOT KEY
BusinessWorld, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N (LINK is a non-governmental international research group)
The long-standing notion of the United States as the sole locomotive for global growth is now "complex," according to LINK. The US has contributed about 30% to 40% of the growth of the world economy in the last few years, and most economic recoveries in other countries have been fueled by their exports to the US. But "this locomotive has been powered by resources borrowed from the rest of the world," LINK says. "The current account deficit of the United States, a measure of how much of the spending by the US is financed by borrowing from abroad, is running at more than 5% of GDP. The sustainability of the United States economic expansion is therefore crucially dependent on the willingness of the rest of the world to continue to lend to the United States by accumulating US assets... Such a cycle of interdependency between the United States and the rest of the world is unlikely to prove sustainable."
**UNIQUENESS: US ECONOMY COLLAPSING NOW**

**INEVITABLE INCREASES IN FED INTEREST RATES WILL TANK THE GLOBAL ECONOMY**

*BusinessWorld, May 12, 2004, Pg. L/N.*

The global economy has been living in the comfort of trading with the 1% interest rate in the US, but economic figures from the leading economy have been hinting the need of a hike to about 1.25% in the third quarter. Analysts said an increase in borrowing expenses could muffle global economic growth as higher interest rates would mean a higher cost of business for investors. "Investors, particularly the foreign fund managers, are getting concerned about the increase in US interest rates. Based on the latest advice from the Feds, it looks like it's already in the ground work, and the markets are anticipating that," said broker Filomeno Francisco of AB Capital Securities, Inc.

**US INTEREST RATES INCREASING – MORTGAGE RATES PROVE**

*Xinhua General News Service, April 29, 2004, Pg. L/N*

Interest rates on 30-year mortgages in the United States climbed above 6 percent this week, the first time in this year, US mortgage giant Freddie Mac reported on Thursday. In its weekly national survey, Freddie Mac said that average interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages rose to 6.01 percent from 5.94 percent last week, marking the sixth consecutive weekly increase and the highest level since they averaged 6.02 percent the week of December 5, 2003.

**INTEREST RATES AND OIL PRICES COLLAPSING THE ECONOMY NOW**

*The Times, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N*

WHEN I was in Boston ten days ago, financial analysts had two main worries about the world economy and the outlook for stock markets. The first was that the interest rate cycle had turned and that world interests rates, including those of the United States, would now be on a rising trend. The second was that the relatively high oil price, which had been around $ 40 a barrel for some months already, would rise still farther. These two worries made a majority of the analysts I talked to fear that next year would be a "down year" for the world and for Wall Street. Of course, the two worries are closely linked. High or rising oil prices have an inflationary effect on all costs. In the 1970s, when oil prices rose almost vertically, there was hyperinflation and interest rates went up proportionately. If oil prices do continue to rise from their present level, interest rates will follow. In Britain, rates are already going up on account of the boom in house prices.
UNIQUENESS: US ECONOMY COLLAPSING NOW

FANNIE AND FREDDIE ARE A HUGH THREAT TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Insight on the News, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Echoing Greenspan's warning, U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow said on April 22 that continued growth of the giant government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could pose a threat to financial markets. "There are clear systemic risks in the continued growth of entities this large relative to the whole financial system," Snow said at a meeting of the Bond Market Association.

RAPID BANK M&A ACTIVITY IS POSING SYSTEMIC RISK TO FINANCIAL MARKETS – COLLAPSE INEVITABLE
Insight on the News, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Though the most recent warnings of Greenspan are welcome and indeed overdue, it is worth noting that the Fed under his leadership has encouraged the creation of gigantic institutions that pose just as great a "systemic risk" to the U.S. financial system as do Fannie or Freddie, several close observers of the Fed say. Since the last U.S. banking crisis in 1991, it has been the policy of the Fed to encourage big banks to merge and embrace derivatives as a primary source of profitability, not just for risk reduction. Of the 575 U.S. bank holding companies and single-unit institutions active in the derivatives market in the fall of 2003, 138 held notional value positions in excess of their weighted risk-based capital [RBCW], as reported to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp [FDIC]. At the top of the pile was J.P. Morgan Chase [JPM] with $34.3 trillion in notional contracts outstanding, some 49.8 percent of total positions held by banking institutions. JPM is also the least profitable a relatively small realized loss in the notional position, a mere 15 basis points, would create a loss equivalent to JPM's entire RBCW. Significantly, the Top 20 institutions represent 97.6 percent of the notional contracts held by banks involved in derivatives, some $67.2 trillion out of the total $68.8 trillion reported by domestic banks.

BUDGET DEFICIT INCREASING

CURRENT DEFICITS ARE STRUCTURAL AND A RESULT OF POLICY CHOICES NOT RANDOM EVENTS
International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Cause. The current deficits are unique in the degree to which they appear to be driven by tax cuts. That is terribly important because it shows that they are in large part a result of deliberate policy decisions, not unforeseen events. Last year, after two rounds of Bush tax cuts, taxes fell to a percentage of the economy not seen, even in the deepest recessions, since 1955. In 2004, they are estimated to come in at just over 16 percent of GDP, a level last seen in 1951.

FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF US DEFICIT TANKS THEIR UNIQUENESS AND MAKES A DOLLAR DECLINE INEVITABLE
International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
Foreign dependence. Over the last few years, an unprecedented 80 percent of the deficit has been financed by foreign governments, institutions and individuals, mainly in the Far East. Debt is debt, to be sure, leading ultimately to a smaller economy than would otherwise be the case. But debt owed to foreigners is more likely to affect the value of the dollar, and foreign capital is more nomadic, leaving the United States vulnerable to the whims of central bankers in Beijing and Tokyo.

LONG-TERM BUDGET DEFICITS INCREASING
The New York Sun, May 24, 2004, Pg. L/N
And while the current year's deficit has come down somewhat, the long-term deficit outlook is big and murky. Over the next 10 years, it is expected to amount to more than $2.7 trillion under the president's policies as laid out in his 2005 budget plan - which does not include the additional costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the CBO. While the president pledges to cut the deficit in half within five years, its fate will depend largely on whether tax cuts are made permanent and the costs of the war in Iraq, economists say.
BUDGET DEFICIT INCREASING

LAST MINUTE APPROPRIATIONS BILLS GUARANTEE BUDGET DEFICITS
United Press International, May 19, 2004, Pg. L/N
The way that discretionary spending is settled on was also the target of attack at the forum. McCain partially blamed the deficit on the discretionary budget process, in which Senators have insufficient time to review the omnibus appropriations bill, and are unable to limit unjustified spending. Lieberman also found fault with the current appropriations process. "Our budget process in broken," he said, it is no longer possible to control the budget because of last minute appropriations methods.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE GUARANTEE BUDGET DEFICITS
Walter Updegrave, CNN/Money contributing columnist, CNNMoney.com, May 18, 2004, Pg. L/N
Ultimately, of course, the budget deficit, the national debt and the financing problems of Social Security and Medicare are intertwined. When spending for Social Security and Medicare exceeds the taxes and premiums earmarked to fund those programs, the federal budget in that year will have to pick up the shortfall. In other words, given current projections these two programs will end up soaking up an increasingly large percentage of tax revenues in the future. And unless there are cuts in other programs or higher taxes, we'll see larger and larger budget deficits.

THE BUDGET DEFICIT WILL COLLAPSE THE ECONOMY EVEN IF IT IS CUT IN HALF
The Houston Chronicle, May 6, 2004, Pg. L/N
Among Greenspan's warnings is the one in which he frets that uncontrolled federal budget deficits will dampen U.S. economic growth. This year's federal deficit could top $ 500 billion. President Bush promises to cut the deficit in half over five years. Even if he makes his goal, a $ 250 billion annual deficit for one year followed by exploding deficits in succeeding years is not a prospect to inspire confidence. Because congressional spenders and Iraqi insurgents have not chosen to cooperate, Bush might not succeed. The White House says Bush will ask $ 25 billion more for Iraq this year, and Bush has asked Congress to make the last round of tax cuts permanent.
US PEACEKEEPING FUNDING HIGH NOW

THE US ALREADY PAYS 27% OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET
Onasa News Agency, May 18, 2004, Pg. L/N
"The Security Council has recently authorised a new mission in Haiti and has expanded the existing mission in Cote d'Ivoire. Missions are being planned for Burundi and Sudan," Annan told the council. "By the end of this year, to absorb the new and enhanced missions, we may need an extra one billion dollars for the UN peacekeeping budget, which is currently 2.82 billion dollars," he said. "Our duty must be to meet this demand, to seize the opportunities to bring longstanding conflicts to an end," he said. The United Nations has no standing army of its own, and all troops are contributed voluntarily by member states. The United States pays around 27 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.

THE US ALREADY SPENDS MORE ON UN PEACEKEEPING THAN ANY OTHER NATION
No nation in the world contributes more to the work of the United Nations than the United States. Since its creation in 1945, the United States has been the world's biggest contributor to the United Nations. The U.S. currently contributes 22 percent of the UN's regular budget. In contrast, France contributes 6.4 percent, Britain 5.54 percent, China 1.53 percent, and Russia 1.2 percent. Total U.S. contributions to the UN system in 2001 totaled $3.5 billion, including $612 million in assessed contributions to the UN regular budget, $712 million towards UN peacekeeping and $2.2 billion in voluntary contributions.

THE US RECENTLY APPROPRIATED $245 MILLION FOR PEACEKEEPING IN LIBERIA
United Press International, February 6, 2004, Pg. L/N
The United States and the European Union have each pledged $200 million in humanitarian aid to help Liberia recover from 14 years of civil war. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan Friday asked the international community for nearly $500 million. The United Nations and the World Bank estimate the West Africa nation will need about $488 million over the next two years in addition to about $180 million sought in the world organization's consolidated appeal for humanitarian activities. "Let us seize this opportunity to end a long-running nightmare that has disgraced humankind," Annan told a two-day Liberia donors' conference. "Let us consolidate the peace, and make the peace process irreversible." Priority attention will be given to health, water and sanitation projects as well as demobilizing combatants -- some as young as 12 -- and helping them return home. Other areas include education, jobs creation, electoral support and infrastructure repair. After recalling previous aid to Liberia, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "I am pleased to confirm today that the U.S. Congress has appropriated an additional $200 million in humanitarian and reconstruction aid and another $245 million for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Liberia."

MULTIPLE NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE WORKS NOW – BUDGETS ALREADY BUSTED
Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules May 20, 2004, Pg. L/N
VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS -- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan is asking for an annual budget increase of at least US$ 1 billion for peacekeeping operations, reports the Voice of America News. "By the end of this year, to absorb the new and enhanced missions, we may need an extra $ 1 billion for the U.N. peacekeeping budget, which is currently $ 2.82 billion," Anna told the Security Council. Such peacekeeping operations are expected to increase dramatically this year. In addition to 14 U.N. mission currently underway, three more in Burundi, Haiti and Sudan are in the planning stage.

AT LEAST THREE NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE IN THE WORKS ALREADY
Taiwan News, May 19, 2004, Pg. L/N.
UNITED NATIONS Secretary-General Kofi Annan is urging the 191 U.N. member states to meet the "surging demand" for U.N. peacekeeping troops, which could add an extra US $ 1 billion to this year's US $ 2.82 billion peacekeeping budget. Last month, he said, more than 53,000 troops, military observers and civilian police were serving in 15 U.N. missions around the world from East Timor to Lebanon and Ivory Coast - the highest number since 1995. "Even more missions loom on the horizon," Annan said Monday. "The Security Council has recently authorized a new mission in Haiti and has expanded the existing mission in Ivory Coast. Missions are being planned for Burundi and Sudan."
UN SPENDING INCREASING NOW

UN SPENDING ON SECURITY INCREASING NOW
M2 Presswire, May 13, 2004, Pg. L/N

Taking into account all those observations, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Assembly appropriate some $40 million gross under the budget for 2004/2005 for the implementation of measures proposed by the Secretary-General to strengthen safety and security of United Nations premises and personnel. The Advisory Committee also notes that some $8.9 million of the provision for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator would be borne by the participating organizations under existing cost-sharing arrangements.
BUDGET DEFICITS DON'T HURT THE ECONOMY

BUDGET DEFICITS DON'T CAUSE INFLATION – EMPIRICALLY PROVEN
David Malpass, chief global economist at Bear Stearns, Financial Times, May 4, 2004, Pg. L/N
The same applies to corporations, where borrowing costs depend on the currency being borrowed and the corporation's creditworthiness, but generally not the size of the debt issue. As a practical matter, a bigger debt issue may bring a lower interest rate because of liquidity considerations. Even for households, larger mortgages often bring lower, not higher, interest rates. Recent history offers the clearest proof of the disconnect between interest rates and the US budget deficit. The deficit has been growing for several years yet interest rates and bond yields went the other way and fell to new lows owing to deflation expectations. Critics of the George W. Bush tax cuts argued that the deficit effect would cause higher interest rates and slower growth, only to find lower interest rates and faster growth.

TRADE DEFICITS OFFSET RISK OF INCREASING INTEREST RATES FROM BUDGET DEFICITS
David Malpass, chief global economist at Bear Stearns, Financial Times, May 4, 2004, Pg. L/N
On Wall Street, the analysts most worried about the US twin deficits have generally expected them to weaken the economy and hold back Fed rate rises. Instead, the economy has done well and rates will probably rise sooner rather than later. In many ways, the trade deficit actually supports this durable growth outlook. As the US economy outperforms most of its trading partners, it draws in more imports than they do. The economic question with a trade deficit is whether a country's investment climate is more profitable than its cost of capital? If so, the trade deficit is a form of constructive leverage. It's very hard to connect this to the level of interest rates. The capital inflow associated with the trade deficit adds to US investment, which creates more goods and restrains inflation. The added economic activity increases demand for capital and the real interest rate. In the end, if real rates rise it is due to higher growth and increased investment opportunities.
NATO COUNTER PLAN
AND AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considered the most successful security arrangement of all times. Formed after WWII, NATO has been the cornerstone of US and European security policy. Designed to originally deter Soviet Union expansion and aggression during the Cold War, the function of NATO has evolved over the last decade. Many questions whether it is still a viable security arrangement or if it should go the way of the Cold War.

Given recent contradictory events, it would seem that NATO is most likely going to stay. While the War on Terrorism unified NATO, especially in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the war in Iraq equally divided the Allies. With the turn over of power imminent in Iraq, the role of NATO will certainly come into question again.

The strength of NATO as a counter plan lies in its ability to deploy troops and fight wars. There is no other alliance that can muster as much force in the world and NATO is gaining experience in peacekeeping operations quickly. NATO peacekeepers are currently deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. NATO is also trying to develop a Rapid Reaction Force to deploy in a much shorter time frame.

The NATO Counter Plan is a good strategic choice against Country Specific Affirmatives that supply military hard power to peacekeeping operations and against Mission Affirmatives that beef up the ability of peacekeepers to do a certain task. NATO has experience in areas ranging from demobilizing combatants to delivering humanitarian assistance to civil society reconstruction.

Negatives could go two different routes with the action of the counter plan. First, the could have NATO do the exact action of the plan (the much better option that is much more competitive) or they could (gasp!) consult NATO and give it veto power but if they say yes, the US would still act.

Net Benefits

NATO Cohesion DA: Increasing NATO’s utility increases the organizations ability to survive. By utilizing NATO as a peacekeeping institution to define its purpose allows it to shed its type cast role as a relic of the Cold War. The impact is that NATO is key to stability in Europe and stops Russian aggression. The consultation link would be UN Bad Arguments: Anything that you have in your files that argues the UN peacekeepers or any other function of the UN fails. There are definitely offensive arguments to be had in this area. Any UN peacekeepers bad arguments are reasons to prefer NATO peacekeeping.

Politics: The Negative will need to tell the story that Congress hates the UN and loves NATO. This will help create a solid political capitol story.

Answering NATO Counter Plans

The Affirmative has many options in answering the NATO Counter Plan. First, there are definitely arguments to be made about the quality of NATO peacekeepers. The same reasons that the Negative argues UN peacekeeping is bad are the same arguments that exist against NATO peacekeeping.

As NATO’s role evolves, it finds itself cooperating more and more with the UN. This opens the door wide open to
the Affirmative permutation. This might not get the Affirmative out of disadvantages that link to the UN it will certainly allow the Affirmative to access NATO peacekeeping good arguments.

Second, read an add-on advantage to UN action such as UN credibility if you don’t read one in the IAC. Make sure it has a big impact and doesn’t deal with peacekeeping because you don’t want the cards that they are already reading about UN peacekeeping to apply to the add-on. This UN specific add-on will be a reason why the plan is better than the counter plan.

Third, it is also possible to read generic NATO bad arguments. Many of the experts who think that NATO’s time has come and gone also argue that the organization makes a war with Russia inevitable. This position has a huge impact and will cut against a NATO Cohesion disadvantage/net benefit. Additionally, it can be argued that NATO is a tool of US hegemony. Read a card that makes that argument and a hegemony bad impact card and you have another disadvantage to the counter plan.

Finally, there are really good trade off disadvantages floating about. The US military is not the only one that is overstretched. With forces in two different regions, NATO is also feeling the strain. There are cards that say future deployments will either have to come from Afghanistan or Kosovo. Both of these have big impacts and easily outweigh any net benefit to the counter plan.
INDEX

INC Text: NATO Alone 127

Solvency: Conflicts 128
Solvency: Terrorism 129 – 131
Solvency: Peacekeeping 132 – 133
Solvency: Failed States 134
Solvency: Kosovo 135
Solvency: US overstretch 135
Solvency: Iraq 136
Solvency: Landmines 137
Solvency: DDR 137
Solvency: AT: Overstretch 138
Solvency: Response Force 138

Consultation INC Text 139 – 141
No Consultation Now 142
Consultation Snowballs 142
Consultation Key to the Alliance 143
AT: Consult = Normal Means 144
NATO Wants Consultation 144

AT: Interoperability 145
Solvency: Nuclear Deterrence 146 – 147
Solvency: War in General 148
Net Benefits: The Balkans 149 – 151
Net Benefits: The Trans Caspian 152 – 157

Affirmative Answers

2AC FRONTLINE 157 – 159
PERMUTATIONS 160
Solvency answers 161 – 163
Hurts European Security 164
Impact answers 165
(Consultation) Answers 166 – 167
Counterplan: Solvency answers 168 – 169
Impact answers 170
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will substantially increase peacekeeping in (insert country here) Funding and enforcement guaranteed.

Observation I: Not Topical

The counter plan does not have the USFG enact a foreign policy substantially increasing support of UN peacekeeping operations.

Observation II: Net Benefits

The counter plan solves the case and avoids the disadvantages.

Observation III: Solvency

NATO peacekeeping forces are the best and can bring peace to any region.

Nato countries have already demonstrated their capacity for peacekeeping, most recently in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Afghanistan. Indeed, Europeans have decades more experience than the US in the complex and arduous task. The EU has also demonstrated a capacity to deal with non-military tasks of "nation-building". With few exceptions, it would not be viewed with hostility in the region. Large-scale engagement by Nato and the EU would blur the role of the US (and Britain), reduce their role as lightning rod for deflected grievances, provide greater international legitimacy and be perceived internally as a more neutral presence.

NATO can succeed in PKOs. Past interventions prove
The Times (London) April 15, 2004

Lord Robertson believes the route out of America's current difficulties in Iraq could be the multilateral organisation of Nato, which was so recently being written off as defunct. Although he refuses to criticise the way that US forces are conducting operations, he suggests there might be better ways of doing things. He cites the relative success of operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia, where Nato has led peacekeeping and rebuilding operations, usually under a United Nations mandate.
NATO restructuring will make forces lighter, and able to respond to out of area conflicts
Voice of America News June 12, 2003 NATO Ministers to Revamp Strategic Command TEXT: Filed: 15: 53 UTC

NATO defense ministers have agreed to a new streamlined command structure, including a 40 percent reduction of military bases, to adapt the alliance for missions outside Europe. Secretary-General George Robertson said the agreement, reached Thursday in Brussels, constitutes the most radical overhaul in the 54-year history of the Cold War alliance. He said it transforms NATO into an alliance that is able to meet its commitments when times get tough. The new structure puts all NATO organizations under a single strategic command based in southern Belgium and led by an American. It leaves the alliance with three combined joint task forces, based in the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal. They will replace several regional commands in Europe. A second strategic command based in the United States in Norfolk in the Atlantic coast state of Virginia, will focus on improving NATO's military capabilities and building an elite rapid reaction force. NATO says the aim is to deploy lighter, more flexible forces that can respond to security threats far beyond its traditional geographic area. The agreement to revamp the command structure came on the first day of a two-day meeting of NATO's 19 defense ministers. They were joined by defense ministers from seven eastern European countries that have been invited to join the alliance next year. The defense ministers want to move away from the static military posture of the Cold War that left NATO unable to strike quickly and hard after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is attending the meeting to brief allies on lessons learned from the Iraq war and to urge them to press ahead with plans to strengthen their military forces.

NATO leaders have agreed to close the operational defense gap by 2006
MARC GROSSMAN, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS 2003 (Federal News Service April 8, 2003)

As the chairman said, at the Prague Summit NATO's leaders decided to close that gap, and Europeans committed to spend smarter, pool their resources and pursue military specialization. For example, Germany is today leading a consortium to get more airlift. Norway leads a consortium to get more sealift. Spain is leading a consortium to get more air-to-air refueling. And the Netherlands is taking the lead to get more precision-guided munitions. This is a good start. And although you have heard testimony that has been optimistic, I believe that follow up and actual spending, and the success of these consortia will be absolutely critical. NATO leaders also created at Prague, as you both mentioned, the NATO response force. We need NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. And I believe that NATO can, and in appropriate circumstances should, undertake military operations outside of its traditional area of operations, as you have both called for. The NATO response force will be a force of approximately 25,000 troops, with land, sea and air capability, deployable worldwide in 30 days. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO response forces should be ready for exercises by October 2004, and mission ready by October 2006. NATO also needs to streamline its command structure.
Afghanistan proves NATO peacekeeping is key to stopping terrorism

The campaign against terrorism should encompass aspects of intelligence cooperation, law enforcement, economic and financial measures, and diplomatic pressures, in addition to military activities. Because the allies were not actively engaged in the military campaign in Afghanistan, their involvement in the second phase of this campaign—the reconstruction efforts—is imperative. Furthermore, active involvement by all alliance members is vital for the operation's legitimacy, and for avoiding the perception of the new Afghan government as an exclusively U.S. design. Allied cooperation in this battle against terrorism is not merely desirable but rather necessary given the alleged presence of terrorist units in more than 60 countries.

NATO is the key to combating terrorism
Turkish Daily News April 8, 2004

Myers highlighted the changed strategic atmosphere in the post-Cold War era, given that the threat of terrorism had no clear-cut borders. "Everywhere is a front. We are in the forefront in Washington, New York, Istanbul, Madrid, Uzbekistan," he said in remarks carried by Anatolia news agency. According to the general, NATO has become crucial in the fight against terrorism and role of Turkey, which he said was a "true friend, commercial partner and ally," in the alliance is of vital importance in that regard. He said a decision of the EU earlier this week to include the renamed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), KADEK and KONGRA-GEL, was a positive development in direction of creating a joint global stance against terrorism.

Decreased cooperation with NATO will gut efforts to curb terrorism
BROOKS & WOHLFORTH, professors at Dartmouth College 2002 (STEPHEN G. is an Assistant Professor and WILLIAM C. an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Foreign Affairs July-August)

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
The US and NATO are cooperating on terrorism now

Moravcsik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, 2003

(Andrew, Foreign Affairs, Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain)

Indeed, these shared interests and values help explain why the trend over the past two decades has been toward transatlantic harmony. Europeans are hardly doctrinaire pacifists or myopic regionalists; the recent Iraq war is the first U.S. military action since the Reagan years to trigger significant European opposition. In the first Gulf War, for example, UN authorization unlocked European support, participation, and cofinancing. And the Kosovo intervention, although "preventive" and conducted without UN authorization, was unanimously backed by NATO. The September 11 attacks themselves did little to change this situation. The celebrated Le Monde headline on September 13 proclaiming "Nous sommes tous Americains" ("We are all Americans") and Schoder's simultaneous pledge of "unconditional solidarity" were not just rhetoric. Diplomats invoked NATO's Article 5 (its mutual defense clause) for the first time, and when the United States invaded Afghanistan in hot pursuit of al Qaeda, European governments lent their unanimous support. Since then, Europeans have provided more financial and peacekeeping support to Afghanistan than has the United States. The shared commitment to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Cote d'Ivoire, East Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone suggests a consensus on humanitarian intervention, and the unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 regarding Iraq in November suggests that a similar consensus may exist on counterproliferation. Even in the recent crisis, the vigorous rhetoric of some European governments was balanced by more tempered action. Many NATO members backed the United States outright. Setting aside a few regrettable episodes, such as the brief attempt to delay NATO defensive assistance to Turkey (easily overcome in a few days), it is misleading to portray France and Germany as having attempted to balance American power. Neither state took material action against Washington, nor even proposed multilateral condemnation of the U.S. position, as has happened many times in decades past. (Indeed, Germany and other countries informally aided the war effort.) Paris and Berlin simply withheld multilateral legitimacy and bilateral assistance for what they considered a rushed war, and encouraged others to do likewise.

The US needs help in the war on terror, they can't go it alone

Valasek, Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information 2001


The United States, the unnamed defense official said, will need active diplomatic support from its allies. All NATO allies expressed the strongest possible support for U.S. actions; the alliance evoked Article V of its charter to call the attack on United States an attack on all allies. But the support can and, in some ways already does, go further. The British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and a trio of high-level European Union (EU) representatives, for example, flew to Iran to win Tehran's support for global anti-terrorist operations. Washington itself could hardly succeed in winning Iran's sympathies given the history of enmity between the two countries, and U.S. legislation prohibiting official contacts. But Iran's support may be essential in keeping Muslim countries on the coalition's side and in strengthening domestic opposition against the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The European intervention points to possible future role for NATO allies - building diplomatic bridges between the United States and countries which, for a variety of reasons, fell out of favor in Washington but whose support may be essential for future anti-terrorist operations. The above two points stretch NATO's traditional roles, but still fall firmly in the realm of the alliance's expertise and past activities. NATO's intelligence experts and diplomats meet regularly in peacetime as well as wartime. And while NATO is primarily a military alliance, its diplomatic role has always been important. NATO cohesion more so that its bombing of Yugoslavia has been credited with forcing Slobodan Milosevic to back down over Kosovo. However, the other areas of cooperation outlined by the United States take the alliance out its traditional areas of responsibility.
Cooperation with NATO will decrease the chances of terrorist attacks
Valasek, Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information 2001

The United States, the unnamed defense official said, will need active diplomatic support from its allies. All NATO allies expressed the strongest possible support for U.S. actions; the alliance evoked Article V of its charter to call the attack on United States an attack on all allies. But the support can and, in some ways already does, go further. The British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and a trio of high-level European Union (EU) representatives, for example, flew to Iran to win Tehran's support for global anti-terrorist operations. Washington itself could hardly succeed in winning Iran's sympathies given the history of enmity between the two countries, and U.S. legislation prohibiting official contacts. But Iran's support may be essential in keeping Muslim countries on the coalition's side and in strengthening domestic opposition against the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The European intervention points to possible future role for NATO allies - building diplomatic bridges between the United States and countries which, for a variety of reasons, fell out of favor in Washington but whose support may be essential for future anti-terrorist operations. The above two points stretch NATO's traditional roles, but still fall firmly in the realm of the alliance's expertise and past activities. NATO's intelligence experts and diplomats meet regularly in peacetime as well as wartime. And while NATO is primarily a military alliance, its diplomatic role has always been important. NATO cohesion more so that its bombing of Yugoslavia has been credited with forcing Slobodan Milosevic to back down over Kosovo. However, the other areas of cooperation outlined by the United States take the alliance out its traditional areas of responsibility. U.S. officials began unveiling their new agenda for NATO at the meeting of allied defense ministers in Brussels on Sept. 26. When and if the U.S. proposals prevails, NATO will have a new target - terrorism - and a new set of tools, including economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement measures, to help it reduce the terrorist threat to Western countries. A U.S. defense official speaking on background before the NATO meeting listed six specific areas for enhanced NATO cooperation. First and foremost is sharing intelligence on the terrorists and their infrastructure. Allied countries are already exchanging information on Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda group, but the cooperation came too late to stop the attacks on New York and Washington. We will never know if the terrorist acts could have been prevented with better intelligence cooperation. However, given that the perpetrators apparently planned their operations in Germany and their associates have since been arrested in France and in Spain, better sharing of intelligence among NATO allies can clearly increase the chances of preventing future attacks.

Cooperation with NATO is key to solving terrorism

In such instances, the role of NATO could be to complement law-enforcement and intelligence agencies whose mission is more geared to fighting this type of underground war with terrorism. By implementing greater intelligence sharing with law-enforcement agencies such as Interpol, Europol, the FBI, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (provided these agencies are ready to use this information wisely and not engage in "turf" fights among one other), NATO could play a key role in the new international order of security. By being flexible in their approach to counterterrorism, and by avoiding the mistakes made by the United States that created "walls" between police and intelligence services, U.S. allies in NATO can develop a program for counterterrorist warfare. Writing in the Summer 2002 "Washington Quarterly," Senator Richard Lugar proposed that the Prague summit "ought to focus on developing a comprehensive plan for restructuring European military capabilities, a task which could extend to rethinking completely the current Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). More important now is the redirection of the capabilities initiative so as to create and harmonize counterterrorism and counterproliferation to serve both U.S. and European interests."
NATO CP: SOLVENCY: NATO KEY TO PEACE KEEPING

On balance NATO increases peace
Handy, Pourchot, & Hatch 2003 (George W. Georgeta Eric LEARNING FROM SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE EXPANDING EURO-ATLANTIC REGION INTERNATIONAL ACTION COMMISSIONS PROGRAM EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY PROJECT FINAL REPORT March 2003 http://www.csis.org/iac/euroatl/finalreport.pdf)

The trend towards increased stability was noted in Southeastern Europe by 2002. Notable results of this increased stability were the decrease in the number of violent conflicts and the increased number of returning refugees. In May 2002, NATO announced reductions in peace-keeping troops from 19,000 to 12,000 in Bosnia, and from 38,000 to 33,200 in Kosovo, on account of the new, more stable conditions on the ground.1 The 2002 Annual Return Statistics of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) records 2002 as the year with the highest refugee return figure in BiH since the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).2 And in the Kosovo of 2002, ordinary people are more concerned about jobs, security, corruption and crime than they are with the political status of the province, according to the head of the UN civilian administration in the province, Mr. Michael Steiner.3

NATO is best suited for peacekeeping operations

In the 1990s, NATO was enlarged in another way as well. The European Union singularly failed as the principal provider of security in the Balkans. After initial U.S. hesitation, NATO went beyond its former region and also beyond defense. It first became a peace enforcer in Bosnia, and then it waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia over Kosovo, where it continued as a security force on the ground. It also intervened in Macedonia to stave off the crisis there. This expansion of NATO’s mission and region of operation, codified in its 1999 Strategic Concept, has given it a prime responsibility as a crisis manager in the loosely defined Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO is best suited for PKOs

At the same time, the decision to shift the international force in Afghanistan from an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" to a full-fledged NATO command also reflects an important shift in American understanding. Recent tensions notwithstanding, over the past half-century the alliance has worked out methods to transfer commands smoothly and share responsibilities among countries. More professional than the United Nations and with potentially more soldiers to draw upon than the U.S. armed forces acting alone, NATO, not a rotating set of random commanders, provides the right structure to run multinational peacekeeping or military forces. In time, it might prove to be the right force for Iraq as well.

Coalitions are not as good as NATO

MAX BOOT: NATO is important, and certainly the Baltic states should be part of it. We cannot, however, place all of our trust in coalitions. We certainly ought to use coalitions as much as possible, and it is important that you don't have to do the heavy lifting yourself all the time. It makes good sense to get your allies to pitch in. In many interventions we don't even send American ground troops. If the Australians, for example, want to go to East Timor, that's great they can do the job; we don't need to do it. Or if the British or Nigerians want to go into Sierra Leone, that can work out. But, ultimately, I would be dubious about the ability of any international organization to take on this global policing role that the United States has taken on, because nobody else has the kind of military capabilities that we have. It is very hard to get coalitions to act together, to coordinate independent entities. Even NATO had problems during the Kosovo War. It is even harder to get the UN Security Council to sign off on something where now you have not only China as a Permanent Member, but as one of the Rotating Members you have Syria. So if you are debating terrorism, what will the Syrian Representative say about taking action against terrorism? This distinction between unilateral and multilateral is a false one. It should not be the distinction. We should do what makes sense, not because it's multilateral or unilateral.
Experience shows NATO is the best for PKOs
Everts, Centre for European Reform, 2003 (Steven, Why Nato should keep the Mideast peace published: 29 July 2003 http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/everts_ft_29jul03.html)

Nato has peacekeeping experience in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. It is constantly looking for ways to prove its continuing relevance. The idea of a Nato-led peacekeeping force, once dismissed as ludicrously ambitious, is slowly gathering support. In the US, Senator John Warner, chairman of the armed services committee, is a leading if lonely advocate. Senior US officials, including at the National Security Council, are known to be supportive. Nato defence ministers discussed the proposals in Madrid last month. The Dutch government is keen, as are top Nato officials. Nato has already brought Israeli and Palestinian security officials to Kosovo to show them how a force would work.

Kosovo proves NATO can handle PKOs

The Kosovo crisis was a defining moment for the Balkans, for European security, and for the Atlantic alliance. It demonstrated the alliance’s ability to act in unity for the defense of common interests and common values. Although strategies and methods sometimes differ among the allies, their central goals and values have remained intact. The direct military contributions of the United States and its main allies, as well as the firm commitment of countries located closer to the theater of operations, spell hope both for NATO’s future and for the future of European defense.
NATO CP: SOLVENCY: FAILED STATES

Only NATO can help failed states regain peace


Before a peace process can truly become a rebuilding endeavor, the transitional administration must be able to deliver security throughout the country. Roads must be made safe for travelers and commerce, if necessary by peacekeepers. As mentioned above, the large number of UN troops in Sierra Leone finally restored safety in that failed state in early 2002. That lesson should be applied to Afghanistan, a country with a terrible history of lawlessness and infamous levels of insecurity. A few thousand international peacekeepers in Kabul alone will hardly pacify the entire country. A well-disciplined force more along the lines of NATO's operations in Kosovo, or the UN battalions in Sierra Leone, remains critical.

Lebanon proves NATO style intervention is the best


An example of a once-collapsed state is Lebanon, which had disintegrated before Syria's intervention in 1990 provided security and gave a sense of governmental legitimacy to the shell of the state. Lebanon today qualifies as a weak, rather than failed, polity because its government is credible, civil war is absent, and political goods are being provided in significant quantities and quality. Syria provides the security blanket, denies fractious warlords the freedom to aggrandize themselves, and mandates that the usually antagonistic Muslim and Christian communities cooperate. The fear of being attacked preemptively by rivals, or of losing control of critical resources, is alleviated by Syria's imposed hegemony. Within that framework of security, the Lebanese people's traditional entrepreneurial spirit has transformed a failed state into a much stronger one.

NATO can help failed states


The examples of Tajikistan and Lebanon suggest that failed states can be helped to recover. Even the seemingly hopeless cases, such as Somalia, are not irredeemable. Likewise, the accomplishments of the UN transitional administrations in Cambodia and East Timor, as well as the NATO-UN interim administration in Kosovo, indicate that nation building is possible if there is sufficient political will and targeted external assistance.

Helping failed States is key to stopping terrorism


The new imperative of state building should supersede any lingering unilateralism. State building trumps terror. If state building is done on the cheap, or if the big powers walk away from the failed states too soon and decide that the long slog of reconstruction is for others, then the real war against terror will not have been won.
NATO is increasing its commitment to Kosovo
The Record (Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario) March 20, 2004

NATO peacekeepers showed new resolve in cracking down on lawbreakers, proving they were ready to shoot to kill if threatened. Peacekeepers hunted down and killed a sharpshooter who fired at French forces from one of three apartment buildings inhabited by ethnic Albanians in the divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica, said a NATO spokesman, U.S. Lt.-Col. Jim Moran. Sporadic gunfire rattled the tense city into the early evening. American peacekeepers in full body armour blocked the main road leading to the province's north, searching cars and people for signs of troublemakers and weapons. "All this violence goes against everything we are here for," said Sgt.-Maj. Paul Ragatz. The crisis erupted Wednesday when ethnic Albanians blamed Serbs for the drowning of two children and began rampaging in revenge. The ensuing violence reignited long-simmering tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians that have spilled beyond Kosovo's borders into the Serbian heartland. The United Nations and NATO, which was bolstering its 18,500-member peacekeeping force with reinforcements from the United States, Austria, Britain, Denmark, Germany, France and Italy, urged restraint in Kosovo and elsewhere in the turbulent region.

NATO EASES US OVERSTRETCH

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. - America's European allies are expected to offer this week to play a bigger peacekeeping role in Bosnia and Afghanistan, helping U.S. forces stretched by the occupation of Iraq and their fight against al-Qaida. European nations firmed up plans for both operations at talks ahead of a two-day meeting of NATO defense ministers, which opens Wednesday in this Rocky Mountain city.
NATO IS THE BEST SUITED TO HELP REBUILD IRAQ.
Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Give NATO a Role in Post-war Iraq, Brookings Daily War Report, April 10, 2003

As we contemplate the tremendous challenges of maintaining order and beginning reconstruction in Iraq, it is worth thinking about how the United States can avoid the burdens and risks of what may come to be seen as unilateral occupation. Wouldn't it be nice, for example, if we had at our disposal a multilateral organization to which we could turn for help, a body more effective and efficient than the UN but that would still confer legitimacy on the operation and help spread some of the costs? Imagine, in fact, a grouping composed of over two dozen democracies, including our most prosperous European allies, that had interoperable military forces, experience with peacekeeping and disarmament tasks, an available pool of troops, and existing command arrangements. Imagine further, while we're really fantasizing, that this organization had close institutional links with several dozen partner countries and a proven track record of promoting defense reform and civil-military relations in former authoritarian states. If such an organization did not exist, we would certainly want to invent it. Fortunately, such an organization does exist. NATO has all these attributes and there would be many advantages to giving it a key role in post-war Iraq. First, nowhere else is there a large group of available and experienced peacekeepers who could gradually replace the thousands of exhausted American and British soldiers currently deployed in Iraq. The United States should not wish to keep (or pay for) a substantial part of its army in Iraq for the foreseeable future, especially given other military challenges that could suddenly appear somewhere else around the world. And it is implausible that we will be able to quickly draw down our current force presence, given the political vacuum in Iraq and the potential for ethnic strife, retributions, looting, or outside meddling in the country. Fresh troops will have to come from somewhere, and no organization is better placed to provide them than NATO.

INVOLVING NATO WOULD LEGITIMIZE THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD.
Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Give NATO a Role in Post-war Iraq, Brookings Daily War Report, April 10, 2003

Involving NATO in post-war Iraq would also help to legitimize the reconstruction process in the eyes of many around the world—including a UN mandate more likely and clearing the way for EU reconstruction funds. Having launched the war without explicit UN authority and against the will of much of world opinion, there is already much skepticism about American motives and little trust that Washington will take any but its own interests into account. Putting the Pentagon in sole charge of maintaining security, hunting weapons of mass destruction, and reconstituting an Iraqi army would only heighten that global skepticism, no matter how much confidence Americans might have in their own judgment or fairness. Putting the UN directly in charge of security in Iraq might be reassuring around the world, but as it showed in the Balkans, the UN is ill-prepared to play an effective security role in a potentially hostile environment. Giving a role to NATO—some of whose members have recently proven their willingness to stand up to Washington—would prove that Iraq was not a mere American protectorate, while still giving us confidence that security would be ensured.

INVOLVING NATO WOULD BE A OLIVE BRANCH TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.
Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Give NATO a Role in Post-war Iraq, Brookings Daily War Report, April 10, 2003

Finally, involving NATO in post-war Iraq's security arrangements would be a vital step toward giving our European allies—including Russia—a stake in the successful reconstruction of Iraq. One of the most negative consequences of having to fight this war without support from France, Germany, Russia and most of European public opinion was that those countries and many individuals overseas now see the creation of a democratic, stable and prosperous Iraq as our project, not theirs. Although they would never say so, they even have an almost subconscious stake in our failure, if only to prove the merit of their opposition to the war. To reverse that destructive dynamic, the United States has a strong interest in involving as many European allies as possible in the effort to make a new Iraq; a collective NATO commitment to that goal would be an important first step.
NATO CP: SOLVENCY: LANDMINES

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE TRUST FUND HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL AT DEMINING.
NATO, Demilitarization and Conversion, NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, May 23, 2003,
http://www.trltd.com/trintel/nato_demilitarization_and_conversion.php

The NATO Trust Fund has clearly made a significant impact in the demilitarization of surplus ammunition and weapons. Originally, the Trust Fund was conceived as a convenient vehicle for assisting NATOI partner nations in compliance with Article 4 of the Ottawa Treaty which places obligation on nations to destroy stockpiles within 4 years of ascension. However the success of the early projects led to expansion of the role of the Fund to deal with surplus munitions and weapons. Generally, in the implementation of its role of executing agency NAMSA opted for indigenous solutions reinforced by international expertise with a long term aim of developing sustainable, local capabilities. In some cases practical assistance from the existing European demil industry is necessary and in others cases simply placing international on-site supervision and capacity building is all that is necessary.

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE SOLVES LANDMINES.
NATO, Demilitarization and Conversion, NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, May 23, 2003,
http://www.trltd.com/trintel/nato_demilitarization_and_conversion.php

NATO HQ turned to the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to act as executing agency for PfP projects. NAMSA's Special Projects Division, with its long history of demilitarization management, provides technical, contractual and project management for these PfP projects. Special Projects Division has for some 13 years, effectively managed munitions demilitarization on behalf of NATO nations in Europe. NAMSA utilizes the existing European demil industry, specialist consultants as well its considerable internal resources to manage demilitarization Projects. NAMSA also recognise the need develop sustainable demilitarization capabilities in countries that have large surplus stockpiles. Where possible a sustainable capability is left over on completion of the project.

NATO CP: SOLVENCY: DDR

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE IS EXPANDING ITS DEMILITARIZATION EFFORTS.
NATO, Demilitarization and Conversion, NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, May 23, 2003,
http://www.trltd.com/trintel/nato_demilitarization_and_conversion.php

The Ukrainian Trust Fund Project will destroy almost 400,000 PMN type APMs by industrial process at a factory in Donetsk by September 2003 as the first step in eliminating Ukraine's stockpile of APMs with Canada again as the Lead Nation. Other potential future projects include the destruction of conventional munitions in Ukraine, the destruction of anti-aircraft missiles and range clearance in Georgia with Luxembourg as the Lead Nation, destruction of small arms and light weapons in Yugoslavia with the Netherlands once again the Lead Nation, remediation of former military sites in the Kyrgyz Republic, with Luxembourg as the Lead Nation, and in Azerbaijan, with Turkey as the Lead Nation. These projects are at various stages of their evaluation and development.

THE TRUST FUND IS THE BEST WAY TO DISARM. IT INCORPORATES INDIGENOUS ACTIVITIES WITH INTERNATIONAL EXPERTISE.
NATO, Demilitarization and Conversion, NATO's Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, May 23, 2003,
http://www.trltd.com/trintel/nato_demilitarization_and_conversion.php

The NATO Trust Fund has clearly made a significant impact in the demilitarization of surplus ammunition and weapons. Originally, the Trust Fund was conceived as a convenient vehicle for assisting NATOI partner nations in compliance with Article 4 of the Ottawa Treaty which places obligation on nations to destroy stockpiles within 4 years of ascension. However the success of the early projects led to expansion of the role of the Fund to deal with surplus munitions and weapons. Generally, in the implementation of its role of executing agency NAMSA opted for indigenous solutions reinforced by international expertise with a long term aim of developing sustainable, local capabilities. In some cases practical assistance from the existing European demil industry is necessary and in others cases simply placing international on-site supervision and capacity building is all that is necessary.
NATO HAS THE FORCES, IT'S ONLY A MATTER OF POLITICAL WILL.
Tom Lantos represents California's 12th Congressional District and is the ranking Democratic member of the House International Relations Committee. The Truth News, November 19, 2003, http://truthnews.com/world/2003110075.htm

On paper, NATO members together have more than 2.8 million military personnel, nearly twice as many as the United States. Of that number, however, only 80,000 soldiers are apparently fit for expeditionary service. With existing deployments of 55,000 in various multinational operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere, that leaves 25,000 available for deployment to Iraq. And as outgoing NATO Secretary Lord Roberton has pointed out, moving them to the field in Iraq simply requires NATO member states "to want to do more than they are doing at the expressed moment."

THE NATO RAPID RESPONSE FORCE WILL HAVE 20,000 + PERSONNEL.
Jonathan Marcus BBC Defence correspondent, BBC News Online, October 15, 2003

Within three years, the Response Force will comprise a naval task group, including amphibious forces; a brigade combat team of troops; and an air component capable of mounting two hundred combat sorties a day. In total it will amount to some 20,000 personnel including all of the support services - the "strategic enablers" - like logistics, engineers and so on - that will allow it to survive and support itself once missions are under way. The aim is for the force to be ready to go at five days notice - this, in military terms, is "the speed of light" as once senior officer told me.

THE NATO RRF WILL BE A CATALYST FOR CHANGE AND INCREASE RESPONSE TIME FOR CONFLICTS.
Jonathan Marcus BBC Defence correspondent, BBC News Online, October 15, 2003

But the Nato Response Force will also act as an important catalyst for change. National units will train and then be part of the force for some six months, after which other units will take their place. This constant rotation will mean that troops from many countries will have to meet the stringent standards set for the new force. Over time this will create a much larger pool of units, all with significantly enhanced mobility and equipment. Nato spokesmen see the Response Force as capable of taking part in a variety of missions which could include: disarming groups in a conflict acting as a show of force to deter aggression humanitarian support the initial entry element for a much larger deployment.

NATO PLANNERS ARE ACTING QUICKLY TO BUILD AND STRENGTHEN THE RF.
Jonathan Marcus BBC Defence correspondent, BBC News Online, October 15, 2003

It has taken a long time for Nato governments to appreciate the problems facing their armed forces. But since the decision to create a Response Force was taken at the Prague summit in November 2002, the military planners have moved very quickly. The initial Response Force is being activated one year ahead of schedule. Force planning is also under way for a quite separate expansion of Nato's activities in Afghanistan.

NATO RESPONSE FORCE CAN SOLVE REGIONAL CRISSES EARLIER.

BRUNSSUM, Netherlands (Reuters) - A cutting-edge force of warships, fighter planes and 9,000 troops was born on Wednesday, the product of NATO (news - web sites)'s drive to provide the answer to post-Sept. 11 security threats wherever they blow up. It was a rare moment of glory for the Cold War alliance, which was plunged into self-doubt when Washington sidelined it after the 2001 hijacked airliner attacks on the United States and was then roiled by transatlantic divisions over Iraq (news - web sites). The alliance's top soldier, U.S. Marines General James Jones, said the birth of the NATO Response Force (NRF) was "one of the most important changes" in the organization since its founding Washington Treaty was signed 54 years ago. "The NRF will give the alliance the military capability to do what it could not before: insert military forces into a deteriorating situation earlier in a crisis, with more speed, at greater ranges and with more sustainability than ever before."
NATO Counter Plan (Consultation Shell)

Plan: The United States will enter into binding consultation to increase its support for United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Observation I: Topicality

A. The counter plan is non-topical because it does not establish a foreign policy to increase support for UN peacekeeping; it increases consultation with NATO

B. The counter plan is at best effects topical.

Observation II: Competition

A. The counter plan is mutually exclusive; you can’t consult on a plan of action and do it at the same time. In fact that course of action will destroy cohesion and relations.

Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton administration revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not surprised that the United States and several other allies would only support a smaller group. But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power, using its impressive position of strength to have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern European country that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way it was wrapped." US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible. However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is "damned if it does, and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply reflects a Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-European relations would have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would have been the same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided.
Consultation is key to prevent counterbalancing to US hegemony and the erosion of NATO

**Kissinger is a former secretary of state and adviser to several presidents 2003**
(Henry, The San Diego Union-Tribune April 13, 2003)

America's two strongest allies on the European continent, France and Germany, actively agitated around the world against a policy for which the American president was prepared to risk American lives. That schism tempted Russia to confront the United States more explicitly than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And this pattern is repeated in the controversy with these allies over the U.N.'s role in postwar Iraq. A continuation of these trends would involve the progressive erosion of the Atlantic alliance -- the centerpiece of American foreign policy for half a century. The end of the Cold War and of a common threat had gradually undermined many of NATO's underlying premises. Nevertheless, for a decade, the United States remained dominant by habit and momentum, while beneath the surface, many in Europe chafed at the growing gap in military power and economic growth between the two sides of the Atlantic and at the new American administration's muscular assertion of the national interest. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on Sept. 11 brought latent resentments to the surface under the banner of unilateralism versus multilateralism. The initial solidarity based on America as a victim weakened when the United States gave the challenge a military cast by declaring war on terrorism. And it disappeared with the elaboration of a strategy of pre-emption. Though made necessary by security threats launched by private groups unrestrainable by deterrence because they had no territory to defend and inaccessible to diplomacy because they sought total victory, and compounded by the danger that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of either terrorists or rogue states, pre-emption ran counter to established principles of sovereignty. These justified war only as resistance to aggression or the imminence of attack. But even granting that in the emergency conditions after Sept. 11, the United States cut some corners on consultation and seemed occasionally too prone to righteousness, the relish with which France and Germany challenged the alliance framework that had seen the West through the Cold War has deeper causes. For France and Germany to announce that they would vote against the United States in the Security Council was unprecedented in itself. But this was dwarfed by their intense diplomatic lobbying against American policy in far-flung capitals, ignoring a half-century of alliance tradition -- even going so far as to create the impression among East European leaders that cooperation with the United States in the war might further complicate their entry into the European Union. With an attitude of almost gleeful defiance, the French and German foreign ministers invited their Russian counterpart, the erstwhile NATO adversary, to stand beside them in Paris while they publicly repudiated a top-priority policy of their ally of half a century. Irritations over American tactics could not have produced such a diplomatic revolution had not the traditional underpinnings of alliance been eroded by the disappearance of a common threat, aggravated by the emergence into power of a new generation that grew up during the Cold War and takes its achievements for granted. That generation did not participate in the liberation of Europe during World War II or its reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. It remembers instead the protest against the Vietnam War and the missile deployment in Europe. In Germany, this generation is frustrated by apparently permanent economic crisis. Gaullism, which insisted on a Europe with an identity defined in distinction from the United States, was not supported by a major European country until the Iraq crisis enabled President Jacques Chirac to recruit Germany -- at least temporarily -- into the Gaullist version of Europe. That diplomatic upheaval has split Europe between states that seek European identity through confrontation with America and those, led by Britain and Spain, who see in it an instrument of cooperation. These multiple schisms brought about an at least temporary reversal in Moscow. Coming to power almost contempoaneously with George Bush, President Vladimir Putin sought to navigate the catastrophic collapse of Russia's international position after the Cold War by concentrating on the domestic economy and to fulfill Russia's residual Great Power status through demonstrative consultations with the United States, especially Russia's experience through which Russia was living: the loss of its superpower status and the disintegration of its historic empire. While Russia had no alternative to acquiescing to its new weakness, symbolized by the abrogation of the ABM treaty and the expansion of NATO to its borders, it did so while gritting its teeth. Perhaps had the consultations with the United States been more far-reaching and less focused on an American agenda, Russia might have found a degree of compensation for its diminished stature and been more reluctant to change course. As it was, the Franco-German offer of a united front against the United States over Iraq appealed to Russian nationalism and held out the prospect of new options not dependent on American good will. Six months after NATO expansion admitted three former Soviet republics, the Russian foreign minister could demonstrate the apparent hollowness of NATO to his own people by standing side by side with his French and German counterparts in a gesture proclaimed as symbolizing emancipation from American policy. If the existing trend in transatlantic relations continues, the international system will be fundamentally altered. Europe will split into two groups defined by their attitude toward cooperation with America. NATO will change its character and become a vehicle for those continuing to affirm the transatlantic relationship.
KISSINGER CONTINUES

The United Nations, traditionally a mechanism by which the democracies vindicated their convictions against the danger of aggression, will instead turn into a forum in which allies implement theories of how to bring about a counterweight to the hyperpower United States. The debate over the postwar administration of Iraq illustrates these dangers. After a period of restoring security and searching for weapons of mass destruction, it is in America's interest not to insist on an exclusive role in a region in the heart of the Islamic world and to invite other nations to share the governance -- at first coalition partners, progressively other nations, and a significant role for the United Nations, especially its technical and humanitarian organs. But the French foreign minister's proposal, tacitly supported in Berlin, that American presence in Iraq lacks legitimacy until endorsed by diplomatic processes similar to those preceding the war would magnify existing fissures. Postwar Iraq reconstruction will have to recognize the desirability of a broad international base but also the imprudence of using multilateralism as a slogan and the United Nations as an institution to isolate the United States. Too much has happened to prevent a return to business as usual. A revitalization of the Atlantic relationship is imperative if global institutions are to function effectively and if the world is to avoid sliding into a return to 19th-century power politics. And that revitalization must be based on a sense of common destiny rather than seeking to turn the alliance into an a la carte safety net. If common ground cannot be found -- if pre-Iraq war diplomacy becomes the pattern -- the United States will be driven to construct ad hoc coalitions together with the core of NATO that remains committed to a transatlantic relationship. That would be a sad end to a half-century of partnership. The time has come to put an end to the debate on unilateralism versus multilateralism and to concentrate on substance. Our European adversaries in the recent controversies should stop encouraging their media's tendency to describe the American administration as Rambo-like figures thirsting for war and the United States as if it were institutionally an obstacle to the fulfillment of Europe's purposes rather than a partner in achieving common aims. For its part, America needs more intense consultations to make the partners more predictable to each other. And a vast agenda awaits: curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, addressing the political implications of globalization, speeding reconstruction of the Middle East.
The Bush administration does not think that consultation is needed
Asmus, Foreign Affairs 2003
(Ronald D. September 2003 - October 2003 Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance)

Above all, both sides of the Atlantic need to reinstate the network of close consultations that has formed the bedrock of transatlantic cooperation for the past half-century under Republican and Democratic presidents alike. Most worrying in the U.S.-European relationship today is the lack of any systematic and close dialogue on these strategic issues comparable to what was created during the Cold War to deal with the Soviet Union. Rather than being expanded to include these new issues, consultations across the Atlantic have actually been cut back. In part, this is because the Bush administration is frequently so divided it is unable to conduct meaningful discussions on many strategic issues. Whereas in the past Americans would complain of or poke fun at Europe's inability to speak with a single voice, today it is the Europeans who ask whom in Washington they should call to find out what U.S. policy really is. But the diminished dialogue also reflects Washington's downgrading of the relationship and its misguided conviction that the assertion of American power is synonymous with leadership.

Consultation snowballs. Empirically, binding consultation during the Cold War created common ground. The first step is key.
Asmus, Foreign Affairs 2003
(Ronald D. September 2003 - October 2003 Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance)

To be sure, consultations in and of themselves will not miraculously resolve deeper problems. But it is worth remembering that the consensus achieved during the Cold War did not simply materialize out of thin air. It was built from the ground up. When President Harry Truman and his European and Canadian counterparts created NATO, they did not necessarily have a common view on how to deal with the Soviet threat. But they were smart enough to know that they needed one to confront a common problem -- and to order their top aides to come up with it. Over the years, a web of formal and informal consultations was spun to pull together divergent viewpoints and to integrate them into a common strategy. Today, a similar system to generate consensus is needed to meet the toughest challenges of the twenty-first century. There is little doubt that the gap across the Atlantic can be narrowed if both sides make a political commitment to do so and throw their best and brightest together in order to stake out new common ground.
We must increase consultation or the alliance will collapse
Weidenfeld, is the coordinator for German-American Cooperation in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany and member of the Executive Board of the Bertelsmann Foundation. Werner 1997
(The Washington Quarterly 1997 Summer)

Furthermore, the potential for differences of opinion between the Western partners has decreased considerably since the end of the Cold War. Constant points of friction over the appropriate reaction to the Soviet threat have disappeared. Compared to the controversies of the 1980s, the present state of transatlantic relations exudes considerable harmony. Yet, the current risk is that of increasing transatlantic indifference on a scale to match the disputes of old. Potential sources of friction concerning security policy coordination have ceased to exist, dealing with one's partners seems less and less necessary, and, given the more promising topics of everyday politics, cooperation is now frequently seen as a tiresome obligation. Any analysis of transatlantic circumstances and options brings us to this central dilemma. On the one hand, as indicated above, no two other regions in the world enjoy such close ties, characterized by friendship and shared common values as well as by political and economic efficiency, as do Europe and the United States. On the other hand, the historical development of this alliance over the last 50 years makes it clear that, without a revitalization of these ties that is both forward-looking and geared toward the changing geopolitical situation, the two partners will inevitably grow apart. The closeness of the transatlantic community in recent decades has been possible only because the security partnership founded in the postwar era provided the necessary framework. In the future, this framework will no longer be available. Thus far, only the initiated have been able to discern the first tiny cracks in the superstructure, demonstrated by the sharp decline in the number of visits to Europe by members of Congress and the cutbacks in U.S. funding for transatlantic cultural exchanges. On both sides of the Atlantic, the everyday routine of politics is creating ever-greater distance between what were once the closest of partners. If this tendency is not halted, this slight indifference will eventually develop into more sharply defined differences of perception concerning international politics and strategies. This will become visible as a serious problem for Europe and the United States only when this perceptual difference turns into conflict, most likely when the partners face a concrete international challenge, such as peacekeeping in a crisis region of the world. The expectation that tried-and-tested methods of long-standing transatlantic cooperation will be able to solve this conflict of ideas may be deceptive. Successful U.S.-European conflict management rests on the permanent agreement between policymakers and their public on a common direction. If this agreement is lacking on the minor issues, or if politicians begin to prefer solving domestic problems at the cost of dealing with their foreign partners (for example, in trade policy), then, when a serious issue arises, neither the politicians nor the general public will see the value of maintaining a transatlantic consensus. The ultimate consequences of such a split could be a permanent break in the transatlantic culture of close political and social interaction.

Without consultation the alliance will collapse
Stanzel, German diplomat who presently works as foreign policy adviser to the Social Democratic Party in the German Bundestag. 1999 (Volker, The Washington Quarterly 1999 Spring)

The role of NATO needs to be discussed if the West is to have a clear strategic concept by April 1999, when the alliance celebrates its fiftieth anniversary. In this framework the opening of NATO to the East must be carefully deliberated. If, however, the U.S. Senate put off its vote on NATO enlargement in order to pressure the president on domestic educational issues, U.S. and Western European security has been held hostage to domestic U.S. infighting. Jeopardizing global security as well as the country's own national security does not meet the level of responsibility expected of the world's sole superpower. Lastly, calling Saddam's bluff and forcing him to accept United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) controls on his WMD potentially accords with the special responsibility of a superpower. However, America's allies were drawn in without the chance to codetermine a strategy. Granted, it is faster that way: without discussion no one can get you off track. But will such a policy always be successful? Gradually it will breed resentment. This eventuality could be shrugged off -- once. In the end, however, built-up resentment might become a stumbling block to developing coherent alliance strategies. In another way, U.S. unilateralism also breeds complacency among its allies by reinforcing the impression that the United States will take care of everything. Why bother thinking about tomorrow? Knowing that their input has little weight, complacent allies will gradually lose interest in actively working within the alliance. When the United States, Japan, and South Korea were not capable on their own of diffusing the danger of North Korea's nuclear potential, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established. It was more effective in bringing together allies who understood the problem and were ready to chip in. In the context of major crises, resentful or complacent allies are the seed of future confrontation within the alliance.
NATO CP: CONSULTATION: AT: NORMAL MEANS

Iraq proves consultation is not normal means. Consulting happens when the Americans want something.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) June 1, 2003

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Dan Hetlage said that consultations were under way with European allies about peacekeeping forces in Iraq and that the issue would be further addressed at a NATO meeting June 12 in Brussels, Belgium. He declined to say whether the United States was asking Europeans - or Arabs - to send troops.

NATO CP: CONSULTATION SOLVENCY: NATO WANTS CONSULTATION

European leaders are looking for consultation of PKOs.
The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN) June 10, 2001

In his first major overseas trip, President Bush hopes to soothe frustrated European leaders and set a new course for U.S.-Russian relations. The six-day, five-nation tour will put the new American President face-to-face with leaders critical of his policies on missile defense, trade and the environment. Heading into the trip, Bush has recalibrated his position on some issues and promised better consultation on others. Even on topics that bind the allies - NATO expansion, Iraq, the Middle East and peacekeeping in the Balkans - world leaders will closely watch Bush for clues about his intentions.
The Foreign Military Financing Program provides the Georgian military with defense articles, services and training. FMF also promotes Georgian's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP). The International Military Education and Training program helps Georgian soldiers to develop the English-language and professional military skills necessary to augment Georgia’s PfP participation and its interoperability with NATO and other international peacekeeping missions. Georgia is eligible in FY 2003 to receive Excess Defense Articles that will assist in meeting defense requirements and enact defense reforms. The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Program provides equipment, logistical and infrastructure support, and training to help Georgia's Border Guards maintain an active border presence, particularly along the Georgian-Russian border. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security provides technical assistance, training and equipment to enhance Georgia's capability to deter, detect, interdict, and prevent the spread of dual-use equipment and technology. The U.S.-initiated Train and Equip program is continuing in FY 2003, when two more battalions will complete their training.

Training has made NATO forces interoperable

NATO's forces have for years been training for joint operations, proponents point out. Their military equipment, communications systems and command structures are largely "interoperable." Using an all-European NATO force in the Balkans suggest a number of benefits. It would strengthen and balance the NATO alliance. It would reduce the risk of a confrontation with Moscow -- which strenuously objects to the U.S. role. And it would free the U.S. to maintain vigilance elsewhere.

NATO members must focus on interoperability before the join
World Affairs March 22, 2002

The formal technical and general criteria for the accession of new aspirant countries to NATO and the EU are quite clear and have been set forth in numerous official documents. (2) For both organizations they are, in short, democratization, economic reform and modernization, institutional reform, and human rights. In addition, the EU requires applicant states to conform to the extensive legal, regulatory, and financial stipulations of the Acquis Communautaire. NATO also has a variety of technical requirements that include the restructuring of civil-military relations according to the Western model, reform of defense ministries and of equipment, armaments, and military systems to achieve interoperability, and the ability to be a net contributor to, not a drain on, NATO forces and functions, including, importantly, peacekeeping in Southeast Europe and now cooperation on counterterrorism.
NATO IS KEY TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

NATO's nuclear forces are another component of NATO's strategy and that is why the current talk of denuclearization is so fraught with danger. Without nuclear weapons, as one keen observer has noted, war is once again thinkable. For four decades, NATO's nuclear deterrent has worked superbly. The Russians have had to resort to expending their military efforts elsewhere, and in a very limited fashion in Asia, Central America, and Africa.

NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE KEY TO DETERRENCE.

The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies continues to be provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States. The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France play an important role of their own. Yet for nuclear forces to fulfil their role in war prevention, NATO cannot rely solely on the strategic forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Rather, NATO requires nuclear forces deployed in Europe and committed to the Alliance's defence, with delivery systems provided by both nuclear and non-nuclear allies. Such forces provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance, demonstrating that an attack on the European members of NATO could ultimately engage the strategic forces of the United States. They also allow the risks and burdens of NATO's nuclear posture to be shared through wider participation. Widespread participation is manifest not only in the basing of nuclear forces, but also through participation in common funding of infrastructure and in collective planning through institutions such as the Nuclear Planning Group.

NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES ARE A CRITICAL BACK UP IN THE WORLD OF REDUCED CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

The role of NATO's nuclear weapons as described so far may seem academic, at best, particularly in the absence of a specific military threat. Today, the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are remote. And for most of the crises likely to confront the Alliance - such as the fighting in the former Yugoslavia - nuclear weapons will play no role. To understand their role more concretely, one must consider a spectrum of future risks that could affect NATO's security and involve a nuclear dimension. None of these has the immediacy or clarity of the Cold War scenarios, but all must be given serious consideration. One set of risks involves the re-emergence of a major threat on the European landmass, particularly one stemming from a nation that is well armed with nuclear weapons. NATO's conventional forces are anticipated to remain sufficient to cope with the non-nuclear elements of such a threat, particularly given the expectation that NATO will have more time to augment its defences than during the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO could fail to act promptly or the adversary could see its nuclear weapons as a way to coerce the Alliance before or even without building up a large conventional capability. In the face of these risks, NATO's nuclear forces are a source of stability and reassurance. They underwrite the reductions in conventional forces now underway in Europe by demonstrating that any future attempt to gain superiority by unilateral rearmament would not guarantee political or military advantage. In addition, NATO's nuclear forces help to protect against any attempt to intimidate or coerce any allied nation through the threat of nuclear force.

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATO CP: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE HELPS STOP NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.
J. Gregory L. Schulte, Director of NATO's Nuclear Planning Directorate, Nato's Nuclear Forces In A Changing World,
NATO Review, WEB EDITION,. No. 1 - Feb 1993 Vol. 41 - p. 17-22

A second set of risks involves the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, resulting in the emergence of newly nuclear-armed countries on the Alliance's periphery. These countries are unlikely to have the conventional capability to challenge NATO, or even the nuclear forces to threaten the territory of all Alliance members. Yet they may see even a limited nuclear capability as an equalizer, allowing them to intimidate the Alliance and challenge its resolve. The leaders involved may be motivated by intense hatred or ideology, and not behave as rationally as those that NATO sought to deter in the past. For this set of risks, NATO's nuclear posture should serve to discourage such leaders from thinking they can profitably threaten allied countries with nuclear weapons. There has been much speculation about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence upon leaders who are irrational by our standards; however, such leaders may be more effectively deterred than we think, particularly those who consider nuclear weapons so influential that they have sought to attain them for themselves.

NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES PREVENT WARS.
J. Gregory L. Schulte, Director of NATO's Nuclear Planning Directorate, Nato's Nuclear Forces In A Changing World,
NATO Review, WEB EDITION,. No. 1 - Feb 1993 Vol. 41 - p. 17-22

Clearly, NATO's nuclear forces must have the flexibility to play their war prevention roles for a broad range of eventualities. But in all cases, they would be weapons of last resort, not because NATO would sacrifice their deterrent value by planning to fight a protracted conventional war, but last resort in that NATO would have a panoply of other instruments in its arsenal to deal with future crises. These start with preventative diplomacy, non-proliferation measures and crisis management, and extend to rapid reinforcement and, if necessary, reconstitution of a stronger defence posture. Good intelligence, effective conventional capabilities, and anti-missile defences would also play important roles.

NATO IS PROTECTING AND UPDATING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TO ENSURE THEIR WAR DETERRENT VALUES.
J. Gregory L. Schulte, Director of NATO's Nuclear Planning Directorate, Nato's Nuclear Forces In A Changing World,
NATO Review, WEB EDITION,. No. 1 - Feb 1993 Vol. 41 - p. 17-22

For NATO's nuclear forces to play their role in war prevention, the Alliance must ensure that its forces, while maintained at a minimum level, are effective, flexible, survivable and secure. The effectiveness of NATO's nuclear forces is fundamentally dependent on the qualification and training of the people responsible for operating them. It is also dependent upon ensuring the capability of the delivery systems - dual-capable aircraft (DCA) - and the weapons themselves. NATO's DCA force continues to be updated and today includes some of the Allies' most capable aircraft, such as the Tornado, the F-16, and the F-15E. But we must guard against inattention which would allow these systems or their weapons to become obsolescent. Flexibility is an inherent characteristic of NATO's DCA force. DCA can be used for conventional or nuclear missions, and they can be assigned as reaction, main defence, or augmentation forces under the new Strategic Concept. DCA and their mission planning can be rapidly reoriented to counter emerging threats. Their ability to reinforce any region of the Alliance at risk and to participate in multinational operations can provide a clear demonstration of Alliance resolve and solidarity. With the considerable reduction underway in the Alliance's nuclear posture, NATO Defence Ministers have placed a premium on the survivability and security of those systems that remain. The NATO Infrastructure Programme continues to enhance the protection of NATO's sub-strategic forces, including the weapons themselves. In addition to being effective, flexible, survivable and secure, NATO's nuclear forces must be supported by an adaptive planning system that can respond to unpredictable threats by adequate command, control and communications and by regular exercises. These exercises must test not only military units but also the mechanisms enabling political control. In sum, NATO requires a nuclear posture that is credible in the eyes of a potential aggressor, so that it cannot be easily dismissed. Only thus can it contribute to the prevention of war.
NATO CP: IMPACTS: WAR IN GENERAL

AS STATES APPLY AND ENTER NATO, IT PREVENTS THEM FROM FIGHTING EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

The benefits provided by NATO naturally pertain first to defense and security. To the extent that states enter NATO's gravitational orbit, it becomes progressively much more difficult for their armed forces and government to launch or stumble into internal ethnic wars, civil wars, foreign wars, and coups d'etat. The negative examples of the Russian and Yugoslav/Serbian armed forces in the 1990s confirm this. NATO not only helps create a democratic political and military order among its members that precludes war among them, its gravitational pull attracts other states while it restrains their militaries, forcing them to build more democratic, transparent, and accountable military and police structures that are more attuned to international standards and accords concerning the use of force.

NATO IS KEY TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

Precisely because of the dearth of effective mechanisms for resolving and terminating conflicts, organizations like the EU and NATO have a golden opportunity to extend their burgeoning capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management to new areas and to learn from and overcome previous errors. More importantly, these organizations are eagerly developing those capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution, and for peace and stability operations. NATO has been as much about creating, consolidating, and now extending a political or military-political order in Europe, with particular reference to civil-military relations as it has been about a common defense against Soviet or subsequent threats to peace and security. Perhaps more than any other security organization NATO fundamentally has transformed its structure, capabilities, and outlook to assume a much more active, and even potentially proactive role in conflict resolution, crisis management, and peace and stability operations beyond its borders.
A. THE BALKANS REMAINS ON THE BRINK OF REIMПLOSION. FAILURE MAKES THE REGION A HUB FOR TERRORISM AND CONFLICT.
Edward C. Meyer, Chair, &William L. Nash, Project Director, Balkans 2010: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action

Nevertheless, sources of instability remain. Economic stagnation has generated unemployment and underemployment. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced families still await return or resettlement. Money for reconstruction and development is inadequate. Prominent accused war criminals remain at large. Key institutions have resisted reform. Political and legal reform are impeded by corruption and by entrenched obstructionist forces—including organized crime syndicates—that rely on extremism and aggression to advance narrow, personal, or ethnically driven claims and grievances. Neglecting these challenges will have severe and destabilizing consequences for southeast Europe, including growing poverty; an increase in illegal economic activity, including trafficking in people and drugs; further human displacement; and a greater likelihood of political extremism, insurgency, and terrorism. A renewal of conflict, however limited, would be devastating for the region and beyond. It would be an especially serious blow to Europe, raising the specter of increased refugee flows. But it would also have an impact on U.S. interests. Renewed conflict would be a policy failure with damaging implications for Balkan Muslims and for U.S. relations with the broader Muslim world. It would be an unwelcome diversion from other priorities; would increase the amount of drug and other trafficking that reaches Europe and beyond; and would enable terrorists to use the region as a transit hub or a haven.

B. NATO FORCES ARE ONLY HOPE TO KEEP THE BALKANS STABLE.
Edward C. Meyer, Chair, &William L. Nash, Project Director, Balkans 2010: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action

NATO’s military commitment in the Balkans includes the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, and Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia. It is important to recognize that approximately 85 percent of the forces in these NATO operations are non-U.S. forces. Beyond its peacekeeping responsibilities (which, in Bosnia, have included the capture of suspected war criminals), NATO is also involved in the region through its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and Membership Action Plan (MAP). Taken together, these programs are the means by which Balkan countries can develop their own military and police forces, under democratic civilian control, that are professional and in the service of the state and its citizenry.
NATO CP: BALKANS NET BENEFIT

BALKAN BACKSLIDING INCREASES THE RISK OF TERRORISM.
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Balkans_TF.pdf
November 19, 2002

The United States is also a key stakeholder in the Balkans. The United States shares the EU’s security concerns and has other longstanding interests in the region as well. Since 1945, American administrations of both parties have accepted the premise that American security and economic interests require a peaceful and stable Europe. Continued U.S. engagement will reassure its partners of America’s commitment to democracy and stability in the region and contribute to fulfillment of the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” The new countries created from the former Yugoslavia are also strategically important as a bridge to current or aspirant EU and NATO members—Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania—and to the Middle East. As noted above, abandoning the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Kosovo to face new threats from their neighbors will further reduce America’s standing in the Muslim world and may encourage Balkan Muslims to turn to religious militants, rather than to Europe, for protection. Put simply, America’s security will suffer if the Balkans slide toward division, lawlessness, and religious or ethnic conflict.

NATO CAN STABILIZE AND INTEGRATE THE BALKANS.
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Balkans_TF.pdf
November 19, 2002

The U.S. interest is to support the Balkan states’ efforts to reform—in particular using its influence in NATO to ensure a stable security situation and to guide military reform—while recognizing, and supporting, the European Union’s lead role in providing political, economic, and technical assistance. Based on current spending patterns, the Task Force estimates that the United States will spend $8 billion to $12 billion on military operations and $2 billion to $3.5 billion on assistance to the Balkan region between now and 2010. A continued U.S. commitment at this level is essential to the successful transformation of the region. Working together between now and 2010, the European Union and the United States can shepherd the Balkans along the path to full integration into Europe.

ENTICEMENT OF NATO MEMBERSHIP CAN REINFORCE THE BALKANS COMMITMENT TO REFORM.
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Balkans_TF.pdf
November 19, 2002

The carrots available to the Balkan governments from these stakeholders are abundant. As befits its primary role in the development of the region, the European Union has the most to offer. In return for continued peace, stability, and political and economic reform, the countries earn closer association with European institutions and structures, including privileged political and economic relations and favorable trade terms on most goods. Both the European Union and the United States also offer economic, technical, and reconstruction assistance. Development assistance, largely in the form of loans, is also available from the World Bank. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the granting of normal trade relations is another carrot that the United States can offer in return for economic reform. Active involvement in NATO’s PFP and MAP will enable states to reform and improve their militaries; develop interoperability with NATO; and prepare force structures, procedures, and capabilities for possible future membership.
Nevertheless, there is still a risk of backsliding in the region: the security situation in Macedonia remains tenuous; the coalition government in Serbia is irretrievably splintered; and in Kosovo all the political parties are organized around ethnic objectives and pander to nationalist sentiment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile, the elections in October 2002—which resulted in presidential victories for the three main nationalist parties at the expense of their moderate competitors—demonstrate that nationalist feelings remain potent. One reason for these trends is the increasing discontent of local populations whose embrace of the West has failed to bring immediate improvements in their standard of living. Disturbingly, parties uninterested in bringing their countries closer to the European mainstream could benefit in elections over the next few years. The hard truth is that, while all the major parties in such states as Bulgaria and Romania—as in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic earlier—have endorsed their countries’ continued efforts to join the European Union and NATO, such an outcome is not preordained for the states of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia. Irredentist, criminal, and antidemocratic forces will try to exploit people’s frustration brought on by the difficulties inherent in transitions, and it is these elements that must be countered through active engagement by the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations. These stakeholders, and the international community as a whole, need to make clear the economic, political, and security benefits of cooperation and reform, and they must also be equally explicit about the penalties—including the withholding of financial aid and international isolation—for regression, obstructionism, or the use of violence.

COHESIVE RESPONSE FROM NATO FORCES IS CRITICAL TO KEEPING THE BALKANS ON TRACK.

The cohesiveness of the international community is another key element if progress is to be made in the Balkans. The European Union’s Stabilization and Association Process and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and Membership Action Plan are the planning blueprints around which the international community can most usefully prioritize and organize its activities, incentives, and penalties.9 These programs, taken as a whole, provide the necessary standards for association with, and integration into, Europe.10

NATO IS KEY TO REFUGEE RETURNS.

A crucial point implicit in this recommendation is that resettlement may be preferable to return for some individuals and families. Acceptance of this option by governments (especially the U.S. government) and international organizations, and adjustment of refugee policy where appropriate, are critical for the successful integration or re-integration of refugees into their communities. The Task Force also emphasizes the need for the NATO missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia to continue providing security assistance for refugees, particularly minority returnees. In Bosnia, for example, refugees are returning to their homes at a higher rate each year—approximately 92,000 returned in 2001. Without such assistance, returns will not continue.
A STRONG NATO ALLIANCE IS CRITICAL TO STOPPING PROLIFERATION, TERRORISM AND WAR IN THE TRANSCAPSIAN REGION.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

The present cooperative security regime that has grown around European security, arms control, and the war on terror offers both a model for future collaboration and for extending that regime into the CIS. Extending that regime into the Transcaspian zone also offers Europe, the United States, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE important missions for their future operation and cooperation. Certainly the challenge of establishing new, more relevant, and adaptable military missions and force structures adapted to them provides a way to reinvigorate NATO forces and Transatlantic military collaboration in the war on terrorism and to act "out of area" through these renovated force structures. Europe's recent example and evolution is relevant and instructive for the CIS, both because it confronts so many factors of actual and potential conflict and because it is now part of the intricate and often competitive security relationships of Europe, the greater Middle East, and South, if not East Asia. The numerous efforts to involve local governments in these competitive security relationships since 1991 demonstrate the CIS' participation, albeit sometimes unwilling, in these complex relationships that have taken place in the last decade. Not only are Central Asia and the Transcaucasus integral parts of the global war on terror, they are fast becoming pivotal actors in the global energy economy. In other cases, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia and China sought to sweep them into an organization whose purpose and perspective far transcended regional security issues and reflected their global resistance to American policies. Central Asia and the Transcaucasus cannot remain aloof from those other regions' challenges-as signs multiply of the region's vulnerability to trafficking in narcotics, conventional weapons (either small arms or more lethal platforms), weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and even to involvement in potential nuclear rivalries. Local governments' support for a nuclear weapons free zone and for export control regimes signals their leaders' understanding that a multilateral approach that originates with their own decisive involvement with other states is the only way to go in this regard. But these challenges to regional security, like the porosity of borders and police corruption, as well as large scale availability of WMD stocks, are also traceable to the Soviet period, the manner of the Soviet state's dissolution, and subsequent trends in politics and economics in all the successor states. No vision of future international cooperation among all the relevant actors here is realizable or sustainable without an honest cataloguing and analysis of the multiple crisis factors that challenge security both now and for the foreseeable future. Regular access to and dialogue with EU, NATO, and OSCE mechanisms by both Russia and other CIS states would facilitate a more open and candid discussion of these challenges and of ways to respond to them. These security challenges comprise both man-made misguided policies and economic-political-military decisions, and structural elements of the economy like factor endowments or geography. The combined force of their interaction in the region's politics, economics, sociological trends, and ecology threatens to become a negative "force multiplier" for the intensification of simultaneous, multiple, and interactive crises throughout the Transcaspian if we cannot arrest and reverse the negative trends that they represent. That negative, even Hobbesian, vision of an international or at least regional order composed of several failing or failed states and violent pseudo-states like the Palestinian Authority is the alternative for the Transcaspian region's security future. It is one where cooperation is exceedingly difficult, if at all possible. Here war, poverty, and ecological and social destruction prevail over peace, security, and development, and interstate and internal conflicts are the order of the day.
NATO PRESENCE IN THE TRANSCASPIAN REGION PREVENTS PROLIFERATION, TERRORISM, AND ESCALATORY VIOLENT CONFLICTS.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

This monograph aims to refute those criticisms. The new East-West partnership offers both the United States and NATO manifold opportunities to exercise a positive influence upon and along with Russia and governments in the CIS to enhance security. This is because the criticisms of NATO as an outdated anti-Russian or suddenly toothless institution wholly overlook or underestimate the positive changes that NATO has undergone since the end of the Cold War, and its great utility for transforming the security situation across Eurasia. Those changes offer the U.S. Government and its armed forces and NATO and its component forces an opportunity to extend the positive transformation they have undergone further afield to reduce the chances of another September 11 or an explosion of insurgency and terrorism in Eurasia or other areas adjacent to or vital to European and American security. By acting in this fashion, the United States, its armed forces, its allies, and their armed forces can all contribute to the lasting integration of Russia into the West, an outcome that prevents it from trying to upset or revise the status quo in Eurasia and that acts as a moderating and democratizing force for reform within Russia's national defense structure. Additionally, the United States and our allies can foster real progress in deepening the kinds of relationships and engagement with CIS militaries that will make them and their governments reliable partners with the United States and/or NATO in the war on terrorism and in potential future contingencies. Also, these transformative military-political activities and the achievement of the desired outcome of stability and integration of Eurasia with the West reduce the likelihood of future outbreaks of terrorism, insurgency, and violence in an area whose importance to the West as a whole, and not only because of energy, has risen steadily in the recent past. Given the opportunities at hand and the strategic benefits to be gained from exploiting them, it is utterly misguided to assert NATO's uselessness and to refrain from employing available policy instruments to achieve these highly desirable objectives.

NATO IS KEY TO PEACE IN THE TRANSCASPIAN.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

Finally, to the extent that Russia welcomes and cooperates with NATO and EU military-police missions in the CIS, its own forces will hopefully become more professional, sensitized to examples of military-police "best practice" in internal conflicts, and less politicized. At any rate, they will be more constrained politically by the possibility of risking harmony with NATO and the West and thus constitute less of a threat to neighboring states or become less willing to support separatists and rivals to existing governments in the CIS than is now the case. Today the absence of democratic control and professionalism among regional militaries threatens many states in the CIS "shatterbelt," not least Russia itself. In Chechnya, unprofessional, brutal, and corrupt behavior remains the norm. Russian forces there not only resist changing their behavior despite explicit rules to the contrary, but they have also habitually threatened to precipitate a crisis inside Russia if "victory" (which can only mean the destruction of locally organized social life) is denied to them. Russian generals also assert openly that they feel not enough pressure has been placed upon Georgia. Thus they want to widen the Chechen war, a decision that would have unimaginably bad repercussions across Russia and the Caucasus, if not beyond. Moreover, their operations and threats against Georgia since 1999 are inconceivable without support from Moscow. Thus the strong temptation to strike at Georgia, combined with an inbuilt tendency towards military adventurism in Moscow could easily lead to further provocations and actions along the lines of those in 2001—through April 2002 that could trigger another military conflict involving Georgian, Russian, and now U.S. forces. Russia's armed forces also resist implementing agreements with the OSCE to vacate bases in Georgia and Moldova, participate in the drug trafficking through Tajikistan, and provide much of the flood of stolen or corruptly obtained small arms that are a scourge to the entire CIS. In Central Asia they have played a rather dubious role in the war on terrorism. Moreover, Chief of Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin recently conceded that their condition was "worse than critical," and that they can neither defend Russia nor fight terrorism elsewhere. Subjecting these forces to international norms and standards of military conduct would greatly benefit Russia and its neighbors. Thus the military-political integration of Central Asian and Transcaucasian states into NATO strengthens chances for peace within and among them, without which further progress in any dimension would become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATO'S CENTRAL ASIAN EXPANSION FORCES RUSSIAN COOPERATION, PEACE AND STABILITY.

Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

The aforementioned criticisms of NATO and of U.S. policy overlook or neglect many facts; first, the fact that there is a real basis for cooperation with Russia that is accepted by Moscow as serving its interests, too. In this respect, they are more mindful of traditional or quasi-imperial Russian interests than is the Russian government. After all, in February 2001 (well before the attacks of September 21) Sergei Ivanov, then Secretary of the Security Council, told Lord George Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, that joint efforts against terrorism might become the basis of NATO-Russia trust and cooperation. Similarly, some Russian analysts advocate programs similar to those outlined below. Neither do these critics consider the visible disaster of Russian-led modernization in Central Asia and the wider CIS. Nor do they ponder the possibility that partnership with the West can give Russia a more legitimate prominence in the region, albeit one tempered by the demands of partnership. As Richard Haass, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, recently observed, Another area for cooperation is Central Asia, where the United States and Russia have a shared interest in the economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, in halting drug and weapon trafficking, and more broadly in promoting stability, moderation, trade, and development. It seems to me that assuring Russia a prominent role in the economic reconstruction of this region could go a long way towards alleviating Moscow's concerns about the growing U.S. military presence there. Moreover, these critics also ignore the evolution of NATO and other European security organizations towards cooperative security, the acknowledgment of that evolution by both nonmember states and statesmen, the existence of U.S. programs to engage and transform CIS militaries, and the genuine contribution those programs make to security, stability, and eventual democratization. In fact, these new accords with Moscow permit NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to realize the potential inherent in their organizational evolution since 1990 and to do so for and with those endangered states who might become the basis of NATO-Russia trust and cooperation. Similarly, some Russian analysts advocate programs similar to those outlined below. Neither do these critics consider the visible disaster of Russian-led modernization in Central Asia and the wider CIS. Nor do they ponder the possibility that partnership with the West can give Russia a more legitimate prominence in the region, albeit one tempered by the demands of partnership. As Richard Haass, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, recently observed, Another area for cooperation is Central Asia, where the United States and Russia have a shared interest in the economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, in halting drug and weapon trafficking, and more broadly in promoting stability, moderation, trade, and development. It seems to me that assuring Russia a prominent role in the economic reconstruction of this region could go a long way towards alleviating Moscow's concerns about the growing U.S. military presence there. Moreover, these critics also ignore the evolution of NATO and other European security organizations towards cooperative security, the acknowledgment of that evolution by both nonmember states and statesmen, the existence of U.S. programs to engage and transform CIS militaries, and the genuine contribution those programs make to security, stability, and eventual democratization. In fact, these new accords with Moscow permit NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to realize the potential inherent in their organizational evolution since 1990 and to do so for and with those endangered states who clearly welcome this enhanced attention to conflict prevention and have repeatedly advocated it. At the same time all these organizations now enjoy Russian cooperation and support.

MILITARY REFORMS PROMPTED BY THE NATO APPLICATION PROCESS PROMOTE PEACE IN A CONFLICT PRONE REGION.

Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

NATO's critics also overlook that many security challenges and threats to the new Transcaspian states originated in Russian policy; e.g., support for separatists, undeviating support of anti-democratic rulers, and Moscow's incessant search for economic, political, and military hegemony over these states that would radically circumscribe their real independence. Critics of a Western security presence in the Transcaspian also overlook that subordinating CIS governments to Russia's exclusive sphere of influence ensures their endless backwardness, proneness to violent conflicts, and the overall continuation of pathological political-economic-military phenomena afflicting them and their neighbors. Therefore Western security organizations should not use the opportunity arising from these agreements to underwrite failed Russian "peace operations" and neo-imperial policies, but rather help Russia and CIS governments move beyond the failed policies and outlooks of the past and towards stabilizing, developmental, and democratizing policies. Under present circumstances, the way to do this is to change the "correlation of forces" in the area. Instead, as leading Russian defense correspondent Alexander Golts writes, The only way a couple of dozen countries can plan and carry out long-term military programs is if they all have transparent and public defense budgets. Only democratic institutions can guarantee that a country's armed forces won't try to influence political decisions and draw the whole alliance into some risky undertaking or other. In other words, the NATO conditions are essential for maintaining confidence among the member states. In fact, given continuing terrorist threats in and around Afghanistan and to the states of Central Asia, as well as the threats connected with Russian or Chinese interests in hegemony there and proliferation concerns since those states' borders are notoriously porous, a professional military presence there greatly enhances everyone's interests by strengthening the ability of those states to defend themselves against these threats. Given the visible weakness of both the state-building process in the CIS and the real military threats to many of those states, multilateral combined activities would have a strongly positive effect. As observers have noted, shoring up the feeble statehood of several Central Asian states is an important anti-terrorist task for the United States, and nothing we can do to this end is as important as training combat-capable armed forces. We began doing this quietly after the IMU incursion [in 1999-author] but the pace and scope of this aid has greatly increased since September 11. We need to see this process through to success. This will take time and it will be facilitated immensely by a local U.S. military presence.
NATO CAN TRANSFORM THE TRANSCASPIAN.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

These trends are transforming the Transcaspian security situation and carry within them beneficial possibilities for local governments, if only because globalizing their contacts with multiple external governments and institutions reduces chances for any one actor to monopolize or control their policies, thereby ruling out new imperial dreams for the foreseeable future. These trends also reflect the beginning of a hopefully irreversible process of integration and globalization that alone can galvanize their backward economies to progress and escape the well-known and formidable domestic challenges to their security. Global integration, particularly with real organizations that can provide tangible improvement of local conditions and of physical security, is essential but has eluded the region's grasp since 1991. As Western writers have observed, perhaps the most important factor threatening Transcaspian states' long-term security is the absence of institutionalized mechanisms for resolving inevitable conflicts: ecological, economic, political, ethnic, military, internal, or international. Actions to further integrate these states with Europe are essential for building lasting peace because they strike at that defect, perhaps the most intractable aspect of local states' inability to make a regional peace. Given an external mover and impetus progress might well be forthcoming. Today's global interaction increasingly connects all the disparate parts of the CIS, former Warsaw Pact members, and the Baltic states with Asia, Europe, and America. It generated their increasing involvement with the European, Asian, and Middle Eastern security agendas even before September 11. Apart from the new opportunity to benefit from the EU's, OSCE's, and NATO's experience, Transcaspian states can gain in other ways from this globalizing trend. Despite their entanglement in foreign rivalries, these foreign connections and the possibility of their expansion through the construction of new transport, communication, and other infrastructures give hope of overcoming one of the most deep-rooted causes of backwardness, namely being landlocked states located far from major trade routes and the inability to compensate for that factor. Finally, this new trend towards seeking multilateral and cooperative security solutions in the CIS offers great scope for NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. These organizations, especially NATO, are the most effective recent providers of regional security. NATO, contrary to its critics, is a functioning organization whose integrated military command and political leadership have adapted well to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Thus it remains the case today that, NATO's political procedures and practices were unmatched among security institutions in their design for intensive consultation, commitment to consensus, aversion to the appearance of disarray, and concrete capacity for implementation.

NATO AND NATO'S HELP REFORM THE TRANSCASPIAN.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

Nor is America the only provider of such assistance. Sweden and Finland have equipped and are continuing to equip almost 19 battalions of Baltic forces, and Finland and Sweden are not only equipping these forces but, along with the U.S. Army, are training them at institutions like the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. Turkey and U.S. military officer schools are also providing aid, assistance, and training to CIS officers and armies. Other NATO and American institutions like the Marshall Center and U.S. military colleges are deepening their contacts with CIS militaries. Thus other NATO members and institutions too are taking a leading role in strengthening security and deepening their military engagement throughout the CIS, even to the extent of organizing new security arrangements there. This applies in particular to Turkey and the Transcaucasus. These valuable training and advisory missions not only help inculcate Western notions of military order and professionalism, they provide much needed resources and examples for CIS forces, unlike the Russian forces in Chechnya or Tajikistan, and could provide a basis for helping states like Armenia and Azerbaijan to make peace. More professionalization should also foster a trend towards more rational military expenditures and force structures and help restrain them despite the presence of real threats so that nonmilitary sectors of these states' budgets are not wholly starved of resources. This dimension has been overlooked abroad, but there is no doubt that the terrorist insurgencies in Central Asia since 1999 have stimulated much higher military spending by governments who can ill afford to do so but see no other choice.
TRANSCASPalian CONFLICTS WILL SPREAD AND ESCALATE.
Stephen J. Blank, Congressional Information Services, Policy Papers, August 2002, Pg. L/N

These processes facilitate the intensifying interaction and mutual engagement with Western governments and Russia. They are and will be an essential instrument of further multilateral progress if the Transcaspian is to move from being a zone of war, as much of it now is, to being a zone of peace. Otherwise, the citizens of all the local governments and, indeed, in more distant lands will suffer the consequences of a breakdown in security and the creation of more black holes in the international order that resist any efforts at reconstruction. Analysts now warn that, if a new center for Islamic terrorism and extremism were to emerge, it would happen in a place resembling Afghanistan where a weak or failed government and an indigenous movement ideologically tied to religious extremism coexisted. In the CIS, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have recently been singled out as places where this scenario could come to pass. Others see Pakistan's decline into authoritarian rule since 1999 as a harbinger of what could be in the Third World and point directly to the breakdown of controls over police, military, intelligence, and terrorist forces, exactly what the program being suggested here aims to counteract. In fact, many CIS and other Third World regimes could easily become failing or failed states that materialize a truly Hobbesian nightmare vision where man is a wolf to man and where organized social life has broken down, seemingly with no hope of recovery. And while ideological fanaticism is essential for international terrorism to flourish, it is hardly necessary for any one failing or failed state to become a threat to its neighbors and more distant interlocutors. Nonetheless, the urgency of the situation in the southern CIS is compelling and could easily spread. Every state in the former Soviet Union is subject, albeit in varying degrees, to the pathologies that make for failing states and then spread abroad. Thus the spiraling criminality of Central Asia that also involves large-scale trafficking in narcotics and conventional weapons (mainly small arms), and several attempted cases of nuclear or other proliferations has now spread to take over crime in Russia's Far East. To the degree that these criminal elements and linked groups can gain control there, they will likely spread further into Russia and East Asia.
1. **PERMUTATION: DO BOTH. THE UN AND NATO HAVE COMPATIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATING.**

   M2 PRESSWIRE March 9, 2004, Pg. L/N

Let me start with our existing cooperation, which is wide-ranging both in terms of geography and the challenges involved. We have worked alongside each other in the Balkans for almost a decade. More recently that collaboration has been extended to Afghanistan. Here I would want to stress just one point: it is absolutely essential that we sustain these efforts over the long term. That is especially true of Afghanistan, where elections are approaching, and where sustained commitment and expanded engagement by NATO would make a real difference.

2. **NATO CAN'T INCREASE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.**

   The Frontrunner February 6, 2004 Friday

   The Wall Street Journal (2/6, Shishkin) reports, "Late last year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization started looking for help running the Kabul airport, a key hub of the alliance's peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Two months later, only two-thirds of the 250 jobs are filled. 'If you look at all the forces of NATO, at all the thousands and thousands of people, you'd think it would be easy,' says an official familiar with the effort. But recruitment has been hampered by a shortage of air-traffic controllers, salary concerns, time-consuming training -- and wariness about working in a recent war zone. As NATO seeks to expand its peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan, one of the most ambitious missions in the alliance's history, its airport difficulties underscore a lingering quandary: NATO's political commitment to succeed in Afghanistan often exceeds its ability to furnish personnel and equipment."

3. **THE PERMUTATION SOLVES THE IMPACT TO YOUR NET BENEFIT: UN & NATO COOPERATION KEY TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY. NATO/UN RELATIONS KEY TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY.**

   M2 PRESSWIRE March 9, 2004, Pg. L/N

   We also share concerns about the effectiveness of our collective security system. The war in Iraq, the terrorist attacks on the United States and other events of the past few years have revealed serious divergences of opinion on fundamental questions of policy and principle. To find a new consensus, and to equip us to deal with a newly uncharted security landscape, I have appointed a panel of eminent men and women from around the world to look at the issues involved. People have described this panel as a panel on UN reform. It may indeed propose changes in our rules and mechanisms. But if so, those changes will be a means to an end. The objective is to have a collective security system that acts effectively to deal with all global threats, and inspires confidence in all States. I hope to make recommendations to the General Assembly later this year or early in 2005.
4. No Impact to NATO collapse: Economic interdependence and democratic institutions will prevent war even if NATO collapses

Christopher Layne, consultant at Rand, 2001 (http://csis.org/europe/euroforum/v3n2.pdf)

Assuming that U.S. and European interests are diverging, an amicable separation now would be preferable to a messy divorce later. Moreover, if one accepts the premise that Europe has become less important to U.S. interests than Asia or the Persian Gulf, then one would also have to question NATO’s continuing relevance. To some, the alliance may even act as an obstacle in such issues of U.S. security policy as NMD. An alternative would be a transformed transatlantic relationship, based on the phased withdrawal of U.S. peacekeepers from the Balkans, U.S. acknowledgment of ESDP, European acceptance of NMD, and eventually, a withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Europe. Both sides can maintain all links (trade, political, etc.) and even a North Atlantic Treaty that would exclude the presence of an organization. NATO’s U.S. architects never intended it to be more than a temporary structure to aid Europe’s recovery from World War II. Now that Europe has developed into a democratic, prosperous, and institutionally sound region, the NATO-U.S.-EU relationship no longer seems to reflect current realities. Many actors on both sides of the Atlantic take exception to this proposal. Despite the growing stability in Europe and the absence of a hegemonic threat, many Americans believe they must protect what they spent the last 50 years building and cannot afford to leave this task to new and unproven structures. The United States can both support ESDP and maintain a presence in Europe. In addition, despite occasional disagreements such as over policy towards Iraq, one should not underestimate Europe’s role as a potential source of political support for U.S. actions around the globe.

5. NATO CAN’T HANDLE OUT-OF-AREA MISSIONS

Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

Though the North Atlantic Treaty limits when it can act, NATO still intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo and expanded its geographical reach. At a minimum, history should discourage NATO from conducting another "out-of-area" operation. Increasing NATO "out-of-area" missions is "the classic expression of an institution's instinct to survive and expand whatever the continued usefulness of its original function." Those who support NATO's intervention in Kosovo want to expand NATO's jurisdiction without amending the North Atlantic Treaty. Following that logic, NATO should prevent discrimination against ethnic minorities in the "Near-Abroad," or protect the Kurds from atrocities. After the Cold War, NATO had to go "out-of-area" or out of business. Having gone "out-of-area" twice with very limited success, however, NATO might go out of business.
6. TURN: COLLAPSE OF NATO IS GOOD. BETTER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE BORN.  
Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

The end of NATO will produce a Euro-centric security system. In turn, the Western European Union (WEU) should replace NATO as the primary security organization in Europe. Established by the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU is the security arm of the European Union (E.U.). Though it has limited utility for conflict resolution, the WEU draws upon tremendous military and financial resources from European nations. European nations now give the WEU greater support. In December 1999, E.U. leaders "vowed to develop by 2003 the ability to deploy up to 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain that force for up to a year." Additionally, an E.U. security mission has been proposed for Macedonia. European nations are recognizing that the E.U. must expand and NATO must contract. The WEU’s parent institution, the E.U., has a Court of Justice, a Parliament, and a Council - institutions that contribute to conflict resolution. As it expands, the E.U. should admit more members from central and eastern Europe. To achieve this goal, the E.U. must ease its membership criteria. The E.U.’s chief foreign policy adviser, Javier Solana, served as NATO’s Secretary-General; thus, the E.U. has a special link to NATO. Many E.U. members are also NATO members. Consequently, the E.U. is quite familiar with NATO training methods and logistics. The WEU is the best chance to preserve European security. It can develop into more than a “European pillar” of security. The WEU can draw upon NATO airfields and bases after the Atlantic Alliance shuts its doors. It can also adopt a simple charter based on a mutual security guarantee similar in spirit to Article 5. From the time when NATO’s members deliver their notices of denunciation to the time when the dissolution becomes final, NATO officials should consult with WEU officials on many issues. NATO should assist in this gradual transition. The end of NATO will decrease U.S. formal involvement in European security. As NATO disbands and the WEU achieves precedence in preserving European security, the United States will reduce its troop levels in Europe. This reduction in troops cannot occur too quickly. It is foolish, however, to believe that the United States will isolate itself from Europe by decreasing its formal involvement in European security. Instead, the United States will continue to be a good friend to European nations.
NATO CP ANSWERS: PERMUTATIONS

NATO CAN HELP WITH AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
M2 PRESSWIRE March 9, 2004, Pg. L/N

Looking to the future, NATO's increasing willingness to "go global" presents important opportunities, in particular for Africa. As you know, the Security Council has just authorized a new peace operation for Côte d'Ivoire. It is also likely that the year ahead will see other new peace operations in Africa, as well as in Haiti and possibly elsewhere. Should such a surge take place, stronger support from NATO would be tremendously helpful. Specifically, NATO might be employed in a "peace enforcement" role, much as the European Union deployed "Operation Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a bridging force before the deployment of a UN operation. NATO could also provide an "over-the-horizon" capacity, should the need arise for localized enforcement tasks.

NATO CAN SOLVE THE UN'S PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS.
M2 PRESSWIRE March 9, 2004, Pg. L/N

Second, as members or associate members of NATO, you represent an alliance whose unrivalled ability to deploy rapidly and robustly can have a major impact on the UN's work for peace and security. So I am pleased to have this opportunity to explore what more we can do together.

NATO/UN RELATIONS CAN SOLVE WMD AND TERRORISM.
M2 PRESSWIRE March 9, 2004, Pg. L/N

Of course, the UN-NATO relationship is not focused exclusively on peace operations. We also share a concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and about terrorism. I would welcome your thoughts on how to move ahead in this area, particularly in strengthening compliance with the multilateral treaties and addressing gaps in international coverage.
AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS TO NATO (ALONE) COUNTERPLAN: SOLVENCY ANSWERS

NATO and UN troops commit human rights abuses
Andrew Gray Reuters Mar 13, 2000

PRISTINA, Yugoslavia, March 13 (Reuters) - Amnesty International accused NATO and the United Nations on Monday of failing to observe high human rights standards in Kosovo. In a report focusing on an outbreak of violence last month in the volatile city of Mitrovica, the human rights organisation called for an independent inquiry into the fatal shooting of an ethnic Albanian man by the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force. It also said 49 people detained by French troops in the aftermath of the violence were kept in inhumane, cold and unsanitary conditions and denied rights such as being told of the reasons for their arrest and being given access to lawyers. Liz Griffin, an Amnesty field worker in Kosovo who co-wrote the report, said the organisation feared the abuses documented in Mitrovica pointed to broader failings on the part of KFOR and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which runs civilian affairs. "We are concerned that the violations that we observed that day in Mitrovica are illustrative of a wider pattern of disregard for human rights by KFOR and UNMIK while operating in the capacity of a law enforcement agency in Kosovo," she said. Even if NATO stops the fighting the UN will fail in the reconstruction of peace

NATO can't solve with the UN, Kosovo proves
The Daily Telegraph (UK) November 16th 1999

THE United Nations mission in Kosovo, responsible for setting up and running the civil administration in the war-ravaged province, has become bogged down by bureaucracy and incompetence and almost all its major projects are far behind schedule. Morale among mission members is at an all-time low, huge amounts of money are being wasted and ethnic Albanians and Serbs, infuriated by the incompetence of the administration, have largely taken the governing of the province into their own hands. Five months after Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav President, pulled his troops and police out of Kosovo, there is still no effective postal service or telephone network. Hundreds of criminals have been arrested but not a single case has been brought to court. The registration of civilians, cars and property, considered essential to setting up a governable state, has not yet begun. Organised crime is out of control. The murder rate is rising and elections scheduled for next spring have been postponed until the autumn. The registration of civilians, cars and property, considered essential to setting up a governable state, has not yet begun. Organised crime is out of control. The murder rate is rising and elections scheduled for next spring have been postponed until the autumn. Pristina's traffic management, electricity and water supply are all being run less efficiently than under the Serbian regime. Power and heating are off for at least half of the day and most of the streets are unlit. Multi-racial police teams patrolling in new red-and-white four-by-fours are derided as "Coca-Cola patrols" by locals. One had to be rescued by Nato soldiers after being attacked by Serbs. The inefficiencies of the UN mission - dismissed as a joke even by its own employees - have been emphasised by the relative success of Kfor, the Nato-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The UN was not originally considered for overseeing the reconstruction of Kosovo after its force performed badly in Bosnia, failing to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica. The European security body, the OSCE, would probably have been given the mission had the Serbs agreed to a peace plan tabled at Rambouillet in France in February but the UN was called in after the Russians intervened. Five months on the UN mission is a laughing stock. The Telegraph interviewed more than a dozen employees and few had anything good to say. One employee said: "Everything it touches goes wrong. The 'cover-my-ass' mentality rules. The thinking goes, 'this is not for the greater good of the organisation but at least I won't get fired'." Another, who is leaving after several years in different UN missions, said: "The whole thing is a joke. Even by the standards of other missions this one is going nowhere. Some people are gifted but they are just smothered by the incompetence of the system." Even when there is will there is not enough materials and personnel for NATO peacekeeping
Affirmative answers to NATO (alone) Counterplan: Solvency answers

NATO can’t solve because of a lack of burden sharing, Kosovo proves
Dr. Hulsman January 24, 2000

Almost all of NATO's problems in Kosovo stem from the two over-arching dilemmas of burden sharing and power sharing. Both have been present since NATO's founding in 1949, but the Soviet threat demanded that NATO de-emphasize these questions. The United States has always contributed more than its fair share to the alliance. During the Cold War, this was deemed a reasonable, if not a necessary, price to pay to preserve Western Europe from Soviet domination. With the Cold War's end, however, American geopolitical calculations have changed, while European defense habits have not. Kosovo illuminated this disparity: U.S. intelligence assets identified almost all the bombing targets in Serbia and Kosovo, U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the missions, and nearly every precision-guided missile used was launched from an American aircraft. The European contribution, overall, lacked computerized precision weapons and guidance systems, night-vision capabilities, and advanced communications equipment. The American general who oversaw the air operation curtailed European aircraft sorties to avoid unnecessary risk. By almost any measure, European military hardware is inferior to that available to the U.S. armed forces. Kosovo illustrated that the military gap is widening.

NATO failures in the past prove that even with a UN mandate PKOs will fail
The Times Union (Albany, NY) September 6, 2003 Saturday

Third, will U.N.-provided troops be able to handle the quasi-guerrilla war environment in Iraq? For that matter, when is the last time the United Nations did a quasi-guerrilla war well? Its supporters regularly point to the ongoing Bosnia and Kosovo missions as examples of how the U.N. can handle difficult peacekeeping missions. But the current success in Bosnia and Kosovo came after five years of quasi-combat during which the U.N. was a disaster. Bush critics studiously avoid discussing a more apt analogy, Somalia -- a nation-building mission that was actively opposed by at least one well-armed militia. In that case, the U.N. was largely a failure. The United States is, of course, counting on a U.N.-NATO operation to run Afghanistan, but it is too early to tell whether that will work. The plain truth is the U.N. does old-fashioned peacekeeping rather well, and neocolonial nation-building fairly well, but only when those missions are not significantly challenged by local militarized groups. If the critics are right that the problem in Iraq is security, then the U.N. is probably not the vehicle for addressing it.

The Congo proves if France is involved NATO can’t solve
The Boston Herald July 17, 2003

Gosh, maybe France could help solve Iraq's problems just as it has during the peacekeeping mission it has led on behalf of the European Union in the Congo. There, some 3 million have perished since war began five years ago and, according to the last report from Reuters, "Fighting still continues in the east of the vast central African country, and there are fears that the continued unrest could jeopardize the political settlement."
BOSNIA AND KOSOVO ARE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES THAT SHOW HOW NATO CAN'T ACT TO MAINTAIN PEACE.

Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

The conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo illustrate NATO's structural limitations. In Bosnia, NATO "failed year after year to take effective action." In Kosovo, NATO conducted what some commentators call an ineffective bombing campaign, NATO's legal authority to intervene in Kosovo is questionable. Though none of its members were attacked, NATO intervened under the general mantra of humanitarian intervention. Commentators have thoroughly debated the question of whether NATO's intervention in Kosovo was legal, and a full examination of the international legal dimensions of the Kosovo conflict is beyond this Comment's scope. At a minimum, however, the Kosovo conflict illustrates NATO's current identity crisis. If NATO follows the logic of its intervention in Kosovo, then many "out-of-area" missions will await NATO. Assuming that NATO's intervention in Kosovo "sets a new precedent of ethnic self-determination or humanitarian concern trumping national sovereignty," many candidates will appear at NATO's doorstep.

THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH PROVE THAT NATO IS OBSOLETE.

Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and vowed to help the United States combat international terrorism. Two ironies exist in this declaration. First, NATO invoked Article 5 after, not during, the Cold War. Second, NATO invoked Article 5 to defend the United States instead of Europe. Some commentators lauded NATO's Article 5 declaration as another step in NATO's "most creative transition" after the Cold War. This Comment takes a contrary view, and argues that the events following September 11th prove that NATO cannot function in the post-Cold War world. Long before September 11th, commentators debated NATO's relevance. Some argued that NATO was in transition, and was adapting into a political-military alliance. Others said that NATO is the best means to preserve peace in Europe. Finally, others wanted to preserve NATO merely for the sake of preservation. Former U.S. Senator George D. Aiken once stated that the United States should "declare victory and get out" of Vietnam. Having helped to win the Cold War without firing a shot, NATO should declare victory, disband over a ten-year period, and get out of Europe.

NATO IS DESIGNED FOR AN ADVERSARY THAT DOESN'T EXIST.

Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

NATO grew out of a bipolar security system. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union sought diplomatic and political gains at the other's expense. NATO's primary mission was collective defense - "protecting NATO members against possible attack." NATO succeeded because the Soviet Union knew the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on Europe. NATO symbolized the West's resolve to deter Soviet aggression. Thus, the Atlantic Alliance remains a creature of its time. It is a collective defense organization whose sole adversary no longer exists.

NATO CAN'T CONTRIBUTE TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM.

Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

Since the creation of NATO, however, the international system has changed. Presently, nations focus on security, which connotes many economic, political, and military threats. By contrast, defense indicates one particular threat. Thus, security is a broader concept. Because it was designed to focus primarily on defense, NATO is not useful in a security-oriented international system. The composition of coalitions varies from crisis to crisis in the post-Cold War world, conflict exists where the major powers find it. Nations devote more time to issues such as weapons proliferation, international terrorism, and economic crises. Recent events have forced nations to recognize the threat that international terrorism poses to world security. NATO cannot solve these problems because it cannot respond to an act of terrorism or to a regional conflict unless one of its members suffers an attack. With no intelligence capability of its own, NATO cannot contribute much to the fight against international terrorism.

Capitol Classic Starter Set Page 163 of 208

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATO CONSTRAINS THE DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.
Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

The longer NATO remains, the longer it constrains the defense capabilities of European nations. Concern has existed that European nations did not pay their "fair share" of NATO expenses. This concern reached its zenith during the 1980s. Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn sponsored an amendment proposing that 90,000 of the 360,000 U.S. troops in Europe "be withdrawn within five years unless the European allies increase their conventional forces." Even NATO's supporters recommended that European NATO members increase their participation in the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO BLOCKS EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION.
Michael M. Gallagher, Houston Journal of International Law, Winter 2003, pg. L/N

Though some have waxed poetic about a mutual commitment to a "Europe whole and free," the United States remains "the acknowledged locomotive perpetually lugging NATO into movement." This fact was plainly emphasized in Afghanistan, where "a new generation of U.S. military technology was on display, ... years ahead of what Europe has today." Simply put, NATO has perpetuated the European welfare state in security matters. As the capabilities gap between the United States and Europe widens, the stability of NATO will become further threatened. Yet European NATO members have shown much reluctance to spend money on defense matters. Both the Cold War and the East-West security divide have ended. European nations should follow the words of the "Sinatra doctrine" and "do it [their own] way" on defense matters. NATO must disband to enable European security integration.
Involving NATO risks European wars


And so the question resounds across the Atlantic: If the collective might of the United States and Western Europe can't stop a brushfire war in Bosnia, then what good is their grand alliance? That good is NATO? ""It's almost reached the point where NATO may be irrelevant," Sen. Bob Dole, R-Kan., said this week. ""If they can't do what they're prepared to do, then what is their real purpose? " A growing school of thought contends that NATO may be a relic from a time that's past, a military instrument no longer fit to fight the battles of the emerging post-Cold War era. ""I would phase it out over the next five to 10 years," said Ted Galen Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. Maintaining America's commitment to NATO and keeping 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe costs U.S. taxpayers $90 billion a year.

Carpenter contends that West Europeans have a larger collective economy than ours and can afford to pay for their own defense. He wrote a book published this week titled Beyond NATO and subtitled ""Staying Out of Europe's Wars."" But the real problem is not NATO itself; it is that the world around it has changed. NATO's member states no longer face a common enemy and so have lost the clarifying unity of common purpose. As a military instrument, NATO remains matchless; confusion and dispute over how to use it are what lie at the heart of today's debate.
Affirmative answers to NATO counter plan (Consultation)

NATO will say no because they can't get enough troops and material to solve Afghanistan
New Zealand Herald May 19, 2004
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3567294&thesection=news&thesubsection=world

BRUSSELS - Nato's secretary-general rapped allies on Tuesday for failing to offer planes and helicopters for an expansion of peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told envoys to the 26 allied nations that Nato risked missing its end-June deadline for setting up five military-civilian reconstruction teams in the north and west of the country, dealing a blow to its own credibility. NATO and UN troops engage in human rights violations

NATO’s consultation with Russia proves the US consults on peacekeeping now
Los Angeles Times November 19, 2002

Putin and Robertson said they were satisfied with the work of the NATO-Russia Council, a body set up in May that brings Moscow into full consultation with the allies on issues such as peacekeeping and terrorism. Critics fear that NATO and Russia are trying to paper over their differences. The council "created the false illusion that Russia can be regarded as a credible partner of the democratic world," Dobrovsky said. But Moscow, he insisted, "retains many of the old Soviet characteristics" even as Putin seeks "modernization at any price."

Consultation is normal means
BBC Monitoring International Reports November 14, 2003

At the regular half-yearly consultation, the most senior officers of the 19 NATO members and seven newcomers, also discussed forces for (peacekeeping) operations in BiH (Bosnia-Hercegovina) (Sfor (Stabilization Force)), Kosovo (Kfor (Kosovo Force)) and Afghanistan (Isaf (US-led International Security Assistance Force)). The participation of Slovene units in Bosnia will remain at the current level, Gen Lipic said. This includes a motorized unit in a multinational combat unit (86 soldiers), two military police platoons (49), a national support element (10), a medical unit (12) and an aviation-helicopter department (18) and, besides this, our country has also a representative in the Sfor command.

NATO consultation fails to create a consensus
Kamp, head of the foreign and security policy research section of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Karl-Heinz, Winter 1999
(The Washington Quarterly 1999 Winter Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 7)

Yet a closer examination of the arguments for broadening NATO's outreach reveals analytical weaknesses in the appeal to globalize the alliance. It is far from clear, for instance, who is going to define the common interests to be defended by a future NATO. U.S. global concerns do not necessarily coincide with the vital interests of the European allies, and even within Europe perceived challenges and preferences differ. Building a consensus for common military action beyond the obligation for self-defense stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will always be a very difficult process, as NATO's Bosnia engagement has conspicuously shown. Leaving aside those issues that are not directly connected to questions of security -- migration, the environment, overpopulation, and so forth -- the intersection of interests in fact boils down to two topics: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and stability in the Persian Gulf. Even these two challenges are much more likely to be tackled in a concrete crisis by an "ad hoc coalition of the willing" instead of within the NATO framework. Any formal extension of alliance obligations (for instance, by renegotiating the 1949 Washington treaty) is politically infeasible, not the least because some NATO partners might suspect that this would degrade NATO into serving as an instrument of U.S. global strategy. This would inevitably cause an anti-American reflex, particularly on the French side, which would further imperil all efforts to bring France back into NATO's military integration. At the same time, a vociferous discussion of NATO's globalization might endanger previous success at anchoring Russia firmly in Euro-Atlantic security structures, since Russia would surely view the broadening of NATO's strategic direction as a confrontational measure. Russia might even fear becoming a renewed target of a globalized NATO.
NATO has warned member states that if they do not deliver the troops and equipment promised months ago to the NATO force in Afghanistan, the alliance's peacekeeping mission could fail. Such a failure could damage NATO's credibility as it tries to establish a new role for itself in the post-Cold War era. NATO is struggling to be relevant in the 21 Century. Now an alliance of 26 countries, it took over command of a 6,500 international stabilization force in Afghanistan last year in a test of its ability to face up to new security threats far beyond the borders it was set up to defend during the Cold War. But NATO's mission in Afghanistan has run into problems. The alliance agreed to set up, by the end of next month, five reconstruction teams in the north and west of the country to provide security for aid workers and help rebuild Afghanistan. It has been unable to do so because member states have failed to deliver the personnel needed to staff the units. Even if some of those teams are set up in the coming weeks, the alliance still lacks back-up resources, like helicopters, transport aircraft and medical evacuation units that would facilitate NATO's stated goal of providing security outside the Afghan capital, Kabul, and extending the influence of the government of President Hamid Karzai into the provinces.
Affirmative answers to NATO (alone) Counterplan: Solvency answers

NATO and UN troops commit human rights abuses
Andrew Gray Reuters Mar 13, 2000

PRISTINA, Yugoslavia, March 13 (Reuters) - Amnesty International accused NATO and the United Nations on Monday of failing to observe high human rights standards in Kosovo. In a report focusing on an outbreak of violence last month in the volatile city of Mitrovica, the human rights organisation called for an independent inquiry into the fatal shooting of an ethnic Albanian man by the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force. It also said 49 people detained by French troops in the aftermath of the violence were kept in inhumane, cold and unsanitary conditions and denied rights such as being told of the reasons for their arrest and being given access to lawyers. Liz Griffin, an Amnesty field worker in Kosovo who co-wrote the report, said the organisation feared the abuses documented in Mitrovica pointed to broader failings on the part of KFOR and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which runs civilian affairs. "We are concerned that the violations that we observed that day in Mitrovica are illustrative of a wider pattern of disregard for human rights by KFOR and UNMIK while operating in the capacity of a law enforcement agency in Kosovo," she said. Even if NATO stops the fighting the UN will fail in the reconstruction of peace

NATO can’t solve with the UN, Kosovo proves
The Daily Telegraph (UK) November 16th 1999

THE United Nations mission in Kosovo, responsible for setting up and running the civil administration in the war-ravaged province, has become bogged down by bureaucracy and incompetence and almost all its major projects are far behind schedule. Morale among mission members is at an all-time low, huge amounts of money are being wasted and ethnic Albanians and Serbs, infuriated by the incompetence of the administration, have largely taken the governing of the province into their own hands. Five months after Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav President, pulled his troops and police out of Kosovo, there is still no effective postal service or telephone network. Hundreds of criminals have been arrested but not a single case has been brought to court. The registration of civilians, cars and property, considered essential to setting up a governable state, has not yet begun. Organised crime is out of control. The murder rate is rising and elections scheduled for next spring have been postponed until the autumn. Pristina's traffic management, electricity and water supply are all being run less efficiently than under the Serbian regime. Power and heating are off for at least half of the day and most of the streets are unlit. Multi-racial police teams patrolling in new red-and-white four-by-fours are derided as "Coca-Cola patrols" by locals. One had to be rescued by Nato soldiers after being attacked by Serbs. The inefficiencies of the UN mission - dismissed as a joke even by its own employees - have been emphasised by the relative success of Kfor, the Nato-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The UN was not originally considered for overseeing the reconstruction of Kosovo after its force performed badly in Bosnia, failing to prevent the massacre at Srebrenica. The European security body, the OSCE, would probably have been given the mission had the Serbs agreed to a peace plan tabled at Rambouillet in France in February but the UN was called in after the Russians intervened. Five months on the UN mission is a laughing stock. The Telegraph interviewed more than a dozen employees and few had anything good to say. One employee said: "Everything it touches goes wrong. The 'cover-my-ass' mentality rules. The thinking goes, 'this is not for the greater good of the organisation but at least I won't get fired'." Another, who is leaving after several years in different UN missions, said: "The whole thing is a joke. Even by the standards of other missions this one is going nowhere. Some people are gifted but they are just smothered by the incompetence of the system." Even when there is will there is not enough materials and personnel for NATO peacekeeping
Affirmative answers to NATO (alone) Counterplan: Solvency answers

NATO can’t solve because of a lack of burden sharing, Kosovo proves
Dr. Hulsman January 24, 2000

Almost all of NATO's problems in Kosovo stem from the two over-arching dilemmas of burden sharing and power sharing. Both have been present since NATO's founding in 1949, but the Soviet threat demanded that NATO de-emphasize these questions. The United States has always contributed more than its fair share to the alliance. During the Cold War, this was deemed a reasonable, if not a necessary, price to pay to preserve Western Europe from Soviet domination. With the Cold War's end, however, American geopolitical calculations have changed, while European defense habits have not. Kosovo illuminated this disparity: U.S. intelligence assets identified almost all the bombing targets in Serbia and Kosovo, U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the missions, and nearly every precision-guided missile used was launched from an American aircraft. The European contribution, overall, lacked computerized precision weapons and guidance systems, night-vision capabilities, and advanced communications equipment. The American general who oversaw the air operation curtailed European aircraft sorties to avoid unnecessary risk. By almost any measure, European military hardware is inferior to that available to the U.S. armed forces. Kosovo illustrated that the military gap is widening.

NATO failures in the past prove that even with a UN mandate PKOs will fail
The Times Union (Albany, NY) September 6, 2003 Saturday

Third, will U.N.-provided troops be able to handle the quasi-guerrilla war environment in Iraq? For that matter, when is the last time the United Nations did a quasi-guerrilla war well? Its supporters regularly point to the ongoing Bosnia and Kosovo missions as examples of how the U.N. (deputizing NATO) can handle difficult peacekeeping missions. But the current (mixed) success in Bosnia and Kosovo came after five years of quasi-combat during which the U.N. was a disaster. Bush critics studiously avoid discussing a more apt analogy, Somalia -- a nation-building mission that was actively opposed by at least one well-armed militia. In that case, the U.N. was largely a failure. The United States is, of course, counting on a U.N.-NATO operation to run Afghanistan, but it is too early to tell whether that will work. The plain truth is the U.N. does old-fashioned peacekeeping rather well, and neocolonial nation-building fairly well, but only when those missions are not significantly challenged by local militarized groups. If the critics are right that the problem in Iraq is security, then the U.N. is probably not the vehicle for addressing it.

The Congo proves if France is involved NATO can’t solve
The Boston Herald July 17, 2003

Gosh, maybe France could help solve Iraq's problems just as it has during the peacekeeping mission it has led on behalf of the European Union in the Congo. There, some 3 million have perished since war began five years ago and, according to the last report from Reuters, "Fighting still continues in the east of the vast central African country, and there are fears that the continued unrest could jeopardize the political settlement."
Involving NATO risks European wars

And so the question resounds across the Atlantic: If the collective might of the United States and Western Europe can't stop a brushfire war in Bosnia, then what good is their grand alliance? What good is NATO? ""It's almost reached the point where NATO may be irrelevant," Sen. Bob Dole, R-Kan., said this week. ""If they can't do what they're prepared to do, then what is their real purpose?" A growing school of thought contends that NATO may be a relic from a time that's past, a military instrument no longer fit to fight the battles of the emerging post-Cold War era. ""I would phase it out over the next five to 10 years,"" said Ted Galen Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. Maintaining America's commitment to NATO and keeping 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe costs U.S. taxpayers $90 billion a year. Carpenter contends that West Europeans have a larger collective economy than ours and can afford to pay for their own defense. He wrote a book published this week titled Beyond NATO and subtitled ""Staying Out of Europe's Wars."" But the real problem is not NATO itself; it is that the world around it has changed. NATO's member states no longer face a common enemy and so have lost the clarifying unity of common purpose. As a military instrument, NATO remains matchless; confusion and dispute over how to use it are what lie at the heart of today's debate.
BORDERS CRITIQUE
AND AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS

THE CAPITOL CLASSIC DEBATE INSTITUTE
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BORDERS COACHING GUIDE

Introduction

John Harely is the academic who is often cited as the founder of critical cartography. He argued that the instrumental use of maps was merely a means of reinforcing hegemonic and authoritarian control of space. The argument is that maps were drawn by those in power and are used to partition areas of the world to ways that best suit hegemonic powers. As with many critiques, Critical Cartography questions the existence and use of power.

Links

The main link story is that the Affirmative reinforces the norm of using borders to separate people. They function from the center of the map and perpetrate the extension of hegemonic powers over the rest of the world.

Even if they do not run a country specific Affirmative, the mention of a specific nation state such as the United States and the use of a body that is predicated on cartographic divisions only serves to reinforce cartography.

Make sure that you use the links to beat the permutation. Your arguments need to be that any endorsement of borders only leads to cartographic violence so even if they say do the plan and embrace the Critique, you can say their use/endorsement of the UN just recreates a system of domination.

Impacts

The Borders K impacts are pretty simple. Drawing and endorsing borders creates disputes over those borders and increases violence. The end impact could be extinction and/or genocide. The real trick is to make sure that you are winning both a turn to the case and an external impact.

Further, the discursive side of the Borders K is pretty good. Use evidence that talks about how the rhetoric of borders and cartography is the impetus for violent struggle and used to justify horrible killings and war. You can also use this to defend against any affirmative permutation.

Answering the Borders K

First and foremost, the Affirmative should make a permutation to this critique. Getting out of some form of link is very difficult and arguing that the plan plus the alternative may be the path of least resistance. There are plenty of authors who respond to the Border K and say that you have to take action too. You can augment these arguments with general “Praxis” or “Pragmatism” evidence as well.

Second, go after the alternative. While borders may be a bad thing, the chances are that there is not much of an alternative to embrace. At best it is hopelessly Utopian and devoid of any practical solution. This argument in combination with the permutation make for a devastating Affirmative attack: Only by doing the permutation can you reject borders and act to stop violence spurred by them.
## BORDERS INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INC Shell</td>
<td>174 – 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Recognizing Boundaries</td>
<td>177 – 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Conflicts W/In Borders</td>
<td>179 – 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: International Relations</td>
<td>182 – 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: AIDS</td>
<td>184 – 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links: Refugees</td>
<td>186 – 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: War Obsfuscation</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: Violence</td>
<td>189 – 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: War</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts: Genocide</td>
<td>193 – 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative: Rethinking</td>
<td>195 – 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Calculus</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT: Permutations</td>
<td>198 – 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Answers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2AC Front Line</td>
<td>200 – 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permutation Extensions</td>
<td>204 – 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The K Fails</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silencing Turn</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The K Contradicts</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BORDERS:  INC SHELL

A. LINKS: GEOGRAPHY IS BORN OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM. ALTHOUGH MAPS WERE DRAWN A LONG TIME AGO, THE WEST STILL USES BORDERS TO ENFORCE ITS WILL.


Though the term geopolitics has been in use for less than a century, the general history of geographical discourse has been a deeply political one (Livingstone, 1993). Geography is a practice that gained its identity from the Western imperializing project of surveying, mapping and cataloguing the earth. From the fifteenth century onwards, Western expansionism produced a "world" measured and defined by Western systems of signification. The mathematical systems constructed upon notions of Euclidian space gave rise to systems of calibration which measured the earth in terms of European scales (the French metric system, the British imperial system). The Linnean-inspired science of natural history in the seventeenth century created a table of classification which European explorers projected onto territories they considered "blank" (Pratt, 1992). The scientific surveying of figures like Alexander von Humboldt was made possible by earlier projects of military surveying which enabled territories to be conquered and subdued. The continued maintenance of colonial empires, and their later encroachment into the interiors of Africa in the middle nineteenth century, was dependent upon the persistent generation of surveys and maps of all sorts: navigational, military, topographical, economic, demographic, scientific and political. The maintenance of empire depended on a will to knowledge about places, territories and populations. European science understood its knowledge to be an objective account of the earth, a form of knowledge which described that which was supposedly independent of thought. Maps were considered to be mirrors of nature, cartographic projections of the reality of territory (Harley, 1992; Rorty, 1979). Though the historical circumstances surrounding the production of surveys has changed in the twentieth century, the Western will to survey the territories of the globe has remained. This will is institutionalized in a multiplicity of different sites in political and civil society, sites which enable the sighting (recognition and rendering visible), sitting (the delimiting of global political space; e.g. the "Middle East," "Eastern Europe", etc) and citing of a world (the judging and textualizing of places by means of literatures of Orientalism, developmentalism, Sovietology, etc.) (Luke, 1993; O Tuathail, forthcoming). It finds expression, for example, in the cybernetic "watching machines" of late modern states (spy satellites, electronic surveillance regimes, photographic intelligence, etc.) and in Western mass media organizations whose dispersed networks of reporters, electronic systems of access and global televsional eyes function as the surveying infrastructure of informational empire (Virilio, 1989; De Landa, 1991). Built upon enormous electronic and cybernetic streams of data, the panoptic surveying eyes of spy satellites and the global media (from print to the instantaneous global television of CNN) promise the possibility of a world order which more transparent than ever before (Vattimo, 1992). New cybernetic surveying technologies hold out the possibility of an ever more exact reproduction of reality, of an increasingly total identity of map and territory. Indeed, as has been widely noted, the forms of reality generated by the technologies associated with the new mode of information make the very notion of the referent problematic (Poster, 1990). In typically hyperbolic terms, Baudrillard has suggested that traditional principles of representational survey are giving way to principles of simulation, of representation without reference to an originary "real." Territory, he proclaims, "no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map which precedes the territory...it is the map that engenders the territory" (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 2).
FURTHERMORE, ACTIONS WITHIN BORDERS REINFORCE STRUCTURES THAT CREATE VIOLENCE.
Gearoid Tuathail, Assistant Professor of Geography Virginia Tech, Critical Geopolitics, 1996, pg. 1 – 2

Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space.

TUTHAIL CONTINUES

The results in many instances were violent, as the jurisdictional ambitions of royal authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. Within the context of this struggle, the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name “geography” in the early modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. To the opponents of the expansionist court, “geography” was a foreign imposition, a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along lines established by royal authority.

B. THE IMPACT IS CULTURAL WARS, GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING AND WAR.
Gearoid Tuathail, Assistant Professor of Geography Virginia Tech, Critical Geopolitics, 1996, pg. 1 – 2

More than five hundred years later, this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the one hand and rebellious margins and dissident cultures on the other hand is still with us. While almost all of the land of the earth has now been territorialized by states, the processes by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested. From Chechnya to Chiapas, and from Rondonia to Kurdistan and East Timor, the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the contradictions marginalized peoples and nations. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement. Indeed, the rise in the absolute numbers of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place.

TUTHAIL CONTINUES

More recently, genocide in Rwanda left over 500,000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refugees from that state into surrounding states. Refugees continue to be generated by “ethnic cleansing” campaigns in the Balkans; economic collapse in Cuba; ethnic wars in the Caucasus; state repression in Guatemala, Turkey and Indonesia, Iraq and Sudan; and xenophobic terror in many other states. Struggles over the ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics.
C. THE ALTERNATIVE: REJECT THE NOTIONS OF BORDERS AND EMBRACE OPEN SPACE. IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT CYCLES OF CARTOGRAPHIC VIOLENCE.
Michael Shapiro, Professor Political Science, University of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, 1997

To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific imagination, it is nevertheless the case that “the cartographer’s categories,” as J.B. Harley has put it, “are the basis of the morality of the map.” “Morality” here emerges most significantly from the boundary and the naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a “topographical amnesia.” Effacements of older maps in contemporary namings and configurations amount to a non-recognition of older, often violently displaced practices of identity and space.
Their acceptance of borders reifies the dominant system of the status quo and defines human identities according to a nation-state system.
Anssi Passi, Professor of Geography at the University of Norway at Oulo, 1998, ["The Role of Identities and Boundaries in the Contemporary World," Nordic-Baltic Conference in Regional Science, October]

Geographers have not traditionally paid much attention to the meanings of boundaries in the construction, organization and reproduction of social life, identities, territorality and power, but rather have understood boundaries as forming categories of their own and then classified them on diverging grounds. The state-centered system of territories and boundaries largely defines how we understand and represent the world and how knowledge of the geography of the world is produced, organized and used in the reproduction of the nation-state system. This maintains that all individuals should belong to a nation and have a national identity and state citizenship and that the bordered state sovereignties are the fulfillment of a historical destiny. This view has become pivotal in defining not only our world-views but also human identities.

ACKNOWLEDGING BORDERS ONLY SERVES TO CODIFY THE DOMINANT STATE.
Michael J Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, Challenging Boundaries Global Flows. Territorial Identities, 1996

As Harold Garfinkel pointed out in an analysis of a society's gender boundaries, what is taken to be the "normal" is also taken as the morally correct. George brings this insight into the global arena. By theorizing the state sovereignty system as the normal frame for global political life, realists have constructed an "international relations" that is less a science than it is a moral mapping of spaces and identities. Moreover, it is a partisan projection that has closed off effective critique by constructing itself within a scientific epistemology that radically separates fact and theory, subject and object, and act an value. With its restriction of global life to state jurisdictions and its dream of a totalizing approach to theory, mainstream international relations theory has been insensitive to morally driven spatial predicates of its gaze. It has also been temporally insensitive, mistaking a particular historical power configuration for a historical destiny rather than a relatively recent and more violently produced system of control

The affirmative's framing of the case in terms of national boundaries crowds out extraterritorial discourses

In short, the language of jurisdictional argument matters, because language both communicates social meaning and, by circumscribing the ways in which communication takes place, creates meaning. n97 The jurisdictional discourse at once reflects a belief in a shared set of interpretive commitments and creates, through consistent use, the belief itself. As one commentator has stated: "A society masks the differentiation within itself by using or imposing a common set of symbols." n98 In the jurisdictional discourse, territory, citizenship, and the national interest are these common symbols. In addition to creating natural categories, the jurisdictional language orders an unstable world in a way that controls and shuts out alternative forms of discourse. n99 Underlying the legal regime's reliance on national classifications is a belief in shared values and a collective good circumscribed by national boundaries. By trumpeting a jurisdictional determination as the product of the collective good, the language of jurisdictional argument hinders an individual's ability to express multiple solidarities or to dissent from a determination viewed as neither collective nor good. In so doing, the jurisdictional language frustrates the expression of an individual's varied interests and competing conceptions of community and embellishes a belief in a bounded and coherent nation that is, in fact, only "imagined." n100
BORDERS: LINKS: RECOGNIZING BOUNDARIES

BOUNDARIES NOW DEFINE THE PEOPLE, NO THE OTHER WAY AROUND.
Jeffrey Herbst, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 2000 [States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton University Press, p. 145]

Political geographers and others have been unable to undertake constructive and systematic analyses concerning the implications of the design of nations because they lack an analytic foundation to approach the problem. However, the perspective developed in this book-especially that population distribution is the critical political challenge facing state builders in Africa-opens the door to explaining how the size and shape of nations affects the consolidation of power. Shapes and sizes are not important in and of themselves; rather, what is critical is the particular population distribution that they present to national leaders. As Gottmann noted in what became a classic study, "it is the organization of a territory by its population that counts more than any other feature of." In the pre-colonial era, population distributions yielded boundaries. In the modern era, boundaries define a people.

CARTOGRAPHIC DISPLAYS ON REINFORCE THE NORM OF THE COLLECTIVE JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, '97. (Michael J, Violent Cartographies.)

Geography is inextricably linked to the architecture of the enmity. But rather than an exogenous "explanatory variable," it is a primary part of the ontology of a collective Along with various ethnographic imaginaries-the ethnoscapess that are a part of geographic imaginations-it constitutes a fantasy structure implicated in how territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings of self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as threats or antagonist. Grammatically, then it is appropriate for me to recognize cartographic violence instead of speaking of the geographic causes of violence.

LOOKING AT BORDERS AS FIXED ITEMS PERPETRATES DOMINANCE.
Dr. Gerard Toal, associate professor of technology at Virginia Tech he received his PhD in geography from Syracuse, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996)

The term "geopolitics" is a convenient fiction, an imperfect name for a set of practices within the civil societies of the Great Powers that sought to explain the meaning of the new global conditions of space, power, and technology. It names not a singularity but a multiplicity, an ensemble of heterogeneous intellectual efforts to think through the geographical dimensions and implications of the transformative effects of changing technologies of transportation, communications, and warfare on the accumulation and exercise of power in the new world order of "closed space." Like other forms of geo-power, these writings were governmentalized forms of geographical knowledge, imperial rightings from an unquestioned center of judgment that sought to organize and discipline what was increasingly experienced as unitary global space into particularistic regimes of nationalist, ideological, racial, and civilizational truth. Circulating within the developing media of civil society (which ranged from elite markets for scholarly books to the yellow journalism of jingoistic newspapers), these discourses were motivated attempts to frame the spectacle and flux of the new global political scene within the terms of imperialistic and militaristic agendas, agendas actively cultivated and pushed by political, economic, and bureaucratic interest groups within the state-societies of the Great Powers.
With the development of the modern state and along with it of specifically military institutions and their legal bureaucratic and political interfaces, the ontological dimension of warfare becomes dissimulated by a web of practical and discursive relations. The violent arm of the state is not directly connected with the state's articulations. In short, we are thrown off the trail of the ontological engine of warfare by the dominance of the legal, political, and bureaucratic discourses through which the state represents the harmony of its order. This institutional obfuscation has been accompanied by a discursive practice at the center of modern political orientations. Since Hobbes raised nonwar to the privileged position in the order of the state, warfare has been regarded as an aberration, a failure of politics rather than a result of the individual and collective identity drives that constitute the domain of the political. Nevertheless, warfare in the modern state remains constitutive of its identity practices, Enemy/others are ontologically just as important to the state society as they were to the prestate society. The primary difference is that the prestate society did not segregate its military operations in the same way the state society did. It is necessary, therefore, to over come the dissimulating political discourse of the modern state with an ethnographic one that will show the ways in which individual and collective modern bodies constitute themselves through war. To recognize this relationship, however, it is important to look at it within a context in which the individual body is differently constituted. For this purpose, the Hurons serve admirably.

EXPLAINING CONFLICT THROUGH THE LENS OF THE STATE CUTS OFF ALTERNATIVE MODES OF THOUGHT.

Michael J. Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, 1997

Clearly the persistence of the strategic view is owed to more than reasons of state. Identity-related territorial commitments and the cartographic imaginaries they produce at the level of representation are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition. The nation-state and its related world of Others persists in policy discourses because of ontological impulses that are dissimulated in strategic policy talk, articulations in which spatial predicates are unproblematic. To foreground the significance of ontology in warring violence and to head the cartographic predicates of self-Other interpretations, space must be treated explicitly as a matter of practice. Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focusing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressed-the familiar focus of war and security studies-the emphasis must be on the practices, discursive and otherwise, for constructing space and identity, on the ways that the self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. This emphasis requires an ethnographical rather than a strategic approach to war, or, more specifically, ethnographic inquiries into how war is located among contending forces at social and cultural levels rather than strategic inquiries into how war is conducted logistically. While strategic approaches to warfare tend to be explanatory in emphasis (and indeed tend to suppress their interpretive predicates), an ethnographic focus is more concerned with the interpretive practices that sustain the antagonistic predicates of war. Moreover, a critical ethnography attempts to disrupt dominant interpretations by locating the silenced remains of various discourses. Rather than naturalizing the boundaries by which states maintain their control over the representations of global issues, the focus involves both criticism and recovery. It is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence, and second at disclosing other forms of affiliation uncoded in state-oriented interpretations.
FOCUS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ONLY SERVES STATECENTERED NOTIONS OF CARTOGRAPHY.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, '97. (Michael J, Violent Cartographies.)

Geographic imaginaries are especially central to my analyses as I attempt to unread one that is particularly dominant. My investigations seek to counter a preoccupation with international enmities: An emphasis on international violence presupposes the institutionalization of the dominant nation-state geographic imaginary, organized on the basis of national boundaries, this map privileges international violence as an almost exclusive subject matter; other forms of war escape analysts' attempts at conceptual mastery, for their grasps are energized by their cartographic commitments. Certainly many identifiable enmities and violent engagements are "international," but rather than treating the way nations produce defensive and offensive strategies, I treat the way the discourse on war to be exhausted by a framing of the world terms of state practices of violence.

DEFINING CONFLICTS IN TERMS OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS MASKS THE TRUE CAUSES OF CONFLICT.
Michael Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, 1999
["The Ethics Of Encounter", Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics And World Politics, editors Michael Shapiro and David Campbell (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minneapolis Press, 1999) ]

For example, a recent analysis in this discursive genre, one that is both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that "conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes," nevertheless has reinstalled the dominance of geopolitical thinking by remaining within its cartography and conceptual legacy. Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of "intervention" as a reaffirmation of a sovereignty discourse, they refer to "the Persian Gulf War" on the one hand and "insurgencies" on the other. As Bernard Nietschmann has shown, the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and unmapping the geoeconomic cartography of "international relations," Nietschmann refers to "the Third World War," which is "hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map," a war in which "only one side of the fighting has a name." Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann maps 120 armed struggles as part of the "war." Only four of his wars involve confrontations between states; seventy-seven involve states against nations. In order to think beyond the moral boundaries constituted by a sovereignty commitment, it is necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moral thinking thereby grant recognition outside of modernity's dominant political identities. This must necessarily also take us outside the primary each that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory.
BORDERS: LINKS: CONFLICTS WITHIN BORDERS

THE NOTIONS OF STATECENTERED VIOLENCE BEGETS MORE VIOLENCE.
Michael J. Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies: Mapping; Cultures of war, 1997

Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geopolitical map of states, the more general discourses of international affairs and international relations continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructed within a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography.

The representation of war shapes the self-interpretation of people included or excluded by imaginary boundaries.
Michael Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, '97.

All analyses and accounts of past wars share at least one attribute: they are performances that enter the interpretive struggles through which the history of a people is constructed. To locate a war in a people's memoryscape is among other things to engage in a politics of interpretation. But the grammar of this sentence is misleading because there are significant ambiguities involved in identifying a "people" for whom a collective memory can be created; there are no definitive boundaries of the "people for whom war histories have resonance. Indeed, the process of fixing stories of past violent encounters plays a role in shaping the spaces and events that constitute the basis for being a "people." Those histories that manage to attain a level of dominance and stability create the imaginative boundaries that contain a people; they exert an influence on the self interpretations and modes of inclusion and exclusion of the people Te who embrace them. They provide the contexts for valued models of subjectivity or identity, for the proprieties of various collective actions such as committing the national body to war, and for constructing a spatial imaginary-the configuration of the world-within which actions have meaning.

DISCUSSIONS OF SUPERPOWER CONFLICT ONLY SERVE TO CONCEAL THE NOTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND WARFARE.
Michael Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, '97.

However, as reasons of state have overcoded the personal and collective, spiritual commitments behind violence, they have also monopolized the historical narratives within which warfare is currently understood. Most significantly, the tendency has been to represent modern war as solely an extension of state policy and as a less and less frequent resort. Why the dominance of this interpretation when a relatively dispassionate historical over-view reveals that (1) "the twentieth century has already been established itself as the most bellicose in human history" and (2) "the nuclear age has not slowed the centuries-old trend toward more frequent, deadlier wars." One answer is that the contemporary account sheet privileges wars among the great powers and classifies other deadly quarrels as non warfare. The answer needs elaboration in terms of practices as well as discourse, however. First, the historical trend whereby the state has increasingly monopolized violence must be recognized. Since the seventeenth century ... rulers have managed to shift the balance decisively against both individual citizens and rival power holders within their own states. They have made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms, have outlawed private armies, and have made it seem normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians. Thus within the state, the rivalous violent struggles have lost their warfare-oriented coding as state social control and policing discourses dominate historical narratives. Then, as the international system came to be dominated by powerful states and their allies, the international discourse on warfare has been dominated by their narratives. And, most importantly, discourses that have dominated in the modern era are political discourses.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IS USED TO DEFINE THE OTHER WITHIN BORDERS.
Jim George, senior lecturer in international relations University of Australia, Canberra, Challenging Boundaries

Given the nature of the earlier discussion, there should be no surprise about the fact that postmodernists are at the forefront of a proliferating critical social theory literature aimed at the primitive reading/writing practices of neo-realism. Nor is it surprising that as critical literature of this kind becomes more widely available the responses of an entrenched mainstream are exposed as primitive to increasing numbers of International Relations scholars in the current generation. It has been in this context, therefore, and to a greater extent than other critical social theory approaches, that postmodernism has exposed International Relations for what it is: a textual tradition become "reality"; a particular reading of (Western) philosophy and history, become transhistorical transcultural "fact"; a way of framing "meaning" and "knowing" shaped by Newtonian physics and Cartesian rationalism, become meaning and knowing in the world of nuclear weapons, AIDS, and ozone depletion. What postmodernism has exposed, more directly, is International Relations as a discursive process: a process by which identities are formed, meaning is given, and status and privilege are accorded; a process by which threats to identity and its meaning are both disciplined and punished; a process of knowledge as power.

THE POWER OF THE NATION STATE IN IR THEORY REENTRENCHES THE NOTION OF BORDERS.
Jim George, senior lecturer in international relations University of Australia, Canberra, Challenging Boundaries

This insight on Havel's part is significant because in its representation of dominant modern theory/practice-as the pursuit of objectivity, omnipotence, and control-it helps relocate International Relations as part of a much larger discursive enterprise that has seen a singular, homogenous, and narrowly focused image of human social life defined, primarily, in terms of the (Western) European Enlightenment become transformed into a universalized and essentialized doctrine of human– per se. In an International Relations context the result has been a crude (positivist- based) realism that has reduced complex and turbulent global experience to a patterned and rigidly ordered framework of understanding derived from a particular representation of post-Renaissance European history, articulated in orthodox Anglo-American philosophical terms. Under U.S. social – scientific tutelege since World War II, this realism has continued to determine the boundaries of legitimate theory research and the art of the possible in policy terms.
Modern International Relations Are Predicated On The Assumption of the State/Map Mindset

Michael Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, "The Ethics Of Encounter", Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics And World Politics, editors Michael Shapiro and David Campbell (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minneapolis Press, 1999) p//60

At present, one particular spatial story is blocking alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the state-oriented, geopolitical map, the discourses of "international affairs" and "international relations" continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Analyses of global violence tend to be constructed within a state-centric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and cross boundary. Ethical approaches aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography.
BORDERS: LINKS: AIDS

WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO CURE AIDS ONLY SERVES TO DEFINE BOUNDARIES.
Cindy Patton, assistant professor school of Theater and Communication at Temple University, Philadelphia, C:hallen in Boundaries: Global Flows Territorial Indentities, [Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minneapolis Press, 1996 p. 368-69

Tropical medicine wedded imperial notions of health and geography to the bourgeois notion of the domestic as a space within a space " (the public). Colonial movement is bidirectional along a single axis; movement into the constructed domestic space of the colony is always accompanied by nostalgia for "going home." Tropical medicine relies on a diasporal imaginary of displacement and return that presumes that local diseases do not affect indigenous people in the same way that they affect the Euro-American occupier. A tropical disease is always proper to a place, to there, but only operates as disease when it afflicts people from here. Pathogens in a locale achieve historicity only when consolidated as disease in the colonist's body. The colonist's ailing body is heroic, not the victim of his or her dislocation but the most intimate site for domesticating the tropics. Tropical disease is contained by virtue of already being there, in the "tropics": even if he could not always get well, the colonist could always go home. Critically, the very idea of tropical medicine rests on the ability to reliably separate an indigenous population perceived to be physically hearty but biologically inferior from a colonizing population to the biologically superior even while subject to the tropical illnesses. Sustaining this medical paradox requires perpetually refilling the category "exotic ailment." Tropical medicine grows out of and supports the idea that the first-world body is the proper gauge of health the third world is the location of disease, even while its occupants are not the subjects of tropical medicine. Tropical medicine, then is ostensive, a pointing that presupposes a map and hierarchy of bodies.

BY DECLARING FOREIGN PEOPLES DISEASED CREATES THE CATEGORY OF THE OTHER STRENGTHING DOMINATION.
Cindy Patton, assistant professor school of Theater and Communication at Temple University, Philadelphia, C:hallen in Boundaries: Global Flows Territorial Indentities, [Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minneapolis Press, 1996 p. 368-69

Epidemiology, on the other hand, is performative. By separating pathogens from the body, epidemiology enables itself to declare disease from some but not all conjunctures of body/pathogen. Less concerned than tropical medicine to detail the diseases that may be fall the Euro-American body in a place, epidemiology visualizes the place of the body in the temporal sequence called "epidemic." It is no longer the body fighting disease that is heroic, but epidemiology, the "disease detective," which alone has the power to visualize and disrupt the "natural history" of germs' vectorial movement. An "epidemic" is more cases than expected, a deceptively simple definition that hides the messy truth that declaring an epidemic depends on cultural perceptions about who is likely to be-sick and to what degree. Epidemiology reverses tropical medicine's concern with who may fall sick by removing disease from the natural environment and placing it in the body_. Instead of viewing tropical inhabitants as _more or less immune to the diseases that surround them, indigenes are now themselves-the location of disease reservoirs, carriers; poverty is no longer “natural” but an assault on the middle class. Epidemiology defines the boundaries of a disease by constituting a category of subject ("risk group"), an imagined community produced through vectors that epidemiology simulates as though discovered. Bodies are at once subject to and perpetrators of pathology, both "sick" and reservoirs or carriers in the larger network of disease.
ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE DISEASE REINFORCE OTHERIZATION AND MASKS DOMINATION.
Cindy Patton, assistant professor school of Theater and Communication at Temple University, Philadelphia, C:hallen in Boundaries: Global Flows Territorial Indentities, [Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minneapolis Press, 1996 p. 368-69

Epidemiology, on the other hand, is performative. By separating pathogens from the body, epidemiology enables itself to declare disease from some but not all conjunctures of body/pathogen. Less concerned than tropical medicine to detail the diseases that may fall the Euro-American body in a place, epidemiology visualizes the place of the body in the temporal sequence called "epidemic." It is no longer the body fighting disease that is heroic, but epidemiology, the "disease detective," which alone has the power to visualize and disrupt the "natural history" of germs' vectorial movement. An "epidemic" is more cases than expected, a deceptively simple definition that hides the messy truth that declaring an epidemic depends on cultural perceptions about who is likely to be sick and to what degree. Epidemiology reverses tropical medicine's concern with who may fall sick by removing disease from the natural environment and placing it in the body. Instead of viewing tropical inhabitants as more or less immune to the diseases that surround them, indigenes are now themselves-the location of disease reservoirs, carriers; poverty is no longer "natural" but an assault on the middle class. Epidemiology defines the boundaries of a disease by constituting a category of subject ("risk group"), an imagined community produced through vectors that epidemiology simulates as though discovered. Bodies are at once subject to and perpetrators of pathology, both "sick" and reservoirs or carriers in the larger network of disease.
BORDERS: LINKS: REFUGEES

REFUGEES ARE CONSIDERED THREATS TO THOSE WHO LIVE WITHIN BORDERS AND JUSTIFIES STATE ACTION TO RID THEMSELVES OF THE PROBLEM.


In other instances, they are written as representing the anarchy of the outside of the domestic sphere. Here, the domain of refugees and migrants becomes a security threat and the signifier of disorderliness, whereas the domestic (inside) sphere is perceived to be the embodiment of peace and security. Refugees and migrants are seen to be the transmitters of/from anarchy of the outside. Large influxes are therefore presented to be a security threat to the peacefulness and the civilization of the inside. The efforts to construct the citizen (as constitutive of domestic community) by constructing an inadequate refugee or a migrant (a non-citizen) are directed in the final analysis at affirming the "sovereignty claims" that there exists a coherent domestic community from which the state receives its legitimacy and authority, and on whose behalf the state acts. As suggested, the very refugee or migrant bodies, which, while at first undermining, for instance, a state's ability to produce the claim that it is in control of its proper territories/borders, at times also become a source of re/presentation for the state(ism) whereby state(ism) itself poses itself as an ontological necessity (being).

CLASSIFYING REFUGEES AS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED IS A FLAWED CONCEPT. ALLOWING MOVEMENT ALONG BORDERS BREAKS DOWN POWER RELATIONSHIPS.


The movements of refugees and migrants are motivated by a plethora of reasons that surely deserve careful analyses, if the connections between the histories of the presents and pasts are to be fully established and living strategies for tomorrows formulated. In their "beginnings," the movements of the bodies across borders and boundaries might be no more than the quest for a "better" life, however that "better" is defined in the image of the participants. The reality of the experience of moving the body toward a better life could be seen in an escape from a bullet to the brain or in a piece of corn finding its way to the stomach. The whole objective of the move across the hundreds of miles could be just as simple for those who are participating in it as "dropping an honest day's sweat on the fields" for survival. Yet, as suggested in the aphorism of Michel Foucault, once in circulation in larger contexts, movements of individual bodies have far more important implications (than the participants themselves would care to acknowledge) for the historically contingent practices and processes by which peculiar identities (of community, noncommunity, home, exile, and familiar and strange) are constructed, assigned, negotiated, resisted and most importantly, made peculiar to to a particular territory, that is, territoriaized in the image of the statist practices. In a fundamental way, there is an amorphously "metamorphosizing" quality to the movements of immigrant and refugee bodies. Above all, however, these movements are, for those who are part of them, acts of resistance by which the "moving" people are able to shape their own experiences in ways hitherto unprecedented.
STATE ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE REFUGEES INCREASES GOVERNMENTAL POWER.

Yet, from the perspective of moving peoples, and the effects of the mass movements on the statist practices of re/presentation, refugees and immigrants spell out a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, as moving peoples, they transgress political and cultural borders ~ and undermine or reaffirm the strategies of exploitation, subjugation, and domination, as well as of resistance. They problematize familiar and comfortable narratives of life and partake in the activities that construct and negotiate new identities and attenuate and resist others. ¹On the other hand, they participate in legal, economic, cultural, political, and even charitable activities married to the techniques and apparatuses of statist practices. I shall call this situation "the economy of refugeeism and migration." By the term economy, I refer to a situation where the presence of a group of people or peoples becomes both a problem to be addressed and a resource to be Employed in the service of this or that objective. It is at the juncture of being both a problem and a resource simultaneously that refugees and migrants constitute a paradox. Their movements or inertia point to the unsettling of loyalties to familiar identities and localities. Perhaps, unwittingly, they contest seemingly axiomatic atavistic "realities" of life such as a membership in a clan, in a tribe, in a profession, or in a domestic community as constituting a nation. In that way, they unmake the traditional language with which the tales of life are told, thus undermining the territorializing sovereignty practices. Yet their very presence affords opportunities for the participants of territorializing practices and conceptualizations to employ that presence in order to shore up what is problematized by the refugee and migrant movements, namely, for instance, the "naturalness" unnaturalness" of a domestic community of citizens. Herein lies the significance of the refugee or migrant category useful to recuperate all that is fast eroding under pressure from the fluid local and global interactions and interplay of things. Increasingly, refugees and migrants become a series of strategic reference points to which the statist practices refer in order to construct subjectivities and affirm the other members of the England semblance to continuities. Referentiality of the refugees an migrants is achieved through a variety of representational practices by which refugees and migrants become objects of a multitude of narratives of inadequacy. For instance, at times refugees and immigrants are re/presented as figures of lack as opposed to the adequacy and completeness of the figure of citizen. In such re/presentations, refugee or migrant status is marked as a double signifier. They simultaneously signify their own void and the completeness of the citizen vis-a-vis a refugee or a migrant.
State Centric View Masks the Reality of Global War
Michael J. Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, 1997, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)p. 176-177

As I noted in chapter I, Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and unmapping the geostrategic cartography of "international relations," Nietschmann refers to the "Third World War," which is "hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map"-a war in which "only one side of the fighting has a name:" Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armed struggles as part of the "war." In his mapping, only 4 of the struggles involve confrontations between states, while 77 involve states against nations.

The State-Map Mindset Obscures Non-State Conflict
Michael J. Shapiro, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, 1997 Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)p.29

The omission of native peoples from the discourse on war is evident in a recent mapping of contemporary armed struggles. Bernard Nietschmann demonstrates that although in recent years there has been relatively little warfare between sovereign states, there continue to be enormous casualties and forced dislocations in the struggles between states and various indigenous nations (as well as between states and stateless peoples). Identifying 10 "wars" in 1987, Nietschmann found only 4 that involved conflict between two sovereign states, while 100 of the wars were accounted for by struggles in which states were at war with insurgencies and indigenous nations." These struggles have received little attention, for "media and academia are anchored in the state. Their tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate or invisible... They are hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map:
ETNOGRAPHY IS BASED ON NON-RECOGNITION THAT RESULTS IN VIOLENCE.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science cr U of Hawaii, ‘97. (Michael J, Violent Cartographies.)

The Pequot War has virtually no place in the Euro-American telling of the history of warfare or in the story of gradual proprietary control over the North American continent. To give it a place of importance, it is necessary to analyze the forces at work that allowed the Pequots and their practices to be so devalued as to become targets of an attempt at total extermination. Moreover, such an analysis serves as a prelude to what I shall be calling an ethnographically oriented approach to warfare, one that is aimed both at disclosing the interpretations through which warring groups impose meaning and value on each other and at providing a critique of approaches to warfare favored by many contemporary historians and political scientists. The dominant strategically oriented treatment of war, historical or contemporary, provides a rationale for violence. More specifically, a geographic imaginary, a nation-state-oriented geopolitical map, which provides the ground plan for what are known as “security studies,” tends to frame conduct and events within a state-oriented cartography and thereby reproduces the structures of non-recognition operating in the seventeenth century, when Pequots turned out to be easy prey for merchants, militias, and moral consciences.

THE HEGEMONY OF THE NATION-STATE REQUIRES VIOLENCE IN ORDER CREATE AND OPPRESS THE OTHER.
Anssi Paasi, Professor of Geography at the University of Norway at Oulo, 1998 ["The Role of Identities and Boundaries in the Contemporary World," Nordic-Baltic Conference in Regional Science, October, http://www.geo.ut.ee/nbc/paper/paasi.htm

National identity is only one of many, often coexisting and overlapping identities (religious, tribal, linguistic, class, gender, etc.) but it is perhaps the most fundamental in the modern world. Greenfeld and Chirot argue that this identity actually defines the very essence of the individual, which the other identities only slightly modify. States are in a decisive role in the production and reproduction these manifestations of territoriality, particularly through spatial socialization and territorialization of meaning, which occur in many ways through education, politics, administration and governance. This territorialization takes place through physical and symbolic violence, and states everywhere attempt to control, marginalize or destroy various aspects of centrifugal otherness, such as instances of ethnic solidarity or indigenous movements.
Modernism justifies State sponsored violence, oppression, and subordination, while securing its sovereignty and marginalizing the existence of individuals in history.


Fourth, although this modern limit attitude is starkly opposed to justifications of the state grounded in classical epistemology (where the state's sovereignty is the "mirror of God"), it does reserve a necessary historical place for the state as agency of legitimate violence, and it does supply a distinctly modern kind of ground for the state's legitimation. In modern discourse, the sovereign figure of man, defined in terms of a necessary limitation and set in opposition to historically contingent limitations, supplies the constitutive principle of both (a) the modern state, as sovereign subject of rational collective violence and (b) domestic society, as object domain subordinated to the state's sovereign gaze. In-all-its-varieties, modern discourse holds that the sovereignty of the state, including the citizen's duty to obey the law, does not derive from any source external to man. Instead, the state's claim to sovereignty obtains in its establishing as the principles of its law and its violence those historical limitations that reasoning man knows to be the necessary conditions of his free use of reason. It consists, put differently, in subordinating raison d'etat to the reason of man, making the former the guarantee of the possibility conditions of the latter in history. The result is a social "compact" between reasoning man and state-the—former as the source of truth and meaning, the latter as the site and resources’ that modern discourse reserves for the exercise of force and violence wherever: history refuses to bow to man's reason. The state, obeying the force-of; reason, will not be disposed to turn its coercive means against reasoning man; it will deploy its means to tame those "anarchic dangers" of history-that threaten to escape the will of reasoning man and to transgress, the essential limitations that reasoning man must renounce transgressing in order; to secure his reasoning being. Reasoning man, in supporting the state-and obeying its law, will not surrender any part of his freedom; he will obey the limitations that supply the conditions of his autonomous reason In turn, the compact is definitive of domestic society. Domestic society will be recognized as that domain of human interaction in which this compact can be sustained. It is the time and place in which sovereign man willingly submits himself as object of the state's law and violence because he knows that the state promises to obey and defend the conditions of his will to total knowledge in history. It is a time and place set in opposition to a region of anarchy—a region of historical contingency and chance that refuses to submit to the sovereign truth of reason and that calls forth the means of the state to exclude or subdue it in the name or reasoning man.

Most conflicts are the effect of a lack of understanding of geography

Laakso and Olukoshi(Liisa and Adebayo, Lic. Soc.. Se, Helsinki; Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, PHD. Leeds Associate research Professor, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos Nigeria, Challenges to the Nation State in Africa. 1996

The period since the late 1980s has witnessed many incidences of violence and conflict, some with clearly genocidal dimensions, in various parts of Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. With a greater frequency and on an increasing scale than ever before, these occurrences of violence and conflict derive from racial, religious, and ethnic sources and a vast majority of them are intra-, as opposed to inter-state in nature. Also, a growing number of recent inter-state conflicts have roots in cross-border ethnic and religious tensions as state authorities, often bowing to chauvinistic domestic pressure, attempt to "protect" the interests of their citizens who constitute ethnic or religious minorities under other jurisdictions. More than ever before, progressively larger numbers of civilians, as opposed to only professional armies, have become involved in the outbreaks of violence and often for no apparent, or for ill-defined, political reasons. Ethnic and racial cleansing have combined with acute religious extremism, intolerance or pure criminality to suggest a growing social crisis in the international system.
STATES ONLY EXIST TO FIGHT WITH ONE ANOTHER.

Martin van Creveld, Professor of History at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1996 ["The Fate of the State,"

The principal function of the state, as that of all previous forms of government, has always been to fight other states whether defensively in an attempt to defend its interests or offensively to extend them Usually a state that was unable to do this was doomed to disappear. The best it could hope for was to lead a sort of shadowy existence under the protection of some other state, as Lebanon for example does under Syrian tutelage; even that existence was likely to be temporary.
CONSTRUCTING A STATE VIA CARTOGRAPHY JUSTIFIES VIOLENCE.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, '97. (Michael J, Violent Cartoaraphies.)

We (that "we" constructed in the discourse of interstate politics) modern industrial societies are therefore absorbed into a geopolitical map in the way we regard "war." We are assembled as a "we" at the same time that we mark others for purposes of antagonism on the basis of spatial infractions that violate this geopolitical cartography. Nevertheless the structures of global enforcement and the quarantining of "war" within the geopolitical map of recognized states is regarded as contentious in various academic and cultural genres. The continuous reproduction of warring organizations and warriors and the maps of enmity they produce and circulate confront continuous cultural resistances. As a result military establishments and their supporters-for example, strategic analysts within and outside of the academy-must continuously inscribe and adjust national and global history and construct models of the warrior's character to at Lincoln has outlined: discourses of national unity that incorporate frames for constructing what is alien and dangerous. Warfare as much as any other practices of states been accompanied by an active writing impetus for those who wish to sustain the practice and make it the primary mode of national self-recognition.

Geopolitical dichotomies are identity practices that define the conditions of war.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, '97. (Michael J, Violent Cartoaraphies.)

As I showed in my reading of Clausewitz in chapter 2, the outward aiming gaze of strategic thinkers, who seem preoccupied with the logistics of encounter, masks the ontological impulse or inward aim of the constitution of collective coherence, their desire to represent the national body as unified and unambivalent. In marked contrast with strategic analysts, who reproduce official rationales for policy action, is the more ethnographic understanding of war (discussed in previous chapters). Rather than the "objectives" of war, treated as if they were wholly external, or the mobilization of the "people's will" the primary objects of ethnographic analyses are the identity practices that provide the conditions of possibility for war. When it is linked to a critical political concern with the present, an ethnographic sensibility, which rejects the idea that there is a privileged identity narrative, treats as essentially contentious how a given "we" is assembled and how it should understand its past, present, and future." And such a sensibility functions by recognizing that insofar as there is a "national identity" it is an ongoing project rather than a fact; it emerges from an energetic cultural performance, a kind of "dream–work" which simultaneously manifest to a people and place and fears the ambiguities in the founding stories that allow a people to cohere and consistently practice the boundaries of communities.
BORDERS: IMPACTS: GENOCIDE

BORDERS ENABLE GENOCIDE.

Similarly simplistic assumptions are also encountered at other levels of geographical analysis. After the myth of continents and the fable of an enduring East-West division, the most debilitating geographical misconception is probably the myth of the nation-state. The nation-state idea, i.e., the assumption that cultural identities (nations) coincide with politically-sovereign entities (states) to create a series of internally unified and essentially equal units-replicates at a smaller scale many of the errors found in continental thinking. To be sure, countries unlike continents, are real entities, with armies to prove the point. For this reason al...the global framework of sovereign states is essential for analyzing political affairs. But very few countries are nation-states in the strict sense of the term; seldom is an independent political territory coterminous with the territory of a self-consciously unified people. That we elect to call such internally divided as India, Nigeria, or even Switzerland nation-states shows a determined desire to will uniformity out of diversity. In the process, states-like continents-become reified as natural and fundamental building blocks of global geography rather than being recognized as the constructed, contingent, and often imposed political geographical units that they are. The inevitable result is that state boundaries are evoked in innumerable arenas where their usefulness is truly circumscribed. Features of the natural world seldom conform to political terrains, and even patterns of human culture more often than not crosscut country boundaries. In few parts of the world, for example, does a map of language distribution bear much resemblance to the political map, and only in exceptional areas like Japan or Iceland do the two correlate more or less precisely. (Moreover, in the case of Japan, it has required centuries of concerted state effort to make them correspond.) Yet most of our encyclopedias, textbooks, atlases and almanacs portray states as holistic entities unified and distinct. While this may seem an innocuous device or classifying knowledge, it can lead to real mischief when its limitations are ignored. A country like Sudan is simply not a basic unit of the human community, despite its ubiquitous portrayal as such; northern Sudan has far more in common with Egypt than it does with southern Sudan, which has greater affinity with Uganda. To assume that northern and southern Sudan form a "Sudanese nation," as the myth of the nation-state to ads us to do, is to reduce the struggle currently being waged there to the status of a civil war – an internal affair that need not concern the global community to any great extent. In fact, the Sudanese war is a rather clear case of one people (those in the north) brutally attempting to impose its will on another. Clearly, countries do not cohere on all the levels we commonly imagine. At its best it the, , myth of the nation-state obscures internal difference. At its worst it can become a tool of genocide.

ATTEMPTS AT BUILDING A “NATION-STATE” JUSTIFY COMMITTING GENOCIDE ON THE OTHER.
Laakso and Olukoshi(Lisa and Adebayo, Lic. Soc., Sc, Helsinki; Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki PHD. Leeds Associate aresearch Professor, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos Nigeria, Challenges to the Nation State in Africa, 1996.)

At independence, most African governments set themselves the task of undertaking a vigorous process of nation-building with the aim of welding their multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural, and multi-religious countries into "one nation". A central element of this official project of nation-building was the assumption that only the state could constitute it (CTNRLSD, 1995). The nation-building project was, therefore, state-driven from the outset, often relying on a top-down approach that carried far-reaching centralising implications. In time, the unity project increasingly took on the form of a unitary project which sometimes rested on a narrow ethnic base around which a system of patronage networks was then built linking other groups and their elites. Another key element of the nation-building project was the assumption that the diversity of ethnic identities was inherently negative and obstructive and that it was a requirement of successful nation-building that the different identities be eradicated, submerged under or subordinated to the identity of the group(s) that dominated state power.
The division of individuals into sovereign nation-states sacrifices commonality and community at the altar of the "herd," justifying mass killings.

Louis Rene Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue University, 1994 ["SelfDetermination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth," Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 1, Spring]

Yet, the cumulative effect of claims for self-determination is violence and death. Reaffirming individual commitments to life in the "herd," these claims contradict the idea of global oneness and cosmopolis. From identification as Moslem Azerbaiianis or Christian Armenians, as Croats or Serbs, individuals all over the world surrender themselves as persons, being told again and again that meaning derives from belonging. Not surprisingly, these individuals are too often willing to do anything that the group commands -- even the mass killing of other human beings, as long as the victims are "outsiders." What do we really seek in world affairs? If it is authentic peace and an end to war crimes n11 and crimes against humanity, n12 then the expectation of selfdetermination must be balanced against the needs of planetization, of a new world order n13 in which the commonality and community of the entire human species takes precedence over the lethal calls of separatism, ethnic rivalry, and militaristic nationalism. Poised to consider that national liberation can itself be the source of armed conflict and murder, individuals everywhere must learn to affirm their significance outside the herd, as persons rather than as members.

We must escape the control of the nation-state to overcome war and genocide and reach authentic personal relationships.

Louis Rene Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue University, 1994 ["SelfDetermination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth," Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 1, Spring]

The State requires its members to be serviceable instruments, suppressing every glimmer of creativity and imagination in the interest of a plastic mediocrity. Even political liberty within particular States does nothing to encourage opposition to war or to genocide in other States. Since "patriotic self-sacrifice" is demanded even of "free" peoples, the expectations of inter-State competition may include war and the mass killing of other peoples. In the final analysis, war and genocide are made possible by the surrender of Self to the State. Given that the claims of international law n35 are rendered impotent by Realpolitik, this commitment to so-called power politics is itself an expression of control by the herd. Without such control, individuals could discover authentic bases of personal value inside themselves, depriving the State of its capacity to make corpses of others.

The nation-state system creates fences of domination between ethnic groups that justify racism and destabilize peace.

Warren Zimmermann, Senior Fellow at the Rand Corporation, 1999 ["From Here To Bosnia; Why Good Fences Don't Make Good Neighbors," The Washington Post, November 13,

In today's conglomerate world, the nation-state concept is a dangerous principle on which to base civil society. At its worst - and it is often at its worst -- it elevates one ethnic group above another. It claims superiority based on race. It demands for one nation privileges not accorded to others. It cites -- or creates -- history to justify expansion to real or imagined former borders. And it seeks to separate ethnic groups, by force if necessary. Good fences do not make good neighbors. ethnically exclusive societies become an easy prey to prejudice, since their organizing principle is essentially racist. Where ethnic cleansing succeeds and the fences go up, there will be no minorities whose views have to be taken into account. Instead of the balancing of interests that defines democracy, politics will become a competition among extremists to decide who is most faithful to the nationalist ideal. Such an outcome is hardly conducive to regional peace.
BORDERS: ALTERNATIVE: MUST RETHINK

Redrawing borders reproduces the marginalization of people outside state borders we must challenge the state map system to recover narratives and historical depth.
Shapiro, Prof of Political Science @ U of Hawaii, 1997. (Michael J, Violent Cartographies.)

What is involved in reopening the book? The most important step to get out of the perpetual present where for example Huntington took up residence in his analysis of civilizational confrontations as merely current realities and exclusively in power terms, that is, as increasingly salient forms of post-sovereign global partisanship. The "cultural fault-line" imagery with which he builds the contemporary global map is both historically and ethically impoverished. As the geopolitical map was formed out of violent confrontations, state boundaries developed and cultural ones were effaced. As a result, states and many nations within states have residual aspects of cultural alterity within them. Such aspects of difference cannot be re-summoned by redrawing geographical boundaries, for they exist as invisible forms of internal otherness. Every boundary-firming practice will simply produce new modes of marginalized difference. It is therefore necessary, as Homi Bhabha states it, to change "the treatment of `difference' from the boundary `outside' to its finitude `within..."°1 The production of a geography within which marginalized peoples can be recognized and accorded political status and moral solicitude requires both a resistant to state system maps that deny otherness within and narrative recoveries that add temporal depth to the global map.

A rethinking of the state, from a fixed entity to a constructed constellation of jurisdiction, is needed to break with conventional discursive understandings of territoriality.

Because the conventional discourse is grounded in a belief in a sovereign nation-state, a state that is bounded and enclosed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape the national referents on which the current language is based without a new conception of the state. Rethinking jurisdictional tales therefore requires rethinking the state itself. It requires envisioning a state not as natural, bounded, and enclosed, but as constructed, boundless, and open, a constellation of [*1296] authoritative behaviors, or authoritative exercises of jurisdiction over individuals, events, and property. The "state," in this view, is the ever-changing snapshot emerging from these jurisdictional assertions, the very pattern of assertions of jurisdiction, not an entity that ponders whether to assert jurisdiction or not. It has no permanent inside and outside, no identifiable interests. In short, the state does not define the scope of its jurisdiction; rather, it is the jurisdictional decisions themselves that define the state.
BORDERS: ALTERNATIVE: MUST RETHINK

THE SUBJECT CAN CHANGE BUT MUST RETRIEVE THE ESSENCE OF BEING TO DECIFER THE NOTIONS OF SPACE.

While many critics have employed (if not always self-consciously) the language of geography while considering issues of ethnicity and nationality, or layout of built space while considering the social placement of subjects, few outside of psychology (particularly object relations psychology) have fully considered the possibility of taking subjectivity-consciousness the experience of being a subject—as an aspect of the subject capable of being described in terms of space. Many are not taking that aspect of subjectivity into account at all (Pollock shies away from it in the passages reprinted above; we saw Mohanty progressively distance herself from it in the work from her covered in Chapter One). It ought to be possible to coordinate all the 'spaces of the subject' and examine finally how all of the other spaces or example, social, physical, geographical, and semiotic-link up to the constitution of particular subjectivities: the texture of consciousness and how it is lived, what forms of relating are available to it, what its likelihood of seeking power, its capacities for "receptiveness" and change. We bring with us to each relation a provisional shape that tends to shape in turn the relationship; at the same time, all forms of interaction also recursively shape the self. Hence in speaking of subjective structures, I am not in any way relying on notions of inherent or inborn psychological attitudes, but on a notion of the subject as malleable and open to reformation. The "space" of subjectivity-the shape it takes in relation-has to do with modes of interaction; and these sorts of behaviors, though often partially learned from familial interaction, are socially formed through and through. Moreover, we learn and relearn them throughout life; indeed, appropriate modes may change dramatically as we move through different social situations, between contrasting groups, or up or down the scale of cultural privilege.

POSTMODERN THINKING HELPS OPEN SPACE.
David Campbell, International Politics at Keele University, 1996 Challenging, Boundaries: Global Flows

The challenge for a mode of representation adequate to our postmodern time is therefore to articulate an understanding of world politics attuned to the need to move beyond the sovereignty problematic with its focus on geopolitical segmentarity: settled subjects, and economistic power, that appreciates the significance of flows, networks, webs, and the identity formations located therein but does not resort simply to the addition of another level of analysis or of more agents to the picture. Some attempts in this direction are being made outside of international relations in a burgeoning literature on globalization. What I want to suggest is that thinking in terms of a political prosaics that understands the transversal nature of politics and the an-archical condition of postmodern life is one way of approaching the issue. Such an effort, however, should not be thought of in terms of constructing a theory, much less a new theory of international relations. Rather, it is part of an aspiration to encourage genealogically inclined critique of the sort Foucault indicated in his thoughts on Kant and the Enlightenment: The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.
ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS IN THE REALMS OF POLITICS MUST COME FIRST.
David Campbell, International Politics at Keele University, 1996 Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows

Wendt wants to maintain that "philosophies of science are not theories of international relations" (hence we should avoid spending too much time on "questions of ontology")," but there seems little escape from the fact that consciously or not international relations theorists are philosophers of knowledge. After all, as Wendt acknowledges, "All theories of international relations are based on social theories of the relationship between agency, process, and social structure." The real question is whether we want to take the constitution and nature of agency seriously—which would by definition require considerable attention to the question of ontology—or whether we are happy in the final instance to merely posit the importance of certain agents. To do the latter involves gliding over a point well made by Judith Butler: Agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction ... In a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative.
BORDERS: AT: PERMUTATIONS

THE PERMUTATION IS ONLY AN ATTEMPT TO REDEFINE BORDERS FROM AFAR.
Kennan Ferguson 1996 graduate student in political science at the University of Hawaii,

Deleuze and Guattari argue that any process of deterritorialization entails a concomitant reterritorialization. "If it is true that the function of the modern State is the regulation of the decoded deterritorialization flows, one of the principal aspects of the function reterritorializing, so as to prevent the decoded flows from breaking loose at all the edges of the social axiomatic." As certain sense making machines become obsolete, new ones are constructed. They argue that this is a paramount function of the state in the modern world: as flows break free from territory, they must be remapped. Governments, in encoding and enforcing borders, are literally encoding and enforcing spatiality. The fragmentation of the map of the contemporary world does not mean that cartography itself stops; instead it means that the state must reconstruct its nation and its people with new meaning. It is the process of reterritorializing the world.

WE MUST RADICALLY DISTANCE OURSELVES FROM BORDERS.

Such skepticism is merited for two reasons. First, our guiding vision of the basic special patterning of human societies is clearly flawed, with problematic consequences for study after study, in every field of human inquiry. Second, beyond considerations of sheer accuracy in spatial representation, metageographies also constitute ideological structures. It is no coincidence that the sea of changes in ideology are generally accompanied by a questioning of metageographical categories—or that those attempting consciously to formulate new visions of the globe often do so as part of ideological power, however, hoary geographical ideas about the earth’s division have proved remarkably tenacious, even among those who are trying to shake them off. Moreover, while it may be increasingly recognized that particular concepts are inadequate, the problem has only been addressed in a ad hoc and piecemeal fashion; metageography as a system has yet to emerge as a topic of sustained intellectual discussion and debate. In the absence of a systemic and forceful effort to expose their inadequacies and to replace them with something better, the old geographical concepts continue to hold our imagination in thrall.
ANY ATTEMPT TO COMBINE BORDERS WITH RETHINKING IS SUPERFICIAL.
Jim George, relations dept of pol sci: Australian National University, 1994, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations.

Consequently, the (generally) unspoken message from the (broad) mainstream to nary critical works like theoretical/philosophical" efforts are of some value to intellectual contribution they generally make to scholarship do not need another philosophical "preface" for International Relations, because the great questions have all been asked and the great philosophical conundrums all posed, and they have all been absorbed understood and integrated by the International Relations community, particularly by those approaches. My response to this perspective is that it represents another major illusion within an International Relations community that, if absorbed, understood, or integrated these philosophical issues at all it has done so only in the most shallow and superficial of terms. The suggestion, more precisely is that the questions and issues of ontology and epistemology—of the way we think and act in the world and understand reality-have either been ignored in International Relations or rendered marginal and barely relevant by a disciplinary orthodoxy that has interpreted the Western historical and philosophical story in a narrow, exclusionary, and inadequate manner. The result: the "backward discipline" noted by Mervyn Frost in the mid-1980s and characterized by the kind of limitation and closure at the core of the analytical and policy paralysis discussed earlier in this chapter. Much of the discussion in this book will concentrate, therefore, on this disciplinary literature—not just as a site of "theory" per se but as the major site at which the reality of global political practice has been (theoretically) framed in the "backward" terms alluded to earlier. Some brief comments on the nature of this backwardness might indicate more fully why such a focus is of significance in this context.
1. **PERMUTATION: DO THE PLAN PLUS THE ALTERNATIVE. THE CRITICISM BY ITSELF WILL FAIL. ONLY BY ENDORSING THE PERMUTATION CAN THERE BE A HOPE OF SOLVENCY.**

   Neil Smith, Center for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture @ Rutgers Political Geography Vol. 19. 2000

   The supposed passivity of Cartesian perspectivalism is again in danger of being replicated as it is displaced. Critical geopolitics risks being intellectually unsatisfying in a formal, theoretical sense, and at the same time risks becoming a politically detached textualism. The point here is not that the critique of ideology is unimportant; it is absolutely vital, a never-ending process, but it is also insufficient on its own.

2. **THE K COLLAPSES IN ON ITSELF. TO DISCUSS GEOPOLITICS IS TO ENGAGE IN IT, REMOVING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CRITIQUE.**

   Joanne Sharp, Department of Geography University of Glasgow, Political Geography, Vol. 19, 2000

   First, it assumes that the intellectuals of statecraft are somehow beyond or outside of hegemonic national culture, or that their pronouncements are somehow unaffected by the circulation of ideas and beliefs therein. But, in order to make their arguments sensible, they must refer to concepts and values that have consonance for the population at large, if there support is to be assured.

   **SHARP CONTINUES**

   Simply to describe a foreign policy is to engage in geopolitics and so normalize particular world views. If this is the case, the surely the media—both high and low culture alike—are intimately bound up with geo-graphing the world, as are a range of activities normally described as occurring outside the sphere of international politics. By forcing apart the “geo-politics” of the everyday and the “geopolitics” of statecraft, O’Tuathail too readily accepts a neo-realist view of state actors as the primary agents in world politics, rather than accepting the fluid and ontested nature of hegemonic values and norms.
3. NO INTERNAL LINK: THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11th SHATTERED THE NOTION THAT GEOGRAPHY PROTECTS POWER.

Neil Smith, Center for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture @ Rutgers, Sept 15, 2001, "A commentary on events in New York" The People's Geography Clearinghouse: Geopolitics, Nationalism, Terrorism Commentaries]

As I walked back north I tried to think how this could have happened. How are we to explain this? What could anyone have been thinking to cause such mayhem, misery and loss of life? The news media treated the destruction of the trade towers and the plane crash at the Pentagon as highly local events and simultaneously national affronts - an attack on America, CNN labelled it after an hour of coverage - but what connected these different scales of response. Why were attacks on two cities construed as a national attack? Of course the symbolic choice of targets by the hijackers was neither random nor the act of madmen; they were prime symbols of worldwide US economic domination and military power. Before it was manufactured as a national event, therefore, these attacks were simultaneously local and global events. Still the xenophobic and nationalist hysteria was in many ways understandable. Somehow, through nearly a century in which the US rose to global hegemony, the actual territory of this nation never witnessed any of the brutal death -- 20 million in World War I, more than 30 million in World War II, and many tens of millions in other wars on four continents. No other country has been so immune to the terror that made the twentieth century the most violent in history. Nowhere else does a populace have the luxury of deluding themselves that geography is salvation, that geography protects power. That fantasy is punctured for ever. A certain kind of global parochialism, peculiar to a country that prides itself on its cosmopolitanism, has been exposed, and the result is not pretty.

4. TURN: SEPARATING FORMAL AND EVERYDAY GEOPOLITICS SILENCES VOICES.

Joanne Sharp, Department of Geography University of Glasgow, Political Geography, Vol. 19, 2000

The division of life into political-effectual and non-political-non-effectual spheres in Critical Geopolitics has a more damaging effect. It silences a whole range of people and groups from the operations of international politics. This division of international and domestic politics reinforces the public-domestic spheres division characteristic of patriarchal, capitalist society were women are effectively contained within the immanent space of home and kept from the transcendence of the public.
5. **THE CRITIQUE CONTRADICTS ITSELF.**

**THE CRITIQUE CONTRADICTS ITSELF MAKING IT INCOHERENT.**


Through the remaining pages I seek to show how some of the book's best insights fall prey to the paradigmatic poststructuralist way to their own critique. Primarily I am referring here to ó Tuathail's skillful reworkings of Derridean and Foucauldian arguments, and it is to these two critical strands that the two following sections turn respectively. In addition, though, I am purposefully using the visual metaphorization of knowledge production explicit in "insights" here because it underlines a potentially paralyzing contradiction in *Critical Geopolitics*. The contradiction lies between ó Tuathail’s all-encompassing critique of the masculinist ocularcentrism running through geopolitics and his own reactivation of visual metaphors running through the critique. Considered from the perspective of disciplinary logistics, ó Tuathail is hereby hoist on his own petard. But re-examined from the perspective of Haraway's arguments about the "persistence of vision" (1991, page 188), this continuing dependency on vision can in fact be read as a sign of the need to re-vision vision as an enabling power/knowledge medium that critics cannot not have. In this way it can become understood as an embodied medium of knowledge production which precisely because of its critical but partial perspective calls out for a new kind of self-situating responsibility. This is the point to which I return at the close through a consideration of ó Tuathail's "anti-geopolitical eye" (CG, page 221). Most immediately, however, I turn to the question of deconstruction and the arguments in *Critical Geopolitics* that in many ways anticipate my own comments about vision and self-reflexivity.

6. **THE CRITIQUE IS INCOMPLETE. THERE ISN’T ENOUGH TO CREATE TRUE RESISTANCE.**


Unlike other interpreters of Foucault in geography who have tended to either imitate his style, emulate his historicising methods, or replicate his studies by researching the micro-power geographies of asylums, prisons and the like, ó Tuathail instead brings Foucauldian arguments about studying power/knowledge into the field of geopolitics: a field which, to be sure, provided Foucault with a host of metaphors, but which never exercised him as a terrain for archival research. Interestingly, as Neil Smith elaborates further in his commentary (pages ***-*** this volume), *Critical Geopolitics* does not take up the historicizing question of why precisely geopolitical metaphors may have resonated with a post-colonial, Cold War child turned avant garde critic like Foucault. Instead, ó Tuathail adapts Foucault's critical skepticism about regimes of truth to the study of how geopolitical truths have scripted struggles over global space. This approach achieves its most compelling results in what is probably the best chapter of the book, the analysis of the scripting of Bosnia in the U.S. between 1991 and 1994. Entitled, "Between a Holocaust and Quagmire," the chapter charts the vacillations in US policy-making vis-à-vis the so-called "Bosnian Crisis," linking them in turn to at least two clearly distinguishable geopolitical scripts. In the first, 'Quagmire' script, ó Tuathail argues that Bosnia is culturally constructed as another Vietnam for the US, a hell-hole of madness and confusion into which the masculinist might of the US military can only get 'bogged down'. In the second, 'Holocaust' script, by comparison, the mass execution, internment and raping of Bosnian Moslems, is constructed as comprising another European genocide, a painful parallel to the historical Holocaust demanding a parallel act of heroic US intervention in European affairs. Irrespective of whether or not the Holocaust really was an explanation of the US decision to enter World War II, ó Tuathail shows it is the power/knowledge constructions of these Holocaust and Quagmire scripts themselves that became so important in the crafting of state department and presidential policy-making.
Instructive as this Foucauldian analysis of discursive scripting is, however, it, like the rest of the book, suffers from a
dearth of commentary on the prospects for resistance. This is a shame because it is of course the analysis of resistance
which so many, particularly feminist, commentators argue has been opened up by Foucault's non-juridical approach to
power. Throughout the book there are too few examples like that of the Irish of Tirconnell who rebel so dramatically
against geo-power at the start. While, Ó Tuathail does a great job of unpacking the vertigo visions of Luttwak's
'geoecconomics', for example, he could have usefully complemented this with an analysis of how feminist, immigrant and
labor groups in the US and peasant movements like the Zapatistas in the poorer parts of the world are themselves moving
to re-script the interdependencies of the contemporary global economy. Yet such alternative and more minoritarian
scriptings are largely absent from the book.

7. THE MAP IS MEANINGLESS. USING IT TO DISCOVER POWER RELATIONS LEAVES NO
ANSWERS.

John Harley, the academic famous for being the first to apply post-structuralist theories of power relations to cartography,
would have found this product very disturbing. Disturbing not because this is an example his favorite theme: the
instrumental use of maps to reinforce authoritarian hegemony of space, but because it reveals the misconception that
underlies his critique. In 'Maps, Power and Knowledge', he draws on the work of Foucault and Derrida, citing their work
as his primary inspiration for this tirade against the 'exercise of power through cartographic discourse'. [1] However, as
Barbara Belyea has pointed out, Harley didn't really get the substance of the argument [2] that: 'il n'ya pas de texte d'en
dessous' [there's nothing underneath the text]; [3] The map in itself, doesn't actually mean anything, or have any stable and
objective relation to 'reality'. The vectors of power that Harley observed in cartographic discourse are so bound up with it
that they are 'an impersonal, indistinguishable, unsubtractable aspect of that discourse.' [4]

8. THE CRITIQUE JUST REMOVES ONE EXTENSION OF POWER AND REPLACES IT WITH
ANOTHER.
Neil Smith, Center for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture at Rutgers, Political Geography,
2000.

But this is hardly different from precisely the intertextuality that he finds his geopolitical subjects intruding
into their texts and which it is his very purpose to reveal and deconstruct. Whether a read or visualized
intertextuality is less the point than who gets to do the reading and viewing, who gets to fill in the substance. In
this sense, critical geopolitics embraces its own panopticism a Cartesian perspectivalism displaced toward text
rather than landscape or globe.
BORDERS ANSWERS: PERMUTATION EXTENSIONS

MERGING PRAGMATIC AND FORMAL GEOPOLITICS TOGETHER IS THE BEST SOLUTION.
Wolfgang Natter Dent. of Germanic Languages and Literatures @ U. Kentucky Political Geography Vol. 19, 2000

My reading of Critical Geopolitics suggests that its author recognizes negativity at the conceptual level as the well-spring of purifying critique. Additionally, even in the absence of the apocalyptic break O'Tuathail's critique at times seems require the following points concern strategies 'in the n meantime practices s of critical geopolitics. Such future work might benefit from a more thorough theorization of the many mediations in play: between practical and formal geopolitics and lived spatial practices between statecraft intellectuals and the pragmatic reasoning of engaged statespersons; and, between representational space, representations of space and space as lived. Such work might offer a model of how ediations between formal and practical geopolitics between geopolitics and geo-politics are experienced and lived outside the domain or expert knowledge with what implications for the discipline of geopolitics.

IT’S ONLY POSSIBLE TO CONFRONT REALISM BY ENGAGING IN IT.
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Prof. Central European University, Realism In International Relations and IPE.

Realism is part of the collective memory and self-definition of international actors, academics or politicians alike, which order thought, suggest analogies and empower attitudes to political action. Hence, it is necessary to engage with realism, although this is emphatically not all what needs to be done in International Relations, theory and practice. One cannot study world politics without understanding the main frame of thought within which it has been consciously conducted.

ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUST STEP OUTSIDE OF REALISM. WE MUST ENGAGE IN IT SO WE CAN CRITIQUE OURSELVES.
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Prof. Central European University, Realism In International Relations and IPE.

This does not mean that the critical thought developed in all these chapters can be forgotten. Indeed, the idea was to open realism up to discussion and to invite the practitioners to more self-criticism, so as to avoid the many possible self-fulfilling prophecies of realism. This chapter has argued that there is no way back to empiricist realism. Similarly, there is little justified hope in realism as causal explanatory theory. Its continuing existence points to the thesis which framed this book, that we have to understand realism as a historical practice, academic and political rather than only as a theory. Realism does not passively reflect the world; it does something for it. This line of thought has been proposed mainly by historical sociologist and materialists, as well as constructivist and poststructuralist theories. Realism as a practice has becomes a privileged object of study, not only for this book (George 1994). This section analyses some of the internal critiques, that is those which take realist concerns very seriously. Since we cannot just step out of our tradition, the critical emphasis comes from making realism visible as a practice, and from turning it against the many irresponsible claims committed in its name.
DISPOSING OF ALL REALISM MAKES ZERO SENSE AND IS IMPOSSIBLE.
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Prof. Central European University, Realism In International Relations and IPE.

On the other hand, to dispose of all realism because some of its versions have been proven empirically wrong, ahistorical, or logically incoherent, does not necessarily touch its role in shared understandings of observers and practitioners of international affairs. Realist theories have a persisting power for constructing our understand of the present. Their assumptions, both as theoretical constructs, and as particular lessons of the past translated from one generation of decision-makers to another, help mobilizing certain understandings and dispositions to action.

REALISM IS A POWERFUL TOOL FOR ENFRAMING ACTION. ONLY BY EMBRACING IT CAN WE GET A TRUE UNDERSTANDING OF POWER.
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Prof. Central European University, Realism In International Relations and IPE.

Despite realism’s several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action. It exists in the minds, and is hence reflected in the actions, of many practitioners. Whether or not the world realism depicts is out there, realism is. Realism is not a causal theory that explains International Relations, but as long as realism continues to be a powerful mind-set, we need to understand realism to make sense of International Relations. In other words, realism is a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics. Getting rid of realism without having a deep understanding of it, not only risks unwarranted dismissal of some valuable theoretical insights that I have tried to gather in this book; it would also be futile. Indeed, it might be the best way to tacitly and uncritically reproduce it.
REALISM WON’T JUST GO AWAY, IT IS HERE TO STAY.
Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Prof. Central European University, Realism In International Relations and IPE.

When all has been said and one, what is left of realism? For all those who believe in general causal theories, the straightforward answers is not much. Certainly there is not enough to keep it going (except as welcome strawman or null-hypothesis for this article industry). Yet despite all, realism is still around. Indeed, we cannot just get rid of realism by proclaiming it dead.

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS DOESN’T PROVIDE A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE.
John Garofano, Contemporary Southeast Asia August 1, 2000 No. 2, Vol. 22; Pg. 413

One wonders whether that is always, and in all ways, a bad thing. In the final analysis, the authors do not collectively or individually come to terms with the problems of different identities sharing space, nor do they even share their opinions on the practical implications of their analyses. Critical geopolitics, then, questions the relationship between geographies and identities, but offers neither answers nor paths to the future -- nor, even, debatable opinions on the desirable conceptions of that future. Perhaps this application of post-modern theory to international relations has served the purpose of showing that sovereignty and identity are constructed. But this would hardly enlighten most world leaders or foreign policy practitioners -- or even traditional analysts. What is built, must be dealt with.
While critical geopolitics is useful for a feminist geopolitical analysis, its deconstructive impulses are insufficient to generate change for building alternative futures. With a few exceptions (Dalby 1994; Sparke 1996), the scholarship on critical geopolitics ignores the gendered landscape of dominant geopolitical debates. Critical geopolitics decentres the nation-state and exposes the investments that our dominant geopolitical narratives embody, but it does not put Humpty Dumpty back together again, so to speak. Nor does it question why Humpty is always falling off the wall. We are left with well-interrogated but tacitly masculinist categories, and no clear way forward in practice.

THE CRITIQUE REINFORCES ELITISM AND HEIRARCHIES.
Joanne Sharp, Department of Geography University of Glasgow, Political Geography, Vol. 19, 2000

Related to this point is the elitism of O’Tuathail’s narrative. He maintains a clear distinction between high and low culture, apparently agreeing with the “intellectuals of statecraft” who he quotes that the High Politics of Statecraft and International relations are beyond the ken of ordinary people, and beyond the effects of the politics of everyday life.

O’TUATHAIL REDUCES EVERYDAY PEOPLE INTO LESSER BEING. AREN’T THEY THE ONE’S THE NEGATIVE IS TRYING TO GET TO MOBILIZE?
Joanne Sharp, Department of Geography University of Glasgow, Political Geography, Vol. 19, 2000

I do not want to resent a romanticized view of popular culture springing from the consciousness of the population, especially given the case being described, but O’Tuathail reduces ordinary people to culture industry drones, empty of agency and awaiting their regular injection of ideas. To him, as with the statesmen and geopoliticians he discusses, geopolitics is something that apparently on the elite do.

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS JUST RE-MAPS FROM A WHITE MALE PERSPECTIVE CAUSING OPPRESSION.
Joanne Sharp, Department of Geography University of Glasgow, Political Geography, Vol. 19, 2000

I want to suggest that the effects of O’Tuathail’s account are the reproduce the geopolitics as a masculinist practice. O’Tuathail’s intellectual history of geopolitical practitioners and critical geopoliticians is a history of Big Men (in order): Mackinder, Ratzel, Mahan, Kjellen, Hausehoff, Spykman, Bowman, Lacoste, Ashley and Dalby. A few women are allowed into the footnotes, but the central narrative is on of the exploits and thoughts of men. The history of struggles for space and representation reduced to a male genealogy, not just when discussing the masculinist history of geopolitical strategies of elite practitioners, but also the interventions of “critical geopoliticians”. Rather than challenging the masculinist tradition of geopolitics, the effect of Critical Geopolitics is to perpetuate it.
O’TUATHAIL’S USE OF WORD PLAY SUCH AS THE HYPHEN IN GEO-POLITICS PROVES THAT THE CRITIQUE IS NOTHING MORE THAN A GENERALIZED INFLATION.

The hyphenation tactic ó Tuathail employs with "geo-politics" can of course sometimes be degraded into a word-play politics where it is made to seem that the really radical, word-changing-turned-world-changing thing is the hyphen itself. By contrast, the hyphenation of geo-politics generally serves in Critical Geopolitics as more of a running reminder of the disciplinary exclusions through which geopolitical truths have been fashioned. As such it prompts both a re-evaluation of disciplinary politics and of the wider political-geographical events and processes previously left out of the visualized pictures of Mackinder et al. However, with this said, there are at least two ways in which ó Tuathail's own very arguments about "geo-politics" come to eclipse the complexity he argues is covered over by the palimpsest of official geopolitical truth. Firstly and with effectively exclusive disciplinary dispatch, the sweeping uses of the word "geopolitics" to describe the spatiality of modernity in general are dubbed "generalized inflations" (CG, page 16). ó Tuathail argues that the "difficulty with such generalized inflations ... is that they can efface the historical and geographical particularity of geopolitics as a way of envisioning and writing space-as-global from the turn of the century." Nevertheless, it seems to me that this very privileging of his own geo-historicized conception of the geopolitical efficacies in its own turn some of the diversity of usages supposedly disclosed by his hyphenation of geo-politics. This may appear a frustratingly disengaged and academicist point, but as such it evokes in turn the second, more systematic problem haunting ó Tuathail's theoretical sophistication. In this regard, Critical Geopolitics may quite literally be read as falling prey to its own critique because, when reading ó Tuathail's critique of Ashley's critical international relations (IR) work, I felt the words could be equally applied to a tendency in their author's own approach to debunking the classics of geopolitics.

O’TUATHAIL’S LACK OF SELF REFLECTION AND FAILURE TO PIN POINT HIS PLACE IN CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS MAKES HIS CRITICIS FAIL.

Instead of using examples of writings by feminist critics (including reporters like O’Kane), ó Tuathail tends instead to rely in the book on instant formulae like 'white male elitism' for his critique of the masculinism running through official geopolitics. One of the problems of this 'white-male-ism' is that, without further detailed commentary, it tends to efface or, at the very least, run-together the painful paradoxes of sexual, racial and class power-relations while allowing white male critics themselves to actually avoid addressing their possible complicities with the structure of power that the formulae function to exteriorize. Indeed, as ó Tuathail (1995) himself underlined in a criticism of an essay of mine, such formulae always need to be historically and geographically contextualized rather than essentialized as abstract transcendental givens. However, when it comes to his own work this call to constantly contextualize one's critical arguments fades away into a series of distant echoes and we are left knowing very little about the 'somewhere' of ó Tuathail's own critique. At the end of the book we know about the critical theorists he prefers, but little about how he positions himself vis-à-vis other theorists, especially feminist critics like Cynthia Enloe, who remain undiscussed. Equally, we are left educated about the scriptings of the geopolitical masters, but ignorant - save for his passionate discussion of the American non-intervention in Bosnia - about ó Tuathail's own, no-doubt counter-hegemonic, scriptings of global politics. I am not at all suggesting that Critical Geopolitics needed page after page of self-discovery type agonizing over the author's critical position. Such commentary can indeed become itself yet another form of irresponsible disengagement. But I am advancing a certain ethic of critical responsibility, a responsibility to engage explicitly with what might be called the 'other in the self'. For example, ó Tuathail could have usefully discussed the theoretical and political background to his uncompromisingly critical comments about the few Marxist scriptings of geopolitics addressed in the book. One can sense in his comments on Karl Wittfogel (CG, pages 144-151) and his disparagement of the "dogma of old Marxists theoretical debates" (CG, page 161) in Antipode a certain impatience with more religious leftists who do not deal with the terrible violence done around the world in the name of Marx and socialism. However, this is never made explicit, and as a paradoxical result, ó Tuathail's own debts and commitments to Marxist scholarship in geography are not made clear.